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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

Federal Statutes and Government
Regulation
ANTITRUST -

CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL -

TION OF SECTION

1

No

PER SE VIOLA-

OF SHERMAN ACT WHERE MANUFACTURER

BEHEST OF PLAINTIFFS'

COMPETITORS WITHDREW

AT

SPECIAL TERMS

OF CONTRACT OFFERED ONLY TO PLAINTIFFS.

De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co. (1975)
Plaintiffs, previous owners of a Ford Motor Company (Ford) franchise that had been destroyed by fire, brought an action' in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against
Ford and certain Philadelphia area Ford dealers (dealers) for violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that Ford had entered
into an oral contract with them under which it had agreed to accept deferred rental payments and give them other benefits not normally available to Ford dealers, in order to reestablish plaintiffs' dealership in a new
location, but later had withdrawn terms3 upon the protests of other Phila1. De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 378 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Plaintiffs also brought suit for violation of section 2 of the Automobile Dealer's Day
in Court Act (Dealer's Act), which provides in pertinent part:
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer
engaged in commerce . . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained . . .
by reason of the failure of said automobile manufacturer from an after [the
passage of this Act] to act in good faith in performiig or complying with any of
the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not
renewing the franchise ....
15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1970). Plaintiffs alleged that Ford violated the Dealer's Act by
threatening to terminate, and by terminating, plaintiffs' original dealership because
plaintiffs refused to sign a waiver of any legal claims arising out of the aborted second
dealership transactions. 378 F. Supp. at 460. The jury found that Ford had violated
the Dealer's Act, but also found that plaintiffs had not suffered any consequential
damages. Id. at 461. The court of appeals refused plaintiffs a new trial to determine
damages because the jury's determination was consistent with the evidence. De Filippo
v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1324 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 216 (1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ....
Id.
3. In addition to suing under the Dealer's Act (see note 1 supra), plaintiffs
brought an action against Ford for breach of contract. The jury found the writing
signed by plaintiffs to be a contract, and further found that Ford had breached the
contract. 378 F. Supp. at 461. However, the district court held that since the defendants had not signed the writing, the contract claim was barred by Pennsylvania's
Statute of Frauds, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-201(1) (1970). 378 F. Supp. at 473.
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the Statute of Frauds was inapplicable because the
subject matter of the sale was the dealership, and therefore, was not a "good" as
defined by the Pennsylvania statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105(1) (1970).
The court of appeals held that since the essential assets which were transferred
qualified as "goods" under the "movable" test, id., Comment 1, it was appropriate
to consider the contract as one for the sale of goods. 516 F.2d at 1323.
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delphia area Ford dealers and the belief by Ford's counsel that the original
4
contract would contravene the Robinson-Patman Act.
The jury found, in answer to special interrogatories submitted by the
district court, that the conduct of Ford and the dealers constituted a conspiracy,5 creating an unreasonable restraint of trade. 6 The jury also found
that the purpose of the agreement was not to exclude plaintiffs from becoming Ford dealers upon any terms;7 notwithstanding this finding,
however, the district court found upon its own inquiry an illicit purpose
in Ford's activities. 8 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed, 9 holding that the district court erred in finding
that there was a contemporaneous withdrawal of special terms from the
plaintiffs and an offering of the same or similar terms to the defendantdealers. 10 Although it could have ended its inquiry at this point inasmuch as the controversy had been tried on a per se theory, the court
further observed that defendants' a~tions had only deprived plaintiffs of
the opportunity to enter the market upon special terms, but did not prevent
them from becoming a dealer or obtaining products upon the same terms
as other dealers. The court concluded, therefore, that the withdrawal of
special terms of a contract, in and of itself, could not constitute a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 1' De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co.,
516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 216 (1975).
4. 516 F.2d at 1315. The Robinson-Patman Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for a person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale . . . by
contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with . . .
the sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1970).
The defendants might have been able to assert as a defense against the antitrust claim that concerted activity was taken for the purpose of preventing illegal
conduct. However, the burden would have been upon the defendants to show the
illegality of the deterred conduct. Cf. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 588 (1925) ; Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955) ; Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations
of the Sherman Act, 10 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 387, 397 (1942). But see Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
5. 378 F. Supp. at 461.
6. Id. Since the trial was conducted strictly upon the per se theory, the plaintiffs
did not offer any evidence regarding the extent of the unreasonableness of the restraint
of trade. Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the
interrogatory concerning the unreasonableness of the restraint was improvidently
submitted to the jury. 516 F.2d at 1319.
7. 378 F. Supp. at 461.
8. Id. at 464-65. The Third Circuit expressed doubt as to the propriety of the
"trial court's assumption of a fact-finding role entrusted in the case at hand to a jury."
516 F.2d at 1320.
9. The instant case was decided by Judges Aldisert, Gibbons, and Garth. Judge
Aldisert wrote the opinion.
10. 516 F.2d at 1320.
11. Id. at 1320-21. Since the court could have terminated its inquiry after determining that the defendants' activity was not per se unreasonable, it is not clear whether
this further observation is dictum or holding.
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The underlying assumption which pervades not only section 1 but
the entirety of the Sherman Act is that economically competing forces will
foster the best allocation of resources, the lowest prices, the greatest
quality, and the promotion of industrial and commercial progress. 12 To
this end, Congress, in section 1, prohibited "every contract, combination...
or conspiracy in restraint of trade.' 1 3 Although the prohibition is literally
all-inclusive, the United States Supreme Court has consistently construed
it merely to preclude those contracts or combinations which unreasonably
restrain competition.' 4 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also concluded that certain types of concerted activity or practices are without
any possible value, and therefore, the Court has conclusively presumed
these activities to be unreasonable restraints upon commerce. 15 Group
boycotts are among those practices condemned by the Supreme Court as
per se violations of section 1.16 As with other per se offenses, once the
12. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). In Trenton
Potteries,the United States Supreme Court observed:
Whether a type of restraint is reasonable or not must be judged in part at least
in the light of its effect on competition, for whatever difference of opinion there
may be among economists as to the social and economic desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and
the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public
interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the
maintenance of competition.
Id. See generally REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMISSION TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1, 5-11, 315"42 (1955).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
14. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). To show that a certain activity constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce the plaintiff must demonstrate the actual impact
that the concerted activity has had upon the relevant market. United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967). The district court in De Filippo stated:
[P]roof of an unreasonable restraint requires extensive statistical evidence as
to the kinds of goods or services with which the product subject to the restraint
effectively competes, the geographic market in which it effectively competes, the
percentage of the market affected by the alleged restraint, the size and strength
of the competition, the existence or non-existence of barriers to entry and effect
of the practice thereon, the purpose behind the alleged restraint, and the effect of
the restraint of price or availability of products.
378 F. Supp. at 461-62.
15. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Northern
Pacific Court stated:
tt]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Id.
16. E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (agreement among manufacturers and retailers prohibiting certain retailers from selling
cars at a special rate to "discounters" who competed with other retailers by selling
to the public); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (agreement among manufacturers not to sell to retailers who follow a policy
of selling products copied by other manufacturers from designs put out by parties to
the agreement) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
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agreement is found, the inquiry becomes whether the defendant's activities
lie within the definition of the particular per se category. In Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 17 the Supreme Court found
significance in the defendant-manufacturers' clear purpose to intentionally
destroy a particular type of competitive manufacturing and selling scheme. 18
The De Filippo court recognized that Fashion Originators' required a
finding of an anti-competitive purpose, and summarized the law with respect to group boycotts, stating:
Concerted activity constitutes a "group boycott" and is considered
per se "in restraint of trade" when "there [is] a purpose either to
exclude a person or group from the market, or to accomplish some
other anti-competitive objective, or both."' 9
In the instant case, the Third Circuit's ruling that the deprivation of
special terms could not constitute a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act 20 presents analytical problems. Courts have pointed to two potential
anti-competitive evils which may result from a concerted refusal to deal:
2
1) a lessening of horizontal competition among those refusing to deal '
and 2) exclusion of the plaintiff or a third party from the market. 22 The
Third Circuit's view in De Filippo that an anti-competitive intent cannot
be inferred from the withdrawal of terms that were generally not available
(1914) (agreement among retailers not to buy from wholesalers who were also
selling directly to the public).
Among the business practices which courts have deemed per se unlawful are
group boycotts, division of markets and price fixing. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (division of markets); United States v.
(price fixing). See generally von
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 569 (1964).
17. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
18. Id. at 461, 467.
19. 516 F.2d at 1318, quoting Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
20. 516 F.2d at 1320-21.
21. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951) (agreement among manufacturers not to sell to wholesalers unless they
agreed to a maximum resale price) ; Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,
282 U.S. 30 (1930) (agreement among film distributors not to deal with exhibitors
except according to terms of a standardized contract).
22. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (agreement between
powerful retailer and several powerful manufacturers not to sell to a particular
retailer) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966)
(agreement between new car dealers and manufacturers to deprive used car dealer
of access to slightly used cars).
However, these cases must be distinguished from cases in which the plaintiff
is effectively excluded from the market by a refusal to deal but where the primary
purpose of each refusal is a legitimate business consideration rather than an intent
to exclude. See E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm.,
467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Cartrade, Inc. v.
Ford Dealers Advert. Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997
(1972); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
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to others was appropriate in light of certain policy considerations. First,
there could be no danger that by withdrawing the terms offered to the
plaintiffs Ford thereby lessened horizontal competition, since it had not
agreed with any of its competitors to do so. Secondly, since there was
an opportunity for the plaintiffs to enter the market on terms equal to
its competitors, there was no danger that the defendants intended to
23
exclude plaintiffs from the market.
While the observation that anti-competitive effect cannot be inferred
from the withdrawal of special terms is appropriate in regard to the facts
of the instant case, it would be ill-advised to extend the Third Circuit's
language to a horizontal agreement to withdraw special terms. Once it is
demonstrated that the purpose of such a concerted activity is to reduce or
eliminate horizontal competition, it should be irrelevant that the means
24
chosen to effectuate that purpose was a withdrawal of special terms.
Specifically, if manufacturers agree among themselves to withdraw a
special term from a customer, competition among the manufacturers is
ipso facto restrained. This underscores the distinction between the situation presented in De Filippo and the same agreement executed among
competitors. In the instant case, the only evil which might have arisen
was exclusion, whereas both exclusion and restriction of horizontal competition are present when two or more manufacturers are involved. Despite
the broad language employed by Judge Aldisert in De Filippo25 these
differences should be taken into account by courts which are faced with
interpreting the De Filippo decision.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the courts should apply De Filippo
only to situations where the withdrawal of terms which were not generally
available to others could not have been for the purpose of eliminating
23. If the aggrieved party is in such a position that the special terms are needed
for the party effectively to compete, and as a result, deprivation of those terms is
tantamount to exclusion from the market, a different problem is presented. If the
defendant knew that such a deprivation would necessarily result in exclusion, a court
might infer an intent to exclude, and thus find the requisite anti-competitive purpose.
However, absent that knowledge on the part of the defendant, such intent could not
be inferred and the aggrieved party would be effectively excluded with no recourse
under the per se rule.
24. A horizontal agreement to deprive one of special terms similar to the special
terms involved in De Filippo appears to be an instance of price fixing, which is per se
unlawful. Suppose manufacturer A has offered to accept deferred payments from
retailer X though not from anyone else. If manufacturers B and C now combine
with A and A agrees to withdraw those terms, the effect would be similar to A, B,
and C agreeing not to give any retailers a special price. See United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), wherein Justice Douglas noted
that "any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful
activity." Id. at 221.
25. See note 11 supra. The Third Circuit may have unwittingly indicated that
activity aimed at depriving a competitor of the benefits of special contract terms is
per se reasonable, 516 F.2d at 1320-21, and that plaintiffs' only recourse was not
under the antitrust laws but under the common law tort of interference with contract,
the merits of which the coprt did not determine. Id. at 1320, see note 4 supra. However, this broad interpretatign of the court's dictum is refuted by the immediate
reference to its discussion of per se unreasonable restraints. 516 F.2d at 1321.
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horizontal competition. A failure to limit the instant decision to its facts
would have the unfortunate effect of undermining the policy of the Sherman
Act as it pertains to group boycotts.
Robert L. Genuario

BANKRUPTCY

-

CORPORATE REORGANIZATION -

SUMMARY JURISDIC-

TION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT HELD NOT TO INCLUDE POWER TO
ENJOIN STATE'S REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY TO DO
BUSINESS.

In re Dolly Madison Industries, Inc. (1974)
The district court entered an order approving a petition by Dolly
Madison Industries, Inc. (DMI) for reorganization under Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act' on June 24, 1970.2 After receiving notices from
several states of the revocation of DMI's certificates of authority to do
business (certificates) in those states, the trustee petitioned the district court
to enjoin the various secretaries of state from cancelling DMI's certificates. 3
The injunctive order was issued on December 4, 1970. 4 On April 30, 1971,
the State Corporation Commission of Virginia (Commission) notified
DMI that its certificate would be revoked on June 1, 1971.r
In response to an order from the district court to show cause why
the certificate should not be deemed in full force and effect, the Commission argued that the certificate had been revoked automatically under
Virginia law, and further, the Commission denied the district court's
jurisdiction to enjoin such revocation. 6 Without addressing the Commission's jurisdictional argument, the district court found that its order of
December 4, 1970, precluded the Commission from considering prepetition failures to comply with Virginia law, 7 and ordered the Commission
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (1970). Chapter X provides a statutory procedure for
corporate reorganization under the supervision of a district court. Id. §§ 1(9)-(10),
511. Section 111 of the Bankruptcy Act grants to the reorganization court "exclusive
jurisdiction of the debtor and its property, wherever located." Id. § 511.

2. In re Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 499, 500 (3d Cir. 1974). The
order directed the trustee to operate the debtor's business, provided the trustee with
the authority to incur any necessary expenses, and included an injunction against
interference with the trustee's possession or management of DMI. Id. at 500-01.
3. Id. at 501.
4. Id. The order enjoined the secretaries of state from instituting proceedings
based upon DMI's failure to take action or make payment of liabilities to their
jurisdictions on or before June 24, 1970, the date DMI filed its bankruptcy petition.
Id. at 501 n.5.
5. Id. at 501. DMI's certificate was to be revoked for failure to file the
necessary annual reports and to pay the required fees for 2 consecutive years, 1970
and 1971. Id. at 501-02; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-117 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
6. 504 F.2d at 502.
7. Id.
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to reinstate DMI's certificate. 8 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed,9
holding that the district court lacked summary jurisdiction in a Chapter X
reorganization proceeding to order the Commission to reinstate the certificate. In re Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1974).

The Third Circuit strictly construed the grant of summary jurisdiction in reorganization proceedings, refusing to bend jurisdictional requirements to expedite the reorganization process. The court perceived the
district court's summary jurisdiction as limited to matters concerning the
administration of the debtor corporation and claims against the debtor's
property. 10 Thus, the court reasoned, although the Virginia property of
the corporate debtor may have been affected by the revocation of its
certificate of authority to transact business, revocation did not constitute a
claim againstthe debtor's property."
The probable impact of the instant decision will be to increase the
possibility of a multiplicity of suits pending in different forums, since
the reorganization court will not be able to maintain centralized control
over all collateral matters concerning the debtor's reorganization. This
would impose increased costs and burdens upon the debtor's estate and
be counterproductive to the aim of corporate reorganization - furnishing
"an expeditious and a sound economic scheme of reorganization for over8. Id. at 502. The district court took the position that, at most, DMI had
not complied with Virginia law for 1 year, 1971, since pre-petition failures to
comply with state law could not be taken into consideration under the district court's
order. See note 4 supra.
9. The case, submitted under Third Circuit rule 12(6), was heard by Chief
Judge Seitz and Judges Gibbons and Garth. Judge Garth wrote the opinion.
10. 504 F.2d at 503. The court recognized that summary jurisdiction is generally
confined to questions relating to: 1) the administration of the debtor's estate; and
2) the property of the debtor which is in the actual or constructive possession of
the court. Id. Since the trustee did not argue that the district court's order rested
upon the power of the court to administer the 'estate of the debtor, the Third Circuit
reasoned that the question of summary jurisdiction necessarily depended upon whether
the court was exercising control over the debtor's property. Id. The trustee did
not contend that the certificate of authority to do business was itself property of
the debtor, rather he argued that revocation constituted interference with DMI's
property in Virginia. Id. In rejecting that contention, the court concluded that the
scope of the reorganization court's summary jurisdiction was not so broad as to
include everything which in some way affects the debtor's property. Id. at 503-04.
11. Id. at 503. The Third Circuit's holding was consistent with the view of
the United States Supreme'Court that a bankruptcy court was without power to
authorize a debtor's noncompliance with a state licensing statute, stating that such
a case did not involve protection of the property within the court's custody. See
Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62, 67 (1934). The Third Circuit relied upon Gillis
in its holding in Dolly Madison. 504 F.2d at 504, citing Gillis v. California, supra
at 67. It distinguished cases, relied upon by the trustee, where the reorganization
court acted to preserve the debtor's property in the face of adverse claims. Id.; see
In re International Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1948) (right of equitable
set-off is a chose in action which constitutes property of debtor in reorganization
court's jurisdiction) ; In re Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 139 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1943)
(reorganization court has jurisdiction over causes of action for alleged wrongdoing
which were assets of debtor) In re Preston Mining Co., 203 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (reorganization court has jurisdiction to require claimant which allegedly held
lien against debtor's assets in another state to make records available to trustee).
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burdened corporations, without unnecessary expense, waste or protracted
2
litigation.'
In conclusion, the instant decision serves as a reminder that the grant
of summary jurisdiction to the reorganization court, though broad, is not
all-inclusive, 13 and the court may not exceed the limits authorized, regardless
of possible adverse consequences to the debtor.
Kathleen M. Shay

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SECTION 706(f)(1)
TUNITY ACT -

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOROF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
LIMIT THE PERIOD IN

OPPORTUNITY ACT DOES NOT IMPLIEDLY
WHICH THE

CHARGE

EEOC

MAY INSTITUTE SUIT TO

180

DAYS AFTER A

Is FILED.

EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (1975)
A complaint lodged with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in December, 1969, charged the defendant with racial
discrimination.' After efforts to reach conciliation proved unsuccessful, the
EEOC filed a civil action against the defendant in November, 1972.2 On a
motion for summary judgment, defendant challenged the timeliness of the
action, alleging that section 706(f) (1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19723 (Act) required the EEOC to institute suit within 180
12. 6 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 0.11 (14th ed. 1972).
13. See 2 id. 123.02.

1. EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1298 (3d Cir. 1975).
The charge was filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
pursuant to section 706(b) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Act).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
2. EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1972). Section 706(f) (1) of the Act provides in
pertinent part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission [EEOC] ...
the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action
against any respondent . . . named in the charge . . . . The person or persons
aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . . If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such
charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . . . or
the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved
and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be
aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by
any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful
Upon timely application, the court may, in its discreemployment practice ....
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days after the charge was filed. 4 The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment, 5 holding that
section 706(f) (1) does not impliedly limit the period in which the EEOC
may institute an action to 180 days after a charge is filed. EEOC v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
Writing for a unanimous court,6 Judge Aldisert recognized that the
language of the statute was ambiguous, but found nowhere in section
706(f) (1) a specific time limitation upon the EEOC's right to institute
suit.7 Given the important role of the EEOC as enforcer of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 the court reasoned that had Congress
intended to restrict the EEOC's performance of that role, it would have
expressly and unambiguously stated such an intention.9 Furthermore, the
court argued that the imposition of such a time limitation would frustrate
the EEOC in its primary role as conciliator. 10
The issue of whether section 706(f) (1) imposes an implied 180-day
limitation upon actions by the EEOC has arisen frequently at the district
court level where a split of authority has developed." E.I. duPont de
tion, permit the Commission ... to intervene in such civil action upon certification
that the case is of general public importance.
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
4. 373 F. Supp. at 1326. Defendant argued that section 706(f) (1) should be
construed as follows: during the initial 30 days after the charge is filed, no one may
bring suit; for the next 150 days, only the EEOC may sue; for the 90 days thereafter, only the aggrieved party may sue; after this 90-day period, all rights to sue
under the statute are extinguished. 516 F.2d at 1298.
5. 373 F. Supp. at 1339.
6. The case was decided by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Garth and Aldisert.
7. 516 F.2d at 1299. The court found only two express conditions precedent to
the EEOC's right to bring suit: 1) 30 days must expire after the filing of the complaint, and 2) the EEOC must make an effort at conciliation. Id.
8. Originally, the EEOC's role was limited to that of conciliator. Act of July 2,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 259. In response to the urgent need for
public enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1972 amendments
to the Act granted enforcement powers to the EEOC. For pertinent legislative history,
see H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1971).
9. 516 F.2d at 1300.
10. Id. at 1301. The court noted that Congress had intended that attempts at
conciliation be fully exhausted before the EEOC would resort to court action. Id.
11. Those cases which hold that there is no implied limitation upon the EEOC's
right to sue are EEOC v. United Aircraft Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Conn. 1974) ;
EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974) ; EEOC v. Rollins, Inc.,
8 CCH EMPLOY. PRACT. DEC. fJ 9557, at 5434 (N.D. Ga. 1974); EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Va. 1974); EEOC v. United States Indus.,
Inc., 7 CCH EMPLOY. PRACT. DEC. J 9068, at 6507 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); EEOC v.
Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Iowa 1973); EEOC v. International Paper
Co., 8 CCH EMPLOY. PRACT. DEC. 119610, at 5618 (W.D. Mich. 1973); EEOC v.
Duff Bros., 364 F. Supp. 405 (E.D Tenn. 1973); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 372
F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1974) ;
EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1973), and EEOC v. Bartenders' Local 41, 369 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Those cases which hold to the
contrary include EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 389 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Colo. 1975); EEOC
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v.
Berman Bros. Iron & Metal Co., 7 CCH EMPLOY. PRACT. DEC. ff 9212, at 7039 (N.D.
Ala. 1974), and EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
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Nemours & Co. aligns the Third Circuit with decisions of the Fourth,12
Fifth, 13 and Sixth 14 Circuits which have held that the EEOC's right to
commence an action does not terminate 180 days after the filing of the
complaint. Moreover, the decision in the instant case is representative of
the liberal attitude adopted by other courts in construing the provisions
of the Act. 15
The decision has the salutary effect of allowing the EEOC more
flexibility in its role as conciliator. Had the Third Circuit construed
section 706(f) (1) to impose a 180-day limitation upon the EEOC's right
to sue, the EEOC would have been faced with the undesirable choice of
initiating court action at the risk of adversely affecting delicate negotiations,
or relinquishing its right to sue for fear of jeopardizing negotiations, leaving
the EEOC without enforcement capabilities should conciliation later prove
unsuccessful. The court's refusal to limit the period in which the EEOC
may sue also indirectly facilitates conciliation, since it offers uncooperative
employers no incentive to hamper the EEOC's initial determination of
reasonable cause'6 in order to delay the conciliation process which cannot
7
commence without such a finding.'
The E.I. duPont de Nemours decision raises two potential problems,
neither of which, however, poses a significant cause for concern. First,
there is the possibility that duplicative proceedings will be instituted, for
according to the instant case's construction of section 706(f) (1), the EEOC
is not precluded from bringing suit during the 90-day period in which the
aggrieved party may file a private action.' 8 Duplicative actions impose
unnecessary costs and burdens upon the judicial system and require a
defendant-employer to defend the same charge twice. However, in light
of the fact that section 706(f) (1) specifically authorizes the utilization of
12. EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 946 (1975).
13. EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 39 (1975).
14. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975).
15. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII
proscriptions extend to practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation) ;
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir. 1975) (state statutes of
limitation do not restrict EEOC); Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1342
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (EEOC has broad investigatory
powers) ; Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971)
(Title VII suit not limited solely to issues alleged in original charge) ; Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970) (employer's pattern of
past discrimination is relevant to EEOC's determination of reasonable cause) ; Blue
Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969) (EEOC may properly
broaden its inquiry to consider evidence concerning discriminatory employment practices not specifically alleged in complaint).
16. Section 706(f) (1) of the Act directs that after a charge of employment discrimination is filed, the EEOC "shall make an investigation thereof" to determine
whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
17. Since the Act mandates that reasonable cause exist before the EEOC may
commence its conciliation efforts, the EEOC's investigation must be concluded before
the conciliation stage can begin. Id.
18. 516 F.2d at 1298; see text accompanying note 21 infra.
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the procedural device of intervention, 19 and because of judicially imposed
restrictions upon the filing of a duplicative suit,20 the likelihood that such

actions will arise is not great.
Secondly, the court's refusal to impose a time limitation upon the
EEOC's right to institute suit may cause an increase in the backlog of
cases 21 pending with the EEOC, for in the typical case it is impossible to
reach an effective conciliation agreement within 180 days. 22 However, if the
EEOC has neither filed suit nor reached a conciliation agreement within
180 days after the filing of the charge, the Act grants the aggrieved party
a 90-day period in which to institute a private action. 23 Thus, any resulting
backlog should prove to be of little detriment to the aggrieved party's
interests.
Although the facts of E.I. duPont de Nemours presented the Third
Circuit with no claim of prejudice from untimely delay by the EEOC in
commencing the suit, the court took the opportunity, by way of dicta,2 4
to outline the protections that the Act affords to a defendant-employer
should the EEOC become unduly dilatory: the Act limits back pay liability
to the 2-year period prior to the filing of the charge, and further, the court
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974). Through the device of intervention either the aggrieved party or the EEOC may become a party to a lawsuit commenced by the other. While section 706(f) (1) of the Act confers upon the aggrieved
party an unlimited right to intervene in a suit brought by the EEOC, the EEOC's right
to intervene in a private action is limited to cases of general public importance. Id.
For the text of section 706(f) (1), see note 3 supra.
20. Some courts have resolved the problem of duplicative suits by holding that
once court action has been instituted by either the EEOC or the aggrieved party, the
right of the other is limited to intervention. See EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493
F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 792-93
(D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 579, 585 (N.D. Ala. 1974);
EEOC v. Cronin, 370 F. Supp. 579, 580 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Crump v. Wagner Elec.,
369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973). In one case, where the EEOC's investigation disclosed violations other than those encompassed within the aggrieved party's suit, the
court did not preclude the EEOC from filing suit on those charges after the aggrieved
party had instituted a private action, stating that it was not duplicitous to proceed
through consolidation under rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir. 1975); accord, EEOC
v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the court gave the

EEOC the right to sue after termination of the private action because new issues had
been raised. Id. at 454.
21. In debating whether the EEOC should be granted enforcement powers, Congress expressed concern for the considerable backlog of EEOC cases which existed.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6, 87 (1971). It was recognized that the
proposed amendments would significantly expand the workload of the EEOC, resulting
in an increase in the backlog. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 697 (1972) (remarks of
Senator Dominick).
22. In 1972, when Congress debated whether to grant the EEOC enforcement
powers, they took note of the fact that 18 to 24 months were required to dispose of a
typical case via conciliation. Id.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1)
706(f) (1), see note 3 supra.

(Supp. IV, 1974).

For the text of section

24. 516 F.2d at 1302 (dicta).
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must reduce the award by "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence ....-25

In conclusion, the decision in the instant case will contribute more
certainty to this often litigated question of law by aligning the Third Circuit
with other circuit courts which have decided this issue. While the decision
may present certain problems, they are slight in comparison to the positive
aspects of the decision, and alternative measures presently exist to satisfactorily minimize them.
Kathleen M. Shay
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Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp. (1975)
Retail Clerks International Association, the bargaining representative
at the Jersey City, New Jersey facility of Hartz Mountain Corporation
(Hartz), was decertified by a proper election on May 11, 1973.1 Two
weeks later, Hartz denied a request made by District 65, Distributive
Workers of America (District 65), for recognition as the employees'
bargaining representative. 2 District 65 had obtained a majority of the
workers' signatures on authorization cards immediately after the decertifying election. 3 Within 7 months, Hartz granted recognition to Teamsters
Local 806 (Teamsters), when presented with cards signed by a majority
of the Hartz employees which authorized the Teamsters to act as their
bargaining representative.4 One month later, Hartz and the Teamsters
signed a collective bargaining agreement, extending through November
1976, which contained a union security clause. 5
Hartz' recognition of the Teamsters caused District 65 to file an unfair
labor practice charge against Hartz, claiming that Hartz had unlawfully
assisted the Teamsters' organizational activities. 6 The Regional Director
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV, 1974).
1. Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 139 (3d Cir. 1975).
2. Id. Hartz, in refusing to grant recognition, claimed that an insufficient
period of time had elapsed since the decertification election for the employees' opinion
upon representation to have become settled. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Although the court did not state in its opinion the sections of the LaborManagement Relations Act (Act) which the employer allegedly violated, the unfair
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of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) petitioned the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey for a temporary
injunction under section 10(j) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(Act). 7 The district court found that the Regional Director had reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice had been committed,
and determined that the granting of temporary relief was "just and
proper" within the meaning of section 10(j ).8 The district court reasoned
that the Teamsters' continuation as the Hartz employees' bargaining representative during the pendency of the unfair labor practice proceeding would
erode support for District 65, prejudicing that union in any future elections
ordered by the Board.9 The district court, therefore, enjoined Hartz from
implementing the contract with the Teamsters and from recognizing the
Teamsters as the employees' bargaining representative until the union
was certified by the Board. 10
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed," holding that problematical private harm to the complaining
union could not make it "just and proper" to issue a temporary injunction
labor practice charge in all probability was based upon sections 8(a) (1) and (2) of
the Act, which provide in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7] of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization ....
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1)-(2) (1970). The pertinent portion of section 7 of the Act
provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities ....

Id. § 157.
7. 519 F.2d at 139. Section 10(j) provides in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint .
charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition
any United States district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice
thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to
grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just
and proper.
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970) (emphasis added).
8. 519 F.2d at 140. The district court decided the case upon affidavits submitted
by the parties, although Hartz and the Teamsters had requested that oral testimony
be taken. Id. The Third Circuit's disposition of the case made it unnecessary to decide
whether it had been proper to forego an evidentiary hearing. Nevertheless, the court
noted that it may be essential in many section 10(j) cases to hold an evidentiary
hearing in order to determine whether an injunction would serve the public interest.
See text accompanying note 26 infra. The court distinguished cases involving section
10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970), which involve a more easily ascertainable matter,
disruption of commerce, and which do not, therefore, necessarily require an evidentiary
hearing. 519 F.2d at 143 n.5; see note 12 infra.
9. 519 F.2d at 140.
10. Id.
11. The case was heard by Judge Hastie, Judge Gibbons, and Judge Weis. Judge
Hastie wrote the opinion.
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under section 10(j) of the Act when such relief would nullify the majority
choice of a union as their representative and, in so doing, disserve the
public interest by depriving the workers of the benefits of an existing
and seemingly fair collective bargaining agreement. Eisenberg v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1975).
Along with section 10(1)12 of the Act, section 10(j) was enacted by
Congress in 1947s to enable the Board to deal effectively with the repercussions of unfair labor practices prior to the Board's final determination
that the alleged violation had actually occurred. 14 Unfortunately, the Act
failed to furnish specific guidelines with regard to when such relief
should be sought by the Regional Director or when it should be granted
by the district court. 15 The only criterion section 10(j) provided was that
12. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970). In contrast to section 10(j), this section requires
the Regional Director to petition an appropriate district court for injunctive relief
when, after a preliminary investigation, he has "reasonable cause to believe" that
a union has committed any one of the unfair labor practices listed therein. Id. The
activities enumerated in subsection (1), such as secondary boycotts, id. § 158(b) (4)
(B), and hot cargo agreements, id. § 158(e), are directly disruptive of commerce.
For a discussion of the interrelationship of subsections 10(j) and (I), see text
accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
13. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, §§ 10(j),
(1), 61 Stat. 149-50 (1947).
14. For the text of section 10(j), see note 7 supra. The enactment of section
10(j) was motivated by Congress' desire to reduce the time which elapsed between
the filing of charges of unfair labor practices and the issuance of final Board orders,
which are enforcible only through lengthy court proceedings. S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947) (hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 105). Recognizing
this time problem and its possible ramifications, the Hartz Mountain court attempted
to resolve the problem by imposing a time limitation upon injunctions issued pursuant
to section 10 (j). See text accompanying notes 48-52 infra.
15. The Board, however, has compiled a list of eight factors relevant in determining whether section 10(j) relief is appropriate. These factors are:
1. the clarity of the alleged violation;
2. whether the case involves the shutdown of important business operations which,
because of their special nature, would have an extraordinary impact on the
public interest;
3. whether the alleged unfair labor practice involves an unusually wide geographic
area, and thus creates special problems of public concern;
4. whether the unfair labor practice poses special remedy problems so that resort
solely to the Act's regular enforcement proceedings would probably render it
impossible either to restore the status quo or to dissipate effectively the consequences of the unfair labor practice;
5. whether the unfair labor practice involves interference with the conduct of
an election or constitutes a clear and flagrant disregard of Board certification of
a bargaining representative or other Board procedure;
6. whether the continuation of the alleged unfair labor practice will cause
exceptional hardship to the charging party;
7. whether the current unfair labor practice is part of a continuing or repetitious
pattern ;
8. whether, if violence is involved, the violence is of such a nature as to be out
of control of local authorities or otherwise widespread and susceptible of control
by 10(j) relief.
NLRB Internal Instructions and Guidelines Manual - Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, § 10310.2, as quoted in Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations
Act: Suggested Reforms For An Expanded Use, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 457,
462-63 (1972).
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the relief ordered should be "just and proper,"' 6 thereby allowing the
judiciary much leeway in interpreting and applying this provision.
In contrast, section 10(l), which has a more limited function than
section 10(j),17 contains a two-pronged test. First, when the Regional
Director has "reasonable cause to believe" that the charge is true, he must
seek appropriate injunctive relief.' 8 Second, as in section 10(j), such
relief may be granted if the district court finds it to be "just and proper."' 9
Some early decisions under section 10(j) indicated that relief was warranted whenever there was "reasonable cause to believe" that an unfair
labor practice had been committed. 20 Recently, however, courts have
applied the two-pronged test of section 10(l) in cases arising under
section 10(j). Under such an analysis the court first determines whether
the finding of "reasonable cause" was "clearly erroneous," 21 and then,
secondly, the propriety of relief is considered. In disposing of the second
factor, the requirement that relief under section 10(j) be "just and proper"
has been interpreted in several ways. Some courts require that the injunction be necessary "to prevent irreparable harm,"22 while others require
23
only that the purposes of the Act will be frustrated unless relief is granted.
The instant case furnished the Third Circuit with its first opportunity
to construe section 10(j) .24 The court carefully examined the legislative
record 25 and concluded that temporary relief under section 10(j) must be
"just and proper" in the sense of being "in the public interest. '2 The
court then noted that, although District 65 charged Hartz with improperly
influencing its employees' selection of a bargaining representative in violation of the Act 2 7 there was no suggestion that the contract was unfair or
16. For the text of section 10(j), see note 7 supra.
17. See note 12 supra.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., McLeod v. Compressed Air Workers, 292 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir.
1961) ; Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 1957).
21. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1967);
Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1967).
22. McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir.), temp. stay pend.
cert., 87 S. Ct. 5 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 1966), cert. granted but remanded to
determine mootness, 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
23. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 271 (8th Cir. 1967),
quoting Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967).
24. 519 F.2d at 140. The court found it helpful to compare section 10(j) with
its former interpretation of section 10(l) in Schauffler v. Highway Truck Drivers
Local 107, 230 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1956). For the coverage of section 10(1), see note
12 supra. The Third Circuit noted that "some guidance" could be taken from
Highway Truck Drivers since a determination of what relief is "just and proper" is
also required by section 10(l). 519 F.2d at 140-41.
25. 519 F.2d at 141-42. The Senate report concerning section 10(j) stated that
this subsection was added so "that the Board, acting in the public interest, and not
in the vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of
all types of unfair labor practices." Id., quoting S. REP. No. 105, supra note 14, at 8
(emphasis supplied by the court).
26. 519 F.2d at 142.
27. Id.; see note 6 supra.
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unfavorable to the workers or that the Teamsters' union was companydominated. 28 The court deemed this to be important in view of the Act's
fundamental objectives of promoting "wholesome" labor relations and
encouraging settlement of labor disputes through the collective bargaining
process.2 0 Since a seemingly fair contract had resulted from negotiations
between Hartz and the Teamsters, the court concluded that the funda30
mental objectives of the Act had been served.
Without directly disputing the district court's concern that support for
District 65 would diminish if the Teamsters' collective bargaining agreement were not suspended during the pendency of the unfair labor practice
charge, 31 the Third Circuit commented that "the feared erosion would be
likely to occur only if the incumbent union should represent the employees
satisfactorily." 32 Realizing, however, that there was a public interest in
maintaining fair competition between labor unions,3 3 the court stated that
the primary interest secured by the Act's requirement that an employer
not aid a favored union was the protection of the integrity and effectiveness
of the collective bargaining process.3 4 Therefore, in the court's opinion,
the possibility that Hartz' actions may have contributed to District 65's
loss of majority support was mere "problematic damage," 3 5 which could
not outweigh the public's interest in preserving the benefits of an ongoing
collective bargaining agreement.3 6
The Third Circuit further labeled the argument for injunctive relief
"exceptionally weak"3 7 in light of its own analysis of the record.38 Since
the evidence offered to support the unfair labor practice charge was limited
to a few isolated instances,39 the court reasoned that, despite some al28. 519 F.2d at 142.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 142, citing Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under The National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 118 (1964).
33. 519 F.2d at 142.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. 'The court did not mention of which particular benefits the Hartz employees would be deprived. Apparently, however, there were health and welfare
benefits at stake, for the Third Circuit's opinion had earlier noted the district court's
denial of Hartz' request for a modification of the injunction to allow the employees'
health and welfare benefits to remain in effect. Id. at 140.
37. Id. at 142.
38. Id. The district court's finding that it was not "unreasonable or improbable"
that a violation had been committed was deemed to be an improper conclusion. The
Third Circuit opined that any finding of "reasonable cause to believe" should be
stated affirmatively. Id. at 143 n.4. The court noted, however, that this was not a
factor in its decision. Id.
39. Id. at 142. While the Regional Director's assertion of "reasonable cause"
to believe a violation of the Act had occurred was based upon the affidavits of three
or four employees, the court recognized that they were "strongly contradicted" by
opposing affidavits. Id.
The Third Circuit, however, noted that it reached its conclusion in the case
even assuming, arguendo, that the Board might ultimately find that Hartz had
improperly influenced particular employees. Id. at 142-43.
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legedly unlawful influence by Hartz, the record indicated that a clear
majority of the workers had freely chosen the Teamsters. 40 While the
court acknowledged that suspicion may be cast upon other votes when
there is evidence of interference with some employees' selections, 41 it concluded that the law requires evidence which confirms that suspicion before
a union can be deprived of recognition. 42 The court also noted that as a
matter of law it was entirely proper for Hartz to grant recognition to a
union which displayed majority support although it had earlier that same
year denied recognition to another union upon a similar showing of majority
support. 43 Accordingly, the Third Circuit found that the district court
had erred in viewing Hartz' recognition of the Teamsters, subsequent to
its refusal to recognize District 65, as further evidence that Hartz had
unlawfully assisted the Teamsters. 44 Summarizing its view of the facts, the
Third Circuit concluded that, although there may have been "reasonable
cause to believe" that a few employees were improperly influenced by the
employer, 45 there was no basis for contending that the Teamsters had not
freely been chosen by a majority of the workers.46 In absolving Hartz,
the court applied the Third Circuit's established rule that an employer
does not commit an unfair labor practice by recognizing a union which
manifests the uncoerced support of " 'a clear majority of the employees.' -47
In addition to the foregoing analysis, the court adopted a stringent
6-month time limitation upon injunctive relief granted pursuant to section
10(j) .48 Under this rule, the district court may also grant or continue a
section 10(j) injunction for an additional period of not more than 6
months after the findings and recommendations of the administrative law
judge have been entered, if the district court determines that such relief is
warranted. 49 Neither of these two provisions are to exclude the possibility
of a 30-day extension of the injunction when administrative action upon
the underlying dispute seems imminent. 50 This ruling was based upon the
court's apprehension that delays in administrative action in unfair labor

40. Id. at 143.
41. Id., citing Department Store Food Corp. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 74, 77 n.4
(3d Cir. 1969).
42. 519 F.2d at 143, citing Wylie Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 991 (1968), enforced,
417 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). For a discussion
of whether Wylie is apposite to the instant case, see text accompanying notes 70-75
infra.

43. 519 F.2d at 143, citing Buitoni Foods Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 767 (1960),
enforced without discussing this point, 298 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1962).
44. 519 F.2d at 143.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id., quoting NLRB v. Air Masters Corp., 339 F.2d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1964).
48. 519 F.2d at 144.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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practice cases, as evidenced by the record of the instant case 5' would, in
52
effect, render a temporary injunction the final disposition of a controversy.
The Third Circuit's analysis of section 10(j), as applied in Hartz
Mountain arguably overemphasized the impact upon the employees of
suspending the collective bargaining agreement and unjustifiably minimized
the effect of continuing the agreement upon District 65, and upon the
public's interest in the integrity of collective bargaining which resulted
from the continuance of the agreement. By asserting that District 65 was
likely to be harmed only if the Teamsters performed well as the workers'
representative,53 the court overlooked the marked advantage that a recog54
nized union has over other unions in gaining employees' adherence.
As evidenced here, in any subsequent election the Teamsters could actually
document the kind of agreement that it was capable of securing, while
other unions, including District 65, could merely promise that they would
be able to obtain better benefits if given the opportunity. 55
Above and beyond the detriment suffered by the complaining union,
the public has an interest in assuring not only that the national labor laws
are complied with, but also that a party violating the Act does not reap any
benefits from its unlawful activities while the charge is pending before the
Board and courts.5 6 Although it stressed the fact that the Teamsters' labor
contract was not unfavorable to the Hartz employees, 57 the court, by labeling
any portended erosion of District 65's support as a "private harm," 58 apparently overlooked the public's concern that the collective bargaining process
51. The court observed that the unfair labor practice charge, upon which the
instant case was based, was still pending at the administrative stage, a full 1 year
after the complaint had been filed. The court went on to surmise:
Indeed, at the present pace of administrative procedure, it is conceivable that
the three-year collective bargaining agreement, that was temporarily suspended by
the injunction in this case, may expire in 1976 of its own time limitation before
the Board determines whether the union was the lawful bargaining representative
of the employees.
Id.
52. Id.
53. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
54. See NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 267 (1938).
55. Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the Need for
Reappraisal of Land Board Dogma, 31 U, Ci. L. REv. 292, 308 (1964), citing
Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 26-27, St. Louis Indep. Packing Co.
129 N.L.R.B. 622 (1960). Professor Getman recognized that the degree to which
employees are influenced by employer assistance to one of two nonincumbent unions
vying for recognition depends upon the circumstances of each situation. For example,
he stated that employees are more likely to be favorably impressed when an agreement is actually implemented than when the employer has merely granted recognition
to a union. Getman, supra at 308-09. Moreover, he asserted that while employees
who prefer no union at all might thereby be persuaded that union representation is
beneficial, those who prefer another union would not be likely to forsake it for the
recognized union. Id. at 309. For a discussion of policy considerations which militate
against permitting a nonincumbent union to gain employer recognition through questionable activities, see 20 VILL. L. REV. 697, 708-10 (1975).
56. S. REP. :No. 105, supra note 14, at 27.
57. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
58. 519 F.2d at 143.
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be free from all taint of unlawful coercion.5 9 While the court was validly
concerned that an injunction would deprive Hartz' employees of the benefits enjoyed under their collective bargaining agreement for what could
be a substantial period of time,60 the court should not have allowed this
61
concern to cloud its analysis of the potential damage to District 65,
the deterioration of the public's confidence in collective bargaining, and even
62
during the same period.
of the possible harm to the Hartz employees
Yet, even if the court had determined that the employees and the
charging party would have been injured unless an injunction were issued,
it is submitted that cases involving section 10(j) relief require a more
thorough review of the probability that a violation of the Act has occurred
than was employed by the Third Circuit in the instant case. Without
assessing the likelihood that an unfair labor practice has been committed,
a court may not be able to prevent the disservice to the parties involved in
the litigation, and to the public interest, which would result if the ultimate
disposition of the complaint were inconsistent with the prior ruling upon
the petition for temporary relief.63 Although the court engaged in a discussion of "reasonable cause," when it scanned the record and found evidence of only a few instances of wrongdoing, the disposition of this matter
seems superfluous to its decision to reverse the district court. The court
twice stated that temporary relief was not warranted - once after discussing the likelihood of harm to District 65,64 and again after the "reasonable cause" analysis. 65 In both instances, however, the conclusion was
based upon the court's declaration that the possibility of harm to District
59. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940).
60. See notes 35, 36 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
61. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
62. See Greene v. Mr. Wicke Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 1012, 1016-17 (D. Conn. 1967).
In Wicke, which involved a factual situation very similar to Hartz Mountain, the
court, inter alia, enjoined the employer from continuing to recognize Teamsters
Local 443, one of two nonincumbent unions, and prohibited effectuation of the collective bargaining agreement which had been signed by the employer and Teamsters
Local 443. Id. at 1017. The Wicke court argued that it is better to grant injunctive
relief to restore the status quo which existed prior to the alleged violation, than to
permit the alleged wrongdoer to become firmly established as the workers' representative through unlawful activities. Id. at 1016-17. The court determined, in that
case, that injunctive relief was appropriate to preserve the rights of the employees
under the Act and to bring "the captive status of the employees involved to an end."
Id. at 1016.
63. Securing consistent rulings in the two proceedings is important since each
party stands to be injured if the preliminary decision is resolved against it. Boire
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975). Denial of temporary relief might render the Board unable to effectively remedy the interim adverse
effects upon the charging party (see note 14 and accompanying text supra), and
conversely, issuance of an injunction might inflict permanent harm upon the employees (see notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra) and upon the alleged
wrongdoer. See 45 TEXAS L. REV. 358, 362 (1967) ; 42 WAsH. L. REV. 1117, 1127
n.61 (1967).
64. 519 F.2d at 142; see text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
65. 519 F.2d at 143; see text accompanying notes 37-47 supra.
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65 did not outweigh the injury to the employees which would result if an
66
injunction were imposed.
Moreover, the court's review of the Board's finding of "reasonable
cause" to believe that an unfair labor practice had occurred was arguably
based upon a questionable premise. The court asserted that "on the present
record it seems as likely as not that a majority of the Hartz employees
freely chose to be represented by Teamsters Local 806."67 The court thus
apparently presumed that there was no evidence to substantiate the unfair
labor practice charge except that which was presented in support of the
Board's petition for preliminary relief. However, since the propriety of
relief pursuant to section 10(j) must necessarily be decided prior to the
Board's thorough investigation of the situation, it is anomalous to predicate injunctive relief only upon a prima facie showing that an unfair labor
practice has, in fact, been committed. Rather, the Board should be permitted to draw appropriate inferences from the facts known at the time
it files for preliminary relief in supporting its claim for such relief. In this
manner, deference to the Board's judgment would allow the court to avail
itself of the agency's expertise in evaluating unfair labor practice charges.
The Fifth Circuit has recently taken a position on this very point in a
case arising under section 10(j).O8 In discussing attacks, which had been
made at a hearing for a preliminary injunction, against the Board's evidence concerning the unfair labor practice charge, the court concluded:
It is not our duty at this juncture to pass upon whether violations have
been established by a preponderance of the evidence, but merely to
decide that the Board's theories are substantial and not frivolous.69
Additionally, while concluding that a clear majority of the employees
had selected the Teamsters, 70 the Third Circuit agreed that the Regional
Director may have had "reasonable cause to believe" that Hartz had made
improper statements to a small number of employees. 7 1 The court also
recognized that "if certain votes were tainted . . . others could be suspect
as well." 72 Despite these premises, the court, citing Wylie Manufacturing
Co.,73 concluded that there must be evidence confirming the suspicion of
unlawful activity before a union with majority support, recognized by the
74
employer, can be deprived of its position as the employees' representative.
Wylie, however, is inapposite to the facts of Hartz Mountain, because it
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

70. 519 F.2d at 143.
71. Id.
72. Id., quoting Department Store Food Corp. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 74, 77 n.4 (3d

Cir. 1969).

73. 519 F.2d at 143, citing Wylie Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 991 (1968), enforced,
417 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
74. 519 F.2d at 143.
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involved a final Board order upon the merits of an unfair labor practice
charge,7 5 rather than a petition for temporary relief pursuant to section
10(j). Certainly confirmation should be required when, as in Wylie, the
matter before the Board or court is one for a final determination of whether
the union should be precluded from representing the employees. Arguably, however, the Board's suspicion should not need confirmation where,
as in Hartz Mountain, the decision would merely temporarily return the
parties to the situation which existed prior to the alleged unfair labor
practice.
It is submitted that once the court has determined that the Regional
Director's finding of "reasonable cause" to believe that the Act has been
violated is not frivolous, the court should only further evaluate the
probability that a violation of the Act has occurred in cases where a decision concerning the propriety of temporary relief cannot be made solely
upon the basis of the relative injuries to be suffered by the parties with
or, alternatively, without injunctive relief.76 Thus, an injunction would be
in order if it were shown: 1) that the harm likely to be suffered by the
complainant and the employees, absent an injunction, would exceed the
77
probable injury to the alleged wrongdoer, employees, and others if
temporary relief were granted, or 2) that the respective harm likely to
ensue to the parties depending upon whether temporary relief is granted
or, alternatively, denied, is of approximately equal magnitude, but the
evidence presently available indicates that a final Board order would
probably sustain the unfair labor practice charge.
The Third Circuit's decision in Hartz Mountain imposes two barriers
to the Board's future efforts to secure section 10(j) relief against employers
charged with unlawful interference with the employees' selection of a
bargaining representative. First, because the court declared that the harm
to the complaining union was attributable to adequate performance by
78
the recognized union rather than to the alleged unfair labor practice, it
will be difficult for the Board to show that any relief is required prior to
75. Wylie Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 991 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d 192 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
76. It has been suggested that the quantum of probable harm which must be
established in order to demonstrate the need for an injunction is a function of the
clarity of the alleged violation. That is to say that, when a violation is clear, there
need be less of a showing of harm likely to result absent an injunction; and conversely, when a violation is doubtful, there must be a more substantial demonstration
of harm likely to occur without temporary relief. Meter v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 273 F. Supp. 659, 670 (D. Minn.), rev'd, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967);
Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1056 (1965) ; Note,
Temporary Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(l) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 111
U. PA. L. REV. 460, 479 (1963) ; 45 TEXAS L. REV. 358, 363 (1967). It should be
noted that the Board considers the clarity of the violation as a significant factor in
evaluating the propriety of section 10(j) relief. See note 15 supra.
77. In a particular situation there may be additional parties to consider besides
the charging party, the alleged wrongdoer, and the employees. In the instant case,
for example, the Teamsters should have been considered, as well, since its status as
the employees' bargaining representative was at issue.
78. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
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the Board's decision upon the merits of the charge. Second, by seemingly
precluding the use of inferences in deciding the probability that a violation
has occurred, 79 relief pursuant to section 10(j) is apparently restricted to
cases in which a violation of the Act is clearly established by the facts
uncovered in the Regional Director's preliminary investigation.
Finally, whenever relief under section 10(j) is secured by the Board,
its effectiveness will be diluted by the court's mandate that such relief
should be limited in the Third Circuit to a 6-month duration.80 Although
this directive seems reasonable in light of the court's valid concern that,
if allowed to linger, temporary relief may itself yield irreparable adverse
effects,"' the order is legislative in nature. Had Congress desired this
expedited procedure, it could have easily inserted a clause into section
10(j), giving cases therein precedence over other alleged violations of the
Act.8 2 The newly promulgated time limitation will require the Regional
Director to assure that quick action be taken upon the merits of the unfair
labor practice charge for which section 10(j) relief is sought so that an
injunction does not expire prior to the ultimate disposition of the case.
It is submitted that, in stressing the temporary deprivation of contract
benefits to the employees, the Third Circuit has established that a high,
yet uncertain, threshhold of probable harm, absent an injunction, must be
reached, before section 10(j) relief can be granted. Perhaps, however,
when the opinion is read in light of the secondary issue in the case, namely,
that the court doubted the existence of "reasonable cause" to believe a
violation had occurred, the decision may not portend the narrow application of section 10(j) which would otherwise be expected to follow.
Stephen C. White

79. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
81. See notes 51 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
82. For example, section 10(1) of the Act instructs the Regional Director to
give priority to the preliminary investigation of charges falling within its scope.
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1) (1970). But, even in this section there is no directive requiring
an expedited procedure in processing the charge after temporary relief is granted.
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PATENT LAW - DISCOVERY IN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS - SECTION 24 OF PATENT ACT OF 1952 WHICH GOVERNS AVAILABILITY OF
DISCOVERY IN DISTRICT COURTS GRANTS JURISDICTION TO COURTS
SOLELY FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS PURSUANT TO RULE 45(a), (b),
(c), (d)(2), (e), AND (f) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-

CEDURE.

Frilette v. Kimberlin (1974)
Parties in two pending patent interference proceedings' sought discovery in federal district court under section 24 of the Patent Act of 1952
(Patent Act) 2 In both cases, the parties requested discovery before the
time allotted for it under Patent Office regulations. 3 In one case, Frilette
1. A patent interference is an administrative proceeding, authorized by the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970), in which the question of priority of invention between parties claiming substantially the same patentable invention is determined. 37 C.F.R. § 1.201(a) (1975) ; see Patent Act § 135, 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1970).
Initially, all patent applications are forwarded to. a patent examiner, who makes a
thorough study of the invention's patentability. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.101, .104-.105 (1975).
If the examiner determines that the invention contains "common subject matter" with
an already patented invention or with another invention for which a patent application
is pending, the application is forwarded to the Board of Patent Interferences (Board)
for a determination of priority. Id. §§ 1.203 (a), .207(a) ; see id. § 1.201(b). A patent
interference examiner then "institute[s] and declare[s] the interference" by notifying
all concerned parties of the interference issue. Id. § 1.207(b). The interference proceeding itself has three stages. In the first stage, each party files a preliminary
statement giving a detailed history of its invention. These statements are exchanged
among the parties. Id. §§ 1.215-.217; see id. § 1.207(b) (1)-(2). This preliminary
stage is followed by a motion period, during which a party may move to dissolve the
proceedings or a portion thereof, amend its application, substitute a new application, or
seek to be awarded the benefit of other applications. Id. § 1.231; see id. § 1.207(b) (3).
The final stage is the trial or testimony period. See id. §§ 1.251-.259. At the outset
of this stage, each party is assigned a time period during which he or she must complete discovery and other preparatory activities. Discovery may not be conducted
prior to this period. Id. §§ 1.251, .287(e). Evidence is submitted to the Board and a
final hearing is held. See id. §§ 1.254-.256, 1.271-.287. The Board then determines
which applicant was the first inventor and is thus entitled to be awarded the patent.
See id. § 1.261.
2. Section 24 of the Patent Act provides in pertinent part:
The clerk of any United States court for the district wherein testimony is
to be taken for use in any contested case in the Patent Office, shall, upon the
application of any party thereto, issue a subpoena for any witness residing or
being within such district, commanding him to appear and testify before an officer
in such district authorized to take depositions and affidavits, at the time and
place stated in the subpoena. The provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to the attendance of witnesses and to the production of documents and things shall apply to contested cases in the Patent Office.
35 U.S.C. § 24, as amended (Supp. IV, 1974). As a general rule, discovery is not
available in connection with an administrative proceeding without special provision
therefor by statute or administrative regulation. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 8.15, at 588 (1958).
Section 24 was amended on January 2, 1975, so that each reference to the
Patent Office now reads "Patent and Trademark Office." 35 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. IV,
1974), amending 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
3. Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 207-08, 209-10 n.7 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 980 (petitioner Frilette) and 421 U.S. 979 (1975) (petitioner Duffy).
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v. Kimberlin,4 Frilette, the junior party 5 in the proceeding, had previously
sought discovery before the Board of Patent Interferences (Board) under
the authority of Patent Office rule 287(c).6 Upon the Board's denial of
7
discovery on the ground that the request was premature, Frilette sought
discovery in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
under section 24 of the Patent Act and several provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 The district court also denied Frilette discovery,
concurring with the Board that Frilette's request was premature and
further noting that Frilette had failed to show good cause for the motion.
The Patent Office does not allow discovery in an interference proceeding until after
the close of the motion period. See note 1 supra.
4. 358 F. Supp. 493 (D. Del. 1973).
5. The first party to apply for the patent is the "senior party" and is presumed
to be the inventor. Any later applicant is a "junior party" who has the burden of
proving that his or her invention date preceded that of the senior party. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.257 (1975) ; In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215, 216 (3d Cir. 1968).
6. 358 F. Supp. at 494. Patent Office rule 287, which specifies the order and
conditions of discovery, provides in part:
(a) (1) Each party who expects to take testimony must serve on each opposing party who requests service the following:
(i) A copy of each document in his possession, custody, or control and upon
which he intends to rely,
(ii) A list of and a proffer of reasonable access to things in his possession,
custody, or control and upon which he intends to rely, and
(iii) A list giving the names and addresses of all persons whom he intends
to call as witnesses and indicating the relationship of each person to the invention
in issue.
(c) Upon motion . . . and upon a showing that the interest of justice so
requires, the Board of Patent Interferences may order additional discovery as to
matters under the control of a party within the scope of the discovery rules of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifying the terms and conditions of such
additional discovery. An order by the Board granting or denying a motion under
this paragraph shall not be subject to review prior to a decision awarding priority.
37 C.F.R. § 1.287 (1975).
7. 358 F. Supp. at 494-95. Frilette's request was considered to be premature
since the senior party still had time to provide documents and lists of witnesses under
Patent rule 287(a). Id. at 495. The senior party in an interference is not required to
provide the junior party with lists of witnesses and copies of documents upon which
he intends to rely until after the date set for the junior party to complete his testimony-in-chief. 37 C.F.R. § 1.287(a) (2) (iii) (1975).
8. Frilette sought to compel Kimberlin to designate witnesses, answer interrogatories, produce documents, and admit certain facts pursuant to rules 30(b) (6), 33, 34,
and 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 358 F. Supp. at 494.
9. Id. at 495-98. Even though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been
amended in 1970 to eliminate good cause as a prerequisite for discovery under rule 34
(see note 20 infra), the district court required it of Frilette. 358 F. Supp. at 496.
The court reasoned that federal courts, interpreting section 24 prior to 1970, had relied
upon the presence of the good cause requirement when they interpreted the statute as
providing broad district court discovery and that the requirement, therefore, should
continue to be imposed under section 24. Id. at 495-96, citing Babcock & Wilcox Co.
v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 432 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1970) ; In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215 (3d
Cir. 1968); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 235 (D.
Conn. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 430 F.2d 1177 (2d Cir. 1968); International Business
Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 7 (D. Del. 1967); Korman v. Shull,
184 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Mich. 1960), appeal dismissed, 310 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1962).
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In the other case, Duffy v. Barnes,10 Duffy, the senior party, did not request
discovery under Patent Office rule 287, but rather filed a discovery motion
initially in the district court." The United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted Duffy discovery, but only with regard to
whether Barnes, the junior party, had committed fraud in filing his patent
12
application.
The cases were argued together on appeal.' 3 The Third Circuit, sitting
en banc,14 stated that it was "not practical to attempt to unscramble the
eggs"' 5 and refused Barnes' request to impound the evidence Duffy had
already obtained through discovery. 16 The court, however, affirmed the
denial of discovery in Frilette, holding that the authority of the federal
district courts to grant discovery in patent interferences under section 24
of the Patent Act is limited to the issuance of subpoenas pursuant to rule
45(a), (b), (c), (d) (2), (e), and (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Frilette v. Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 980 (petitioner Frilette) and 421 U.S. 979 (1975) (petitioner
Duffy).
Section 24 of the Patent Act gives district courts the authority to issue
subpoenas in connection with interference proceedings and states that
"[t]he provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the
attendance of witnesses and to the production of documents and things
u7
In In re Natta,'5 the
shall apply to contested cases in the Patent Office.'
10. Civil No. 822-73 (D.N.J., July 24, 1973).
11. 508 F.2d at 207. Duffy sought subpoenas duces tecum to compel discovery by
depositions. Id.
12. Id. at 225. At the time Duffy sought discovery, Barnes, the junior party, was
awaiting a decision on a motion to amend his patent application. The discovery
granted by the district court to Duffy was limited to "matters dealing with the
veracity of the affidavits" filed in connection with the motion. Id. at 207 & n.1.
13. Id. at 207.
14. The majority opinion was written by Judge Weis. Dissenting opinions were
filed by Judges Van Dusen and Adams.
15. 508 F.2d at 212.
16. Id. Patent rule 286 allowed Barnes to object, during the interference proceeding, to the admission of the evidence Duffy had obtained. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.286
(1975) ; cf. 508 F.2d at 212.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). For the text of section 24, see note 2 supra.
The patent laws were codified in 1952 and, as part of the codification, section
24 was enacted to replace a 1922 statute which had also given district courts authority
to issue subpoenas in connection with interference proceedings. Act of Feb. 18, 1922,
ch. 58, § 7, 42 Stat. 391-92; see In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 1968) (Seitz, J.,
dissenting). The statutory predecessor to section 24 had provided in pertinent part:
The clerk of any court of the United States, for any District or Territory
wherein testimony is to be taken for use in any contested case pending in the
Patent Office, shall, upon the application of any party thereto, or of his agent or
attorney, issue a subpoena for any witness residing or being within such District
or Territory, commanding him to appear and testify before any officer in such
District or Territory authorized to take depositions and affidavits at any time and
place in the subpoena stated. . . . [T]he provisions of section 869 of the Revised
Statutes relating to the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum shall apply to contested cases in the Patent Office.
Act of Feb. 18, 1922, ch. 58, § 7, 42 Stat. 391-92. Under section 869 of the Revised
Statutes, a subpoena duces tecum would only be issued for documents which "would
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Third Circuit construed this language as "manifest[ing] a clear congressional intent to make available to parties to patent [interference proceedings] the broad discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' 19 Stating that Congress would have explicitly limited district
court discovery to the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum under rule 45(b)
if that had been its intent,20 the court affirmed the district court's grant of a
rule 34 discovery motion. 21 The court declared that the standard governing
the scope of allowable discovery was the relevancy standard of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 22 rather than the admissibility standard employed
28
by the Patent Office.
In Natta, discovery had been sought during the testimony period of
the interference, 24 that is, during the period established by the Patent Office
for the gathering and submission of evidence. 25 In subsequent cases, howbe competent and material evidence for the party applying therefor." U.S. REV. STAT.
§ 869 (1875) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 24, 1827, ch. 4, § 2, 4 Stat. 199).
Section 869 was repealed by implication upon enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). It was explicitly repealed when the Judicial Code was
officially codified and enacted into positive law in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 39, 62 Stat. 992-93. For a discussion of the statutory antecedent of section 24, see
3 C. RivisE & A. CAESAR, INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 437 (1947).
18. 388 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968).
19. Id. at 217.
20. Id.

21. Id. at 220. In its opinion, the Natta court noted that a showing of good cause
was prerequisite to the production of documents under rule 34, which is entitled
"Discovery and Production of Documents and Things for Inspection, Copying, or
Photographing." Id. at 219. The good cause requirement was eliminated from rule 34
in 1970. FED. R. Civ. P. 34, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970 Amendment to
Rules, 28 U.S.C. App. at 7793-94 (1970). However, at least one court has considered
it is to be an indispensable element in the Natta court's holding and has, therefore,
refused to allow discovery of documents absent a showing of good cause. See 358
F. Supp. at 495-96.
22. 388 F.2d at 219. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
covers the scope of discovery under those rules, provides in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . .

.

. It is not

ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).
23. 388 F.2d at 219. In reaching its holding, the Natta court relied upon cases in
which the courts had either granted a rule 34 discovery motion under the authority
of section 24 of the Patent Act or had indicated a willingness to do so upon a showing
of good cause. Id. at 217-19, citing Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1967);
Gladrow v. Weisz, 354 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1965); Hogan v. Zletz, 151 U.S.P.Q. 103
(N.D. Okla. 1966); Korman v. Shull, 184 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Mich. 1960), appeal
dismissed, 310 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1962). It should be noted, however, that the dicta in
Natta which interpreted section 24 as "mak[ing] available to parties . . . the broad
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules" went beyond the holdings of the cases cited.
In Gladrow, for example, the Fifth Circuit found that "Rule 34 . . . is among the
rules referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 24, when the production of documents is required for
the examination or cross-examination of a witness." 354 F.2d at 468 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).

24. See 388 F.2d at 217.
25. See note 1 supra.
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ever, the broad interpretation given section 24 by the court in Natta26 was
relied upon not only as a basis for granting access to relevant, although
possibly inadmissible, documents, but also as a basis for granting discovery
27
earlier in the interference proceedings.
The primary factor motivating the Third Circuit to reconsider its
interpretation of the statute was the effect which the expanded discovery,
available under the Natta interpretation of section 24, had had upon both
the courts and the Patent Office. 28 The court noted that a decision on a
discovery request was usually appealable since it disposed of the only issue
before the district court.29 As a result, the judiciary had been burdened
and the detailed schedule established by the Patent Office for interference
proceedings had been disrupted.80 The Natta discovery doctrine, in the
Frilette court's view, had "established a procedural system which violated
such tenets of good judicial administration as centralization of the litigation,
disallowance of appeals on interlocutory and collateral matters, and primary
jurisdiction." 3'
An additional factor cited by the court as motivating its reinterpretation of section 24 was the promulgation by the Patent Office, in 1971,
of rule 28782 which "represent[ed] an improvement over prior administrative practice." 8 3 Rule 287 gave each party to an interference proceeding
the right to obtain lists of documents and witnesses upon which the other
party intended to rely, and also the right to request additional discovery
from the Board "as to matters under the control of a party. '34 Although
section 23 of the Patent Act8 5 had granted the Patent Office the authority
26. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
27. In addition to Duffy v. Barnes, see, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Foster
Wheeler Corp., 432 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1970); Judd v. Engelhard, 159 U.S.P.Q. 571
(E.D. Wis. 1968); Taub v. Rausser, 159 U.S.P.Q. 220 (D.N.J. 1968).
28. See 508 F.2d at 209-11.
29. 8 C. WRIGHT & A.

MILLER,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2006, at 4

(Supp. 1975). The prevailing view is that discovery orders issued by courts under the
authority of section 24 are appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). See, e.g.,
Sheehan v. Doyle, 513 F.2d 895, 898 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 144 (1975) ;
Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Ochsner v. Millis, 382 F.2d 618,
620-23 (6th Cir. 1967). The Second Circuit, however, has recently held that a section 24
discovery order was not appealable. Shattuck v. Hoegl, 187 U.S.P.Q. 1 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. 508 F.2d at 209-10. The court concluded that
[a] more undesirable plan for litigation could hardly be imagined, than that by
which counsel must commute, often frantically and behind schedule, between the
Patent Office and the federal district court in a time-consuming effort to exhaust
discovery rights at the same time the interference trial has begun. When the
district court decision is appealed, as it inevitably is, more delay occurs.
Id. at 210 n.10, quoting Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q.
480, 481 (D.N.J. 1972).
31. 508 F.2d at 211.
32. 37 C.F.R. § 1.287 (1975). For the text of rule 287, see note 6 supra.
33. 508 F.2d at 211.
34. 37 C.F.R. § 1.287 (1975).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 23 (1970).
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to enact rules of discovery, rule 287 represented the first exercise of such
36
authority.
In light of these factors, the Third Circuit decided to overrule Natta.37
Although the Frilette opinion was devoted almost exclusively to an explanation of the court's motivation for reconsidering section 24, the court
was careful to state that it was overruling Natta, not because of the "obvious disadvantages of the Natta discovery doctrine,"3 8 but because the
majority had concluded that the Natta interpretation of section 24 was
erroneous.3 9 Rather than elaborating upon the legal basis for this conclusion, the Frilette court summarily stated that the correct interpretation of
section 24 was that given by then Judge, now Chief Judge, Seitz in his
40
dissent to Natta.
The majority in Natta had concluded that section 24's language plainly
demonstrated an intention to expand the power of the district courts to
order discovery and that there was no "clear indication of contrary congressional intent." 41 Chief Judge Seitz, however, had concluded in his
dissent that the legislative history of section 24 "reveal[ed] an intent to
provide only the same power formerly given the district court under the
old subpoena duces tecum statute. ' 42 That statute had allowed subpoenas
to be issued only for documents that would be admissible in evidence. 43 Chief
Judge Seitz noted that the Senate and House committee reports had stated
that "changes in the substantive law . . . will be explained in some detail

in the revision notes,

'44

but that the notes appended to section 24 had

36. 508 F.2d at 211. The court commented:
It defies reasonable principles of statutory construction to hold that Congress
specifically granted the Patent Office authority to enact rules of discovery under
Section 23, while at the same time only inferentially extending the broad gambit
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery to the courts in interference
cases under Section 24.
Id. at 211-12 n.14. This argument was subsequently developed by the First Circuit in
Sheehan v. Doyle, 513 F.2d 895 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 144 (1975):
[S]ection 24 is simply a provision giving teeth, through the courts' subpoena
powers, to authority conferred upon the Commissioner of Patents.
.TheT
Patent Office has no power to compel the attendance of nonparty
witnesses or to enforce the production of evidence from them, and this need was
apparently the main reason that Congress conferred ancillary jurisdiction upon
federal courts, with their subpoena power and threat of contempt.
Id. at 898-99; see Note, Discovery in Patent Interference Proceedings, 89 HARV. L.

REv. 573, 582 (1976).
37. 508 F.2d at 207.
38. Id. at 211. The court stated that it "would be bound by that rule had Congress in fact conferred such jurisdiction upon the courts." Id.
39. Id. For a discussion of the Natta court's reasoning, see text accompanying
notes 18-23 supra.
40. 508 F.2d at 212 & n.15.
41. 388 F.2d at 217.
42. Id. at 221 (Seitz, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the statute which
section 24 replaced, see note 17 supra.
43. See note 17 supra.

44. 388 F.2d at 221-22, quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1979]; H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1952) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1923].

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/9

28

Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21

made no mention of substantive change. 4 5 Further, Chief Judge Seitz
found that the language of section 24 "faithfully tracked the scope of the
statutory provision which it replaced."'46 He concluded that the statute
"[did] not include the authority to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain production of documents which are not admissible in
evidence or needed to examine witnesses.1 47 This conclusion and the
reasoning behind it were adopted by the majority of the Third Circuit in
Frilette when it stated that the ancillary jurisdiction of the district courts
under section 24 is limited to the "issuance of subpoenas as permitted by
prior practice. '4 The court then held that the reference in the statute to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to the matters encompassed by
rule 45(a), (b), (c), (d) (2), (e) and (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
4

Procedure.

9

As is indicated by the contrary holdings in other circuits, 50 as well as
by the two dissents to the Frilette decision itself,51 the Third Circuit's
revised interpretation of section 24 is subject to criticism. The language
of section 24 is not ambiguous.5 2 It is reasonable to assume, as did the
Third Circuit in its earlier opinion in Natta, that a statute which states that

"provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . shall apply"'5 3

should not be interpreted as incorporating only portions of rule 45. This
conclusion seems somewhat stronger when one considers that the arguments in support of the Frilette court's construction had to be negatively
45. 388 F.2d at 222. The note appended to section 24 offered little aid in interpreting the statute. It merely stated: "Reference to a repealed statute in the first paragraph is replaced by reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and certain rules
are made applicable." S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 44, at 15, and H.R. REP. No. 1923,
supra note 44, at 15, quoted in 388 F.2d at 222 (Seitz, J., dissenting). The applicable
rules were not enumerated.
46. 388 F.2d at 222. Judge Van Dusen disputed this statement in his dissent to
the Frilette opinion. He argued that the language of section 24 - "Rules . . . relating
to ... the production of documents and things" - repeated the language used in the
title of rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as it existed in 1952, thus
indicating that at least rule 34 was to be encompassed by section 24. 508 F.2d at 214
(Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
47. 388 F.2d at 222.
48. 508 F.2d at 207.
49. Id. at 212. Rule 45(d) (1) allows subpoenas for documents "within the scope
of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (1). The
scope of discovery under rule 26(b) may conflict with that under the rules of the
Patent Office. See notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra. Apparently, it was
for this reason that the court omitted rule 45(d) (1).
50. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 430 F.2d 1177 (2d Cir.
1968), aff'g mem. 314 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn.) ; Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968) ; Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Gladrow v. Weisz, 354
F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1965). Contra, Sheehan v. Doyle, 513 F.2d 895 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 144 (1975).
51. 508 F.2d at 212-25.
52. See note 2 supra. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n
the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary, we attribute to the words of a
statute their ordinary meaning . . . ." Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n,
390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (emphasis added).
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induced from the legislative history of the statute.5 4 The committee reports
upon which the court relied do not mandate a narrow interpretation of the
congressional action but merely fail to state that section 24 represented a
substantive change in the law. 55 It has been suggested that Congress may
have thought, evidently mistakenly, that the section 24's language was not
open to dispute and thus needed no express comment.56
Even presuming that Congress did not intend to enlarge the district
courts' authority to issue discovery orders in patent interference proceedings by the Patent Act, Congress' failure, post-Natta, to pass various
proposed bills, some of which would have specifically limited district courts
to granting only those orders which were in compliance with Patent Office
rules, 57 may be viewed as a ratification of the Natta court's interpretation
of section 24. As Judge Adams stated in his dissent in Frilette, a court
"should be wary of infringing on the authority of the legislative branch by
seeking to accomplish by judicial fiat what Congress has contemplated
doing, but so far has declined to do through amending legislation."58
As a practical matter, the Frilette opinion may necessitate additional
litigation to deal with potentially troublesome issues left open by the court's
decision. The court was quite specific in enumerating which provisions of
rule 45 it found to be incorporated into section 2419 and it thereby implicitly
repudiated its former view that discovery should be governed by the relevancy standard of rule 26.60 The court failed, however, to clarify two
issues. First, the court did not decide whether it would require a party
to apply initially to the Patent Office for discovery under rule 287. Second,
the court did not indicate whether it planned merely to "rubber stamp"
future Patent Office discovery decisions. There are strong indications that
the court would respond affirmatively to each question, e.g., the reliance
upon rule 287 as a reason for reconsidering section 24,61 the distaste
expressed for interlocutory appeals, 62 and the reference to the availability
of a trial de novo at the conclusion of the interference proceeding. 63 Indeed,

54. The court's rationale was developed in the following manner: 1) Congress
said it would indicate substantive changes in the law in the revision notes; 2) the
revision notes did not mention any substantive changes; and therefore, 3) there were
no substantive changes intended despite the statutory language. See notes 44 & 45
and accompanying text supra.
55. Id.
56. See Note, Discovery in Patent Interference - Legislation by Courts and
Congress, 1975 DUKE L.J. 955, 962.
57. See, e.g., S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 24(a) (1974) ; H.R. 11868, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 24(a) (1973).
58. 508 F.2d at 222 (Adams, J.,
dissenting).
59. See id. at 212; text accompanying note 49 supra.
60. See note 22 supra.
61. See 508 F.2d at 211.
62. See id. at 209-11.
63. See id. at 211.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/9

30

Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21

the Frilette opinion has been cited for such a position.3 However, the
Third Circuit did not state that subpoenas would be issued only to aid
discovery authorized by the Patent Office. If this is now the Third Circuit's
position, the court will need to make it explicit in a future holding. If, on
the other hand, the court believes that it should independently review a
Patent Office decision upon a discovery request, the court will need to
define more fully both its view of the evidence standards promulgated by
the Patent Office65 and its interpretation of the rule 287(c) "interest of
justice" standard. 6
Finally, the Third Circuit could have remedied some of the "obvious
disadvantages"67 of the Natta discovery doctrine, 8 without distorting the
language of section 24, by limiting the doctrine to the facts of the Natta
case. Natta did not involve a request for discovery prior to the testimony
stage of an interference proceeding.6 9 Also, the case was decided before
the Patent Office's promulgation of rule 287.70 As Judge Adams stated in
64. See Note, supra note 35, at 573 & n.5. The First Circuit stated in Sheehan v.
Doyle, 513 F.2d 895 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 144 (1975) :
The practical effect of [Frilette] is to permit the compelling of testimony and
evidence by the district court which is sought at the proper stage of the Patent
Office proceeding, and also to allow the issuance of subpoenas in aid of discovery
as authorized by the Patent Office but not otherwise.
Id. at 898.
65. Historically, the Patent Office has been fairly liberal in allowing testimony
to be taken which, although relevant, may be inadmissible in court. See Sears,
Discovery in Interferences, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 693, 694-700 (1971).
66. For the text of rule 287, see note 6 supra. Demonstrating that discovery is
required in "the interest of justice" would probably be more difficult than satisfying
the standard of rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See note 22 supra.
The phrase, the "interest of justice," is very imprecise and is subject to varying
interpretations by the Patent Office and the courts.
One example of the application of the "interest of justice" standard appears
in Shattuck v. Hoegl, 187 U.S.P.Q. 1 (2d Cir. 1975). In Shattuck, the court granted
a motion for discovery which had previously been denied by the Board of Patent
Interference when made under rule 287(c). The Board had found that it was not in
the "interest of justice" to allow the discovery, stating that "no order for broad
discovery will be issued merely to investigate the possibility of the existence of fraud."
Id. at 3. It should be noted, however, that in Shattuck, documents were being sought
from a nonparty. See id. at 4. That fact could have precluded the Board from granting
discovery under rule 287(c). See text accompanying note 77 infra.
67. 508 F.2d at 211.
68. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
69. See 388 F.2d at 217.
70. In re Natta was decided in 1968, while rule 287 was promulgated by the
Patent Office in 1971. 37 C.F.R. § 1.287 (1975). Judge Adams, objecting to the
Frilette majority's reliance on rule 287, contended that
[n]othing in section 24 . . . makes the district court's jurisdiction dependent on
the failure of the Patent Office to adopt discovery procedures. Moreover, the
promulgation of a rule by an administrative agency subsequent to the enactment
of section 24 could hardly alter the legislative intent embodied in the statute.
Judicial estimation of the legislative purpose should not turn on the vagaries of
an administrative agency in first rejecting, then accepting, and possibly again
rejecting a procedural device. In addition, the statutory grant of authority under
which the Patent Office adopted Rule 287 predates this Court's decision in Natta.
508 F.2d at 222 (Adams, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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his dissent to Frilette, the volume of patent discovery litigation might be
reduced if the courts "in the exercise of their discretion . . . refuse[d] to

grant discovery which is or will be available in the Patent Office unless
the party seeking discovery can show substantial need for the discovery
in the district court rather than in the Patent Office."' 7 1 Such an approach
would have limited most requests for discovery to the testimony period of
the interference proceeding which is the first stage at which discovery may
be requested in the Patent Office. 72 A showing of "substantial need"
before even making a request would usually be difficult. By so limiting
Natta, it would have been possible to decrease the disruption of the Patent
Office timetable for the interference proceeding without an artificial restriction of section 24's language to portions of rule 45.
Since several circuits have construed section 24 more liberally than
did the Third Circuit in Frilette,73 there is now a potential for "serious
injustice where disclosure of one party's evidence is controlled by the law
of the Third Circuit, while divulgence of that of the adversary party is
governed by the decision of another Circuit." 74 As a result of this lack
of homogeneity, Congress may be encouraged to enact one of the proposed
amendments which would alter section 24.75 Absent such an amendment,
however, this result may, ironically, increase the burden on the federal courts
by increasing the number of dissatisfied patent litigants who would seek
trials de novo in district courts at the conclusion of an interference proceeding. 76 Additionally, the lack of homogeneity may prompt the Board
of Patent Interferences to find that it is in "the interest of justice" to allow
each party as nearly equal discovery under rule 287(c) as is possible.
However, since rule 287(c) allows the Patent Office to grant discovery only
"as to matters under the control of a party,"7 7 it would appear that evidence under the control of a nonparty could not be discovered through the
Patent Office. 78 Therefore, should courts interpret Frilette to preclude
discovery orders which were not previously authorized by the Patent Office,
evidence controlled by a nonparty, even if clearly admissible, may become
impossible to obtain. This could undermine the validity of the patent finally
awarded because the Board's decision, in such a case, would be based upon
only part of the existing evidence.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Third Circuit overreacted
when faced with what it viewed as a discovery monster of its own creation.
As has been pointed out, the broad interpretation given section 24 in
71. 508 F.2d at 223.
72. See note 1 supra.
73. See note 50 supra.
74. 508 F.2d at 225 (Adams, J., dissenting).
75. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
76. A trial de novo in a federal district court is available to a party in an interference who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Interferences;
alternatively, a dissatisfied party may appeal to the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1970). 508 F.2d at 211.
77. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.287(c) (1975).
78. See note 66 supra.
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Natta was not clearly erroneous.79 To achieve the narrow interpretation
of Frilette,the court was forced to contort the language of the statute and,
in so doing, unnecessarily initiated a split among the circuit courts. 80
Further, the Third Circuit may have created a situation where even clearly
admissible evidence will be unobtainable if it is held by a nonparty. One
must hope, therefore, that Natta and Frilette are only the first two in a
line of three cases, the third of which will remedy the "obvious disadvantages""' of both of its predecessors.
Margaret S. Woodruff

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

NONOPERATING TRUSTEE OF
CORPORATION HELD LIABLE FOR INCOME TAXES UPON
INCOME GENERATED DURING LIQUIDATION PERIOD.

BANKRUPT

In re I.1. Knight Realty Corp. (1974)
The nonoperating trustee for the I.J. Knight Realty Corporation
(Knight), which was adjudicated a bankrupt in May, 1963,1 filed income
tax returns covering the years 1963 through 1970, showing no taxable
income and thus no tax due.2 Gross income reported by the trustee included
capital gains upon the sale of property and interest earned upon bank
deposits.3 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) audited
the returns and, after making various adjustments for the years 1963 to
1970, filed a proof of claim for corporate income taxes, personal holding
company taxes, penalties, and interest against the trustee in the bankruptcy
79. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 73 & 74 supra.
81. 508 F.2d at 211.
1. In November 1962, I.J. Knight Realty Corporation (Knight) filed a petition
for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99
(1970). In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 501 F.2d 62, 63 (3d Cir. 1974). In January
1963, Knight's sole source of income, its building, burned to the ground, leaving no
business for the Chapter XI receiver to operate. In May 1963, Knight was adjudicated a bankrupt, and a trustee was appointed. Id. Knight's assets at that time consisted of insurance claims stemming from the fire, land on which the building had
stood, and cash in the amount of $2,030.11. Id.
2. 501 F.2d at 63.
3. Id. at 63-64. In September 1963, the city of Philadelphia instituted condemnation proceedings against Knight's land, and the trustee was subsequently
awarded $130,000 plus interest for the real estate. In November 1963, one of the
insurance claims was settled for $800,000. Id. at 63. In March 1964, the trustee
paid $162,789.45 out of the insurance proceeds to satisfy an outstanding mortgage on
Knight's building. Later the same month, the trustee deposited $500,000 of the insurance proceeds in interest-bearing accounts, and in fiscal year 1966, he deposited
an additional $65,000 in interest-bearing accounts. In February 1967, counsel for the
trustee filed the trustee's federal income tax returns for fiscal years 1963 through 1966.
Based upon the trustee's computations, each return showed no taxable income, and
hence no tax due, after giving effect to net operating loss carryovers. Returns for
fiscal years 1967 through 1970 were filed in due course, also showing no taxable
income and no tax due. Id.
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proceeding. 4 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania granted the trustee's motion for summary judgment upon
the grounds that a "non-operating" trustee5 of a bankrupt corporation was
not liable for payment of federal income taxes.6 Upon appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, 7 holding a nonoperating trustee in possession of, or holding title to, substantially all of
the bankrupt's property is liable for payment of federal taxes upon taxable
income generated during the liquidation and distribution of the bankrupt's
estate. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 501 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1974).
Prior to enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (1954
Code), certain court-appointed officers "operating the property or business"
of corporations were required by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
(1939 Code) and earlier revenue acts to file returns and pay any tax
due.8 Notwithstanding Treasury Regulations, dating from 1934, which
defined "operating" to include "liquidating," 9 courts construed the requirements of the 1939 Code and the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1928 as
exempting from tax liability those trustees whose liquidating activities did
not involve operating the bankrupt's business.1
Both the wording and organization of this 1939 Code section were
altered by enactment of the 1954 Code. Section 6012(b) (3) of the 1954
4. Id.
5.A "nonoperating" trustee does not operate the bankrupt corporation's business, but merely marshals the bankrupt's assets in order to distribute proceeds to
creditors. See In re Owl Drug Co., 21 F. Supp. 907 (D. Nev. 1937).
6. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
7. Judge Adams wrote the opinion.
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 52, 53 Stat. 4. Section 52(a) provided in part:
In cases where receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or assignees are operating the
property or business of corporations, such receivers, trustees, or assignees shall
make returns for such corporations in the same manner and form as corporations
are required to make returns. Any tax due on the basis of such returns made by
receivers, trustees, or assignees shall be collected from the corporations of whose
business or property they have custody and control.

Id. Provisions similar to section 52 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 were contained in the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1928. Compare id., with Revenue Act of 1928,
ch. 852, § 52, 45 Stat. 795 and Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 756.
9. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 86, art. 52-2, 1 CCH 1935 STAND. FED. TAX. REP.
1 463. The regulation provided in part:
Receivers, trustees in dissolution, trustees in bankruptcy, and assignees, operating the property or business of corporations, must make returns of income for
such corporations. If a receiver has full custody of and control over the
business or property of a corporation, he shall be deemed to be operating such
business or property within the meaning of section 52, whether he is engaged in
carrying on the business for which the corporation was organized or only
marshaling, selling, and disposing of its assets for the purposes of liquidation.
Id.
10. See In re Heller, Hirsh & Co., 258 F. 208 (2d Cir. 1919); In re Town
Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1953); In re Owl Drug Co., 21
F. Supp. 907 (D. Nev. 1937). In the earliest of these cases, the Second Circuit
suggested that Congress' intent was to tax the profitable operation of a corporation's
business by court-appointed officers. In re Heller, Hirsh & Co., supra at 211.
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Code" specifically requires trustees of bankrupt corporations to file a
"return of income,"' 2 whether or not the business is being operated, while
section 615113 mandates that those required to make a "return of tax"
4
must "pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return."'
The question of whether a nonoperating trustee, required under section 6012 to file a "return of income," is additionally liable for payment of
taxes pursuant to the section 6151 requirement that those who file a
"return of tax" must "pay such tax" was answered negatively in In re
Statmaster Corp.15 In that case, the bankruptcy referee concluded that
Congress did not intend to change the substantive law concerning payment
of taxes when it enacted the section 6012 requirement that the trustee file
a "return of income," but merely intended to effect a procedural change
requiring the trustee to file an information return. 1 6 In United States v.
Sampsell,17 the Ninth Circuit reached a conclusion different from the referee
in Statmaster,expressing the view that changes in the 1954 Code were not
merely procedural.' 8 The court also rejected the contention that section
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b) (3).

Section 6012(b) (3) provides:
In a case where a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or assignee, by order of

a court of competent jurisdiction, by operation of law or otherwise, has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the property or business of a
corporation, whether or not such property or business is being operated, such
receiver, trustee, or assignee shall make the return of income for such corporation
in the same manner and form as corporations are required to make such returns.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 61 5 1(a). Section 6151(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, when a return of tax is required under this title or regulations, the person required to make such return
shall, without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate, pay such tax to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed,
and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing the return).
Id.
14. Id.
15. 332 F. Supp. 1248 (referee's opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 332 F. Supp.
1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972). The referee's decision
was reversed upon the ground that the trustee's petition for an order requiring the
United States to show cause why the trustee should not be discharged of all liability
for federal taxes upon income generated during the liquidation period was a request
for a declaratory judgment that no taxes were due, which is prohibited by section
2201 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). 332 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
16. 332 F. Supp. at 1261 (referee's opinion). For examples of sections requiring
filing of information, as opposed to tax, returns, see, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 6031 (partnership income), 6033 (tax-exempt organizations), 6035 (officers,
directors, and shareholders of foreign personal holding companies).
17. 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'g In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp.
507 (S.D. Cal. 1956). The district court, following essentially the same reasoning
employed by the referee in Statmaster, found that the defendant trustee was not
operating the business and concluded, therefore, that he was not liable for payment
of income taxes, notwithstanding the changes made by the 1954 Code. 144 F. Supp.
at 509-10.
18. 266 F.2d at 635.
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960 of the Judicial Code, 19 which affirms the tax liability of an operating
20
trustee, implicitly exempts a nonoperating trustee from liability.
Since it was undisputed that the trustee in Knight never operated the
business, 21 the sole question before the Third Circuit was whether a nonoperating trustee is obligated to pay tax upon taxable income generated by
the bankrupt estate during its liquidation. The court first examined section
61 of the 1954 Code, 22 which defines gross income as "income from whatever source derived," 23 and noted that the sources of Knight's income were
specifically enumerated therein.2 4 The Third Circuit next looked to sections
601225 and 615126 which delineate filing procedures for fiduciaries and
mandate payment of taxes which are due. Finding no provision in the Code
that explicitly exempts a trustee in bankruptcy from the duty imposed
by section 6151, the court concluded that the "plain terms" '27 of the statute
require a trustee in bankruptcy to pay the tax, provided he is required to
file a return under section 6012 (b) (3).28
The court then addressed the trustee's specific contentions attacking
this conclusion. It rejected the trustee's terminological argument that section 6151 does not automatically impose a tax upon a nonoperating trustee
because it refers to those required to make a "return of tax," while section
6012 only directs the trustee to file a "return of income."'29 The trustee rea19. 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970).

Section 960 of the Judicial Code provides:
Any officers and agents conducting any business under authority of a United

States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and local taxes applicable to
such business to the same extent as if it were conducted by an individual
or corporation.
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of the relationship between section 960 of the Judicial Code and section
6012(b) (3) of the 1954 Code, see Feigenbaum, Observations Concerning Trustees in
Bankruptcy and Federal Income Taxes, 43 REF. J. 73 (1969).
20. 266 F.2d at 635. It should be noted that the Sampsell court found the
trustee was operating the bankrupt's business. Id. at 634. Thus, its statements regarding whether a nonoperating trustee is liable for federal income taxes were dicta.
21. 501 F.2d at 63. It was only after Knight's building was destroyed by fire
that a trustee in bankruptcy was appointed. See note 1 supra.
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
23. Id.

24. 501 F.2d at 64. Section 61 enumerates 15 sources of income which are included in the definition of gross income. Included in this listing are "gains derived
from dealings in property" and "interest" - the two sources of income imputed by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to Knight's estate. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 61(a)(3)-(4) ; see note 3 supra.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b) (3). For text of section 6012(b) (3), see
note 11 supra.
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6151(a). For text of section 6151(a), see note
13 supra.
27. 501 F.2d at 64.
28. Id. The condition precedent to the trustee's obligation to file under section
6012(b) (3) of the 1954 Code - that he "ha[ve] possession of or [hold] title to all
or substantially all of the property or business of a corporation" - would always be
met in the case of a trustee in bankruptcy by virtue of section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). Under section 70(a), title to all of the
bankrupt's property, with certain exceptions not applicable here, vests in the trustee
by operation of law. Id.
29. 501 F.2d at 64-65.
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soned that in order for a nonoperating trustee to be obligated to pay tax by
section 6151, an explicit Code provision requiring a trustee to file a "return
of tax" would have to be found.3 0 As the court readily conceded, no such
provision exists.81 The court found, however, that the trustee's argument
could not stand in light of "the realities of taxati6n and the schema of the
Code."'3 2 Reading sections 6012 and 6151 together, the court stated that
it considered the "return of income" required by section 6012 to be "pre3
cisely the same 'return of tax' " referred to in section 6151. 3
The trustee also argued that the legislative history indicated that
Congress had no intention of changing prior substantive law when it enacted
the 1954 Code.3 4 The court indirectly answered this argument by disposing
of the related contention that the tax liability of a bankruptcy trustee is
limited by section 960 of the Judicial Code 35 to those trustees who are
conducting business under court authority, i.e., operating trustees.3 6 The
trustee argued that since Congress did not amend section 960, which
predated the 1954 enactment of section 6012(b) (3), it did not intend to
tax a trustee who was not "conducting" the bankrupt's business. 7 Relying
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 960 in Palmer v.
Webster,3 the Third Circuit concluded it was "hardly . . . likely that
Congress would have sought to establish or limit substantive income tax
' 39
liability by a provision in the Judicial Code.
Finally, in answer to the trustee's policy argument that exempting the
trustee from tax liability would further the Bankruptcy Act's4" objective
of compensating creditors as fully as possible from the bankrupt estate's
assets, 41 the court cautioned that Congress, not the court, was the proper
42
forum to effect any reconciliation of the alleged inconsistency.
30. Id. at 65.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court supported its conclusion by observing that Internal Revenue
Service Form 1120 is the only basic federal income return which need be filed by a
trustee on behalf of a corporation under section 6012. Id. Since this form provides
space for the listing of the bankrupt's income, deductions, and tax due for the taxable year, the court concluded this "return of income" was the "return of tax" to
which section 6151 refers. Id.
33. Id.
34. 501 F.2d at 65; see text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970). For the text of section 960, see note 19 supra.
36. 501 F.2d at 66.
37. Id.
38. 312 U.S. 156 (1941). Viewing section 960 as an affirmation of tax liability,
the Palmer Court observed that "[w]hat Congress intended was that a business in
receivership, or conducted under court order, should be subject to the same tax
liability as the owner would have been if in possession and operating the enterprise."
Id. at 163.
39. 501 F.2d at 66.
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
41. 501 F.2d at 67; see note 65 infra.
42. 501 F.2d at 67. One commenator has succinctly categorized the conflict
between the two acts:
The problem of tax claims in bankruptcy liquidation marks an intersection
of two conflicting thoughts and purposes. On the one hand, orderly government
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The Third Circuit's decision in Knight appears to be sound, not only
upon an examination of the statute's language and legislative history, but
also upon two distinct policy grounds. While the court's analysis of the
interrelationship between sections 6012(b) (3) and 6151 seems correct, 43
another argument, not mentioned by the court but which strongly supports
the court's conclusion in the instant case, relies upon a careful analysis
of subsections (a) and (b) of section 6012. It may be argued that section
6012 possesses the following scheme. Subsection (a) delineates those individuals and entities which are required to file "[r]eturns with respect to
income taxes," while subsection (b) directs the filing procedure to be followed by "fiduciaries and receivers" for those individuals and entities which
are required to file under subsection (a) but which lack the capacity to file
themselves. 44 This suggested interpretation of section 6012 of the 1954 Code
makes it clear that a corporation is directed to file a "return with respect
to income taxes" under section 6012(a), and, if such corporation is in
bankruptcy, the corporation's trustee is directed by section 6012(b) to
fulfill the 6012(a) requirements on behalf of the bankrupt corporation. 4 1
Thus, the trustee required by this section to file the bankrupt corporation's
return would be subject to the section 615146 requirement to pay the tax
as are other taxpayers who are required to file under section 6012, 4 7 unless
the trustee is specifically exempted from tax liability by the Code. 48 While
pre-supposes a smooth and uninterruped flow of revenue .... On the other hand,
the very purpose of bankruptcy proceedings is equality among all creditors.
Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV. L. REv. 1141 (1942)
(citations omitted). See also Krause & Kapiloff, The Bankrupt Estate, Taxable
Income and the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (1966).
43. See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
44. The suggested analysis is further supported by a close examination of subsection (a) (1) of section 6012, which defines those individuals who are required to
file returns, while subsections (b) (1) and (2) outline the procedure for making
returns for individuals who are 1) deceased or 2) under a disability. See INT. REV.
0 2
CODE OF 1954, §§ 6 1 (a) (1),
(b) (1)-(2). Similarly, subsection (a) (2) defines
which corporations are required to make returns, while subsection (b) (3) directs
the filing procedure for the corporation if it is in the hands of a receiver, trustee in
bankruptcy or assignee. See id. §§ 6012(a) (2), (b) (3). In addition, subsections
(a) (3) and (4) define which estates and trusts must make returns, and subsection
(b) (4) directs that "[r]eturns of an estate or a trust shall be made by the fiduciary
thereof." See id. §§ 6 0 12(a)(3)-(4), (b)(4).
45. See id. § 6012.
46. See id. § 6151. For the relevant text of 6151, see note 13 supra.
47. Research did not disclose cases of any section 6012(b) taxpayers, other than
trustees in bankruptcy, who had attempted to argue that they were not required to pay
tax under section 6151 because they were directed merely to make "returns" under
section 6012(b), rather than "returns of tax." See note 45 supra.
48. The law is clear that a taxpayer claiming an exemption must rely upon a
specific provision in the Code. The Supreme Court has rejected any argument of
implied exemptions, stating that "[t]hose who seek an exemption from a tax must
rest it on more than a doubt or an ambiguity ... .Exemptions from taxation cannot
rest upon mere implication." United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 71 (1940)
(citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit enunciated the following well-recognized principle:
[S]ince it is settled law that deductions are permitted as a matter of grace only,
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the Code contains various explicit taxation exemptions for certain bankrupt
entities, 49 and allows other tax-exempt organizations to file only information
returns, 50 none of these exemptions specifically include bankruptcy trustees.
Therefore, under either this or the court's analysis of the statute's language
and structure, a nonoperating trustee is obligated to pay tax upon income
derived from the bankrupt's estate during liquidation if he has possession
of, or title to, substantially all of the debtor's property.
Despite the trustee's contention to the contrary, 51 the legislative history
of section 6012(b) (3)52 does not cast doubt upon the validity of the court's
interpretation. Since the committee reports characterize the change effected
by the enactment of section 6012(b) (3) as merely "clarifying" 58 existing
law, it has been contended that Congress did not wish to effect a substantive
change when it enacted section 6012(b) (3).5 4 Specifically, the argument,
which was advanced in Statmaster, is that Congress intended to retain
prior case law which interpreted the predecessor statute55 to section 6012
(b) (3) as requiring only operating trustees to file returns and pay tax.5 6
Arguably, while more explicit wording in the committee reports might
have resolved doubts as to what Congress considered the existing law to
be and, thus, better revealed its intent when it enacted section 6012(b) (3),
the absence of such explanation hardly supports a contention that the
Congress intended an interpretation other than the one that the Third
Circuit found suggested by the statute's language. The Supreme Court has
cautioned that when interpreting a statute, "an uncertain guess at Congress'
'57
intent provides dubious ground for disregarding its plain language.
the taxpayer must not only point to an appropriate statute but must bring himself
squarely within its terms.
Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741
(1943) (citation omitted).
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7507. This explicit exemption of certain bankrupt banks and trust companies arguably leads to the conclusion that had Congress
intended to exempt other bankrupt entities, it would have specifically done so in the
Code. See also id. §§ 501-21.
50. See id. §§ 6031-39.
51. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b) (3). For text of section 6012(b) (3), see
note 11 supra.
53. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 563 (1954). The sole reference to revision of section 52 of the 1939 Code by enactment of section 6012 of the
1954 Code was as follows: "A clarifying change from the wording of existing law
has been made in subsection (b) (3), relating to the filing of corporation returns by
receivers or other fiduciaries." Id.
54. See In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (referee's opinion),
rev'd on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 978
(5th Cir. 1972). See also text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
55. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
56. See 332 F. Supp. at 1258 (referee's opinion). In Statmaster, the referee
concluded that because of the committee's characterization of subsection 6012(b) (3)'s
enactment as only "clarifying" existing law, "Congress was not advised of any such
sweeping substantive change by the enactment of § 6012(b) (3)." Id.; see note 53 supra.
57. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 383 (1966); cf. Albert L. Dougherty, 60
T.C. 917, 925 (1973).
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In a similar vein, the court's rejection of section 960 of the Judicial
Code5" as a limitation 9 upon the bankruptcy trustee's tax liabilities was
sound. Both the legislative history6 ° and previous judicial interpretations
of that statute 6 ' support the conclusion that section 960 affirms, rather
than limits, the obligation of trustees and receivers to pay taxes which are
otherwise validly imposed.
Finally, with regard to the policy considerations implicit in the court's
decision, there would seem to be little justification for exempting from
taxation all income generated by a bankrupt estate during liquidation
when the trustee is deemed not to be operating the business, while, at the
same time, taxing all the income of a bankrupt estate, also in liquidation,
merely because the trustee continues to carry on some minor business while
liquidating the bankrupt's assets. In addition to the inequities inherent in
such a distinction, it presents courts with the problem of deciding what
volume of activity constitutes "operating" the debtor's business. 62 It is
58. 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970). For the text of section 960 of the Judicial Code,
see note 19 supra.
59. See notes 34 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
60. Enactment, in 1934, of the predecessor to the present section 960 of the
Judicial Code followed a series of court decisions which had held trustees and
receivers in bankruptcy not liable for state and local taxes levied upon sales and
gross receipts, absent specific statutory wording imposing such liability. See In. re
Messenger's Merchants Lunch Rooms, 85 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1936) ; In re Flatbush
Gum Co., 73 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 713 (1935). See also
Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1932).
Apparently to clarify the law in this area, Congress enacted the following
legislation in 1934, which provided:
[A]ny receiver, liquidator, referee, trustee, or other officers or agents appointed
by any United States court who is authorized by said court to conduct any business, or who does conduct any business, shall . . . be subject to all State and local
taxes applicable to such business the same as if such business were conducted
by an individual or corporation.
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 585, § 960, 48 Stat. 993, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970).
The Senate's report upon the legislation was explicit:
No good reason is perceived why a receiver should be permitted to operate under
such an advantage as against his competitors not in receivership, and the States
and local governments be deprived of this revenue.
S. REP. No. 1372, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). The word "Federal" was added to
"State and local" when the Judicial Code was revised and codified in 1948. See 28
U.S.C. § 960 (1970).
61. Although some courts construed section 960 as imposing tax liability only
upon operating fiduciaries, most rejected this limitation. Compare In re California
Pea Prods., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. Cal. 1941), with Missouri v. Gleick, 135 F.2d
134 (8th Cir. 1934) (liability for state taxes); In re Loehr, 98 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.
Wis. 1950) (liability for state and federal income taxes in personal business bankruptcy), and In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ill. 1939). In re Mid
America Co. concerned a nonoperating receiver who was contesting liability for state
taxes. The court, in construing the statute, stated:
The phrase "conduct[ing] any business" should not receive a narrow and restricted interpretation, but should be construed to include any activity or operation in connection with the handling and management of the bankrupt estate.
Id. at 606. See also Brown v. Collector of Taxes, 247 F.2d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
62. Even minimal activities have been held to be "operating" the debtor's business. See United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959) (collecting interest
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submitted that if the trustee's interpretation of the Code were accepted,
creditors could, theoretically, and ironically so, receive a larger distribution
if the trustee avoided pursuing any minor income-producing activities that
might be construed as "operating" the business, because such activities
would result in subjecting major estate income, such as gains realized upon
sale of the bankrupt's real estate, to tax liability.63
From the standpoint of possibly impeding the policies of the Bankruptcy Act,6 4 the issues raised by Knight were significant. However, while
obtaining equity in distribution among the bankrupt's creditors is one of
the Bankruptcy Act's primary purposes, 65 Congress seems not to have
intended to relinquish its tax-gathering rights 66 in order to benefit the
bankrupt's creditors. 67 The extent to which Congress has maintained its
tax collection priorities in bankruptcy cases 68 lends further support to the
Knight court's conclusion that the 1954 Code taxes the income of corporate
bankrupt estates which are in liquidation, regardless of whether their
business is being operated.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 9 has
recommended that a trustee in a straight bankruptcy proceeding, whether or
not he is actually operating the business of the debtor, be relieved of any
obligation to file returns or pay state or federal taxes upon income generated
and royalties) ; Pinkerton v. United States, 170 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1948) (collecting
rent); State v. American Bonding & Cas. Co., 225 Iowa 638, 281 N.W. 172 (1938)
(collecting and reinvesting funds).
63. Capital gains upon the sale of real estate were one of the two principal
sources of the alleged taxable income in Knight. 501 F.2d at 63.
64. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970) ; see text accompanying notes 40 & 42 supra.
65. In re F.P. Newport Corp., 123 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Cal. 1954). The Newport
court noted:
[T]he chief concern of the bankruptcy court is the creditor. For the main object
of bankruptcy is to secure the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's estate
among his creditors and discharge him of his debts.
Id. at 99 (citations omitted); see Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 43, at 416.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
67. This unwillingness to relinquish tax collection priorities dates from the
earliest days of the Republic. The Insolvency Act of 1797 provides: "Whenever any
person indebted to the United States is insolvent . . . the debt due the United States
shall be first satisfied." 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
68. Taxes upon income generated during liquidation are treated as administration expenses under section 62(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, and, as such, under section
64(a) are entitled to the highest priority, with certain exceptions. 11 U.S.C. §§
102(a), 104(a) (1970) ; see McColgan v. Maier Brewing Co., 134 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 737 (1943). Taxes upon income for the 3 years immediately
preceding bankruptcy are reduced to fourth priority, after administration and preservation extienses and certain salary claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(a), 104(a) (1970). Even
"stale" tax claims - those more than 3 years old - have not been relinquished by
Congress but stand on a parity with claims of the general creditors and share equally
in any distribution to that class. Id. § 103; see 3A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
64.401 (14th ed. 1972); Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission ons
the Bankruptcy Laws - Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 991 (1974).

69. The Commission was created by Congress in 1970 to analyze and recommend
changes in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354,
84 Stat. 468.
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by the bankrupt estate, unless the debtor's assets prove to be greater than
the creditors' allowable claims. 70 While the Commission's proposal would
further the Bankruptcy Act's policy of providing for an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets and maximize the creditors' recovery by
assuring that the bankrupt's assets would not be diminished by income
taxes accruing during the liquidation period, it is submitted that the
proposal is not without problems. For instance, if capital gains and other
estate income were not subject to taxation, the creditors of a financially
troubled corporation, with the purpose of maximizing their immediate
recovery, might in some cases try to force the debtor into bankruptcy
status at the earliest possible moment, rather than giving the corporation
an opportunity to avoid bankruptcy altogether.
Aside from the impact the Knight decision may have upon the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act, its holding portends no major change. The court's
ability, upon the facts of a particular case, to find a trustee to be "operating"
the debtor's business appears to have had the same effect in the past as
will the unequivocable imposition of the tax under the 1954 Code. The
Knight decision will obviate the necessity for making that often difficult
71
factual determination in future cases.
In conclusion, the Third Circuit's decision that a corporate bankruptcy
trustee is liable for taxes upon taxable income generated by the estate
during liquidation, whether or not the business is being operated, has the
salutary effect of offering firm guidance to those who must administer
estates under the bankruptcy laws and removes the inequities that sometimes arose based upon an ad hoc judicial determination that a trustee
had been "operating" the debtor's business. 72
Mary H. Cosby
70. COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 186 (1973) (proposed section 5-104(a)).
In discussing the rationale for the recommendation, the Commission pointed out:
Data submitted to the Commission by the Treasury Department establishes that
the total amount collected by the Federal Government as a result of all its liens
and priorities in bankruptcy proceedings [estimated by the Treasury to be
$44,000,000 annually] is insignificant in the total federal budget. It is the view
of the Commission that it is unseemly for the Federal Government to insist on
collecting its taxes at the expense of other creditors of the taxpayer, and that
the only possible justification for this would be a plea of necessity in order to
keep the government functioning.
Id. pt. 1, at 22. For the Treasury's estimate, see id. at 234. A bill incorporating
the Commission's recommendation is presently pending in Congress. H.R. 31, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For further discussion of the Commission's recommendations,
see Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws Income Tax Liabilities of the Estate and the Debtor, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 937 (1974).
71. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
72. See id.
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COPYRIGHT

LAW COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISION THE
DUPLICATION OF A RECORDING OF A MUSICAL WORK Is NOT AN
AUTHORIZED "SIMILAR USE" OF THE COPYRIGHTED COMPOSITION.
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc. (1974)

Plaintiffs, 53 music publishers who owned the copyrights to numerous
musical compositions, brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey' against 39 defendants for alleged infringement
of plaintiffs' rights under the Copyright Act.2 Defendants manufactured
and sold sound-tape duplications of previously released phonograph recordings of plaintiffs' compositions. 3 Despite plaintiffs' contention that defend-

4
ants' duplications constituted infringing copies of plaintiffs' musical works,
the district court held that defendants' recordings were authorized under
the Copyright Act's compulsory license provision 5 because defendants had
filed the required notices of intent to use the compositionsO and had tendered
royalty payments to the plaintiffs.7 The district court, therefore, quashed
the writs of seizure8 previously issued against the defendants. 9 On appeal,

1. Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J.
1972).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
3. Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec., Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 393 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
4. 351 F. Supp. at 572.
5. Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J.
1973). The compulsory license provision of the Copyright Act provides:
[W]henever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments
serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may make
similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor
of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to be paid by the
manufacturer ....
17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970).
6. 362 F. Supp. at 502. The Copyright Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any person, in the absence of a license agreement, intends to use a
copyrighted musical composition upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, relying upon the compulsory license provision
of this title, he shall serve notice of such intention, by registered mail, upon the
copyright proprietor ....
17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
7. 362 F. Supp. at 502. For the text of the statute requiring the royalty payments, see note 5 supra.
8. 362 F. Supp. at 503. Under the Copyright Act, writs of seizure may be
issued to impound "during the pendency of the action . . . all articles alleged to
infringe a copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
9. 362 F. Supp. at 503. The district court issued three opinions in this case.
In Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972),
the court granted one defendant's motion to quash a writ of seizure and vacate an
injunction. Originally, the writs of seizure had been issued on plaintiffs' ex parte
application to impound recording materials of the defendants. These writs were
iiacated because the district court did not feel defendants were infringers under the
Copyright Act and because "[b]y their misstatements [about defendants' noncompliance
with notice and royalty requirements of the Copyright Act] plaintiffs practiced a
fraud on this Court. . . ." Id. at 576. In Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec.,
Inc., 362 F. Supp. 488 (D.N.J. 1973), the court denied defendants' motion for summary
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573

the Third Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded, holding
that duplication of a recorded version of a copyrighted musical composition was not authorized under the compulsory license provision of the
Copyright Act. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings,

Inc., 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
Record pirates' ° in the United States have grossed millions of dollars
annually through sales of unauthorized records and tapes which were
manufactured by duplicating licensed recordings of musical compositions."
Most record duplicators have operated surreptitiously, 12 but in recent years
a few have tried to legitimate their activities by complying with the requirements of the Copyright Act's compulsory license provision.' 3 Enacted
in 1909 as an amendment to the Copyright Act, 14 the compulsory license
provision provided that once a copyrighted musical composition had been

judgment because a material issue of fact existed as to whether defendants had
complied with the requirements of the license provision. In Jondora Music Pub. Co.
v. Melody Rec., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973), the court ordered that the
writs of seizure as to all moving defendants be quashed.
10. 506 F.2d at 394. The londora court used the terms "pirate" and "duplicator"
interchangeably, noting that plaintiffs preferred the former term and defendants the
latter. Id. n.7.
11. Comment, Copyright Protection for Sound Recordings: Past Problems and
Future Directions, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 189, 192-93 (1974). Sales of unauthorized
recordings have been estimated at over $100,000,000 annually. S. REP. No. 72, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971). For an explanation of how record pirates make their
recordings, see Comment, Copyright Protection for Sound Recordings, supra at
191-92.
12. Note, Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings, 23 DRAKE L. REv. 449,
450 (1974).
13. Id. at 451. Most record pirates fear liability to record manufacturers under
state law and thus still hesitate to publicize their activities by filing the required
notice of intent to use and by paying royalties.
Although records which were first recorded prior to February 15, 1972, cannot
be copyrighted, record manufacturers have recovered against record duplicators for
unfair competition, breach of common law copyright, and violation of anti-piracy
statutes. See note 18 infra. The londora suit was brought in New Jersey, however,
which does not have a statute punishing record piracy as a crime. 362 F. Supp. at
501. For a discussion of suits brought against duplicators by record manufacturers
and performers for unfair competition or breach of common law copyright, see
Comment, Record Piracy and Copyright: Present Inadequacies and Future Overkill,
23 MAINE L. REv. 359, 378-86 (1971). For a discussion of state statutes prohibiting
record piracy, see Sparkman, Tape Pirates: The New "Buck"-aneer$, 21 COPYRIGHT
L. SYmP. 98, 120-21 (1974).

14. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, § 1 (e), 35 Stat. 1076 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 1 (e) (1970)). Prior to 1909, mechanical reproductions of copyrighted musical compositions, including piano rolls and recordings, could be produced at will because
they were not considered to be copies of those compositions for purposes of the Copyright Act. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). In
reaction to the Supreme Court's holding in White-Smith, Congress, in 1909, amended
the Copyright Act. This amendment provided that recordings were to be considered
copies of copyrighted musical compositions which could not be produced except 1)
under license from the copyright holder, or 2) once the work had been recorded,
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recorded, anyone could "make similar use of the copyrighted work"' 5 by
filing a notice of intent to use the composition 16 and by paying the required
royalty.' 7 Record duplicators reasoned that they could insulate themselves from liability to composers' s for copyright infringement simply
by filing notices of intent to use and tendering royalties to the copyright
proprietors under a claim that their duplicating activities constituted
"similar use of the copyrighted work."' 9 Although several district
courts had so construed the compulsory license provision, 20 this inter-

pursuant to the compulsory license provision's requirements. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
The compulsory license provision was included in the amendment because Congress
wished to avoid granting a monopoly to the one company which at that time appeared
able to dominate the manufacture of piano rolls. See Sparkman, supra note 13, at 100-01.
15. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970)
note 5 supra.

(emphasis added). For the text of the statute, see

16. 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
For the text of the statute, see note 6 supra.
17. 17U.S.C. § l(e) (1970).
18. Since records and tapes first recorded prior to 1972 could not be copyrighted
by their manufacturers, record duplicators could not be liable to manufacturers for
copyright infringement. This was true in Jondora, where all the recordings were first
recorded prior to February 15, 1972. 351 F. Supp. at 584. In 1971, Congress passed
the Sound Recording Amendment, which granted to record manufacturers the right
to copyright recordings which were first recorded after February 15, 1972. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1(f) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
19. See Fame Pub. Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667, 669 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 73 (1975); Edward B. Marks Corp. v. Colorado
Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1120 (1975).
20. Jondora Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J.
1973), vacated and remanded, 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012
(1975) ; Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp.
280 (W.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975) ; Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 331 F. Supp. 127 (D. Ariz.
1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972). Contra,
Fame Pub. Co. v. S & S Distribs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 984 (.N.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd,
Fame Pub. Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 73 (1975); Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y.
1912).
Aeolian was the first, and the only case for many years, to interpret the
meaning of the term "similar use" as used in the compulsory license provision. In
Aeolian, a manufacturer of piano rolls, who had been licensed by the composer to make
rolls of his composition, sued the defendant for duplicating the piano rolls. In finding
for the plaintiff, the court stated that the defendant could not, under the guise of the
compulsory license provision, "avail himself of the skill and labor of the original
manufacturer of the perforated roll or record by copying or duplicating the same, but
must resort to the copyrighted composition or sheet music." Id. at 927. The Jondora
court quoted this language with approval although it noted that Aeolian correctly
had been criticized for allowing the manufacturer-licensee to obtain an injunction
under the Copyright Act. 506 F.2d at 394 & n.5.
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pretation was rejected upon appeal by the Ninth2 ' and Tenth 22 Cir-

cuits prior to the Jondora decision, and shortly thereafter by the Fifth
Circuit.

23

In Jondora, the sole issue which confronted the court was whether
the defendants had made "similar use" of the plaintiffs' copyrighted compositions and thus had acted within the ambit of the compulsory license
provision when they duplicated existing recordings of those works.2 4
Reasoning that the effort required to tape an existing recording was wholly
different from that necessary to produce an original recording from sheet
music, the court stated that the defendants had not used the copyrighted
work in a fashion similar to the original licensee. 25 "[I]ndeed, they [did]
not use the composer's work at all. It was a recording which [was]
21. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 847 (1972). In Duchess, defendants taped previously issued recordings of
plaintiffs' copyrighted compositions for sale in cassette form. 458 F.2d at 1306-07.
The Ninth Circuit held that defendants had not made "similar use" of the copyrighted
works but had instead made "exact and identical copies of them." Id. at 1310. The
one defendant-duplicator who contested the suit had not attempted to comply with the
notice and royalty requirements of the compulsory license provision until after a writ
of seizure had been executed against her. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 331 F. Supp.

127, 128 (D. Ariz. 1971). Despite this, the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona had held that the defendant could continue duplicating under the
umbrella of the compulsory license provision. Id. at 136. One can speculate that this
district court decision encouraged other record duplicators to "go public" with their
duplicating activities by complying with the requirements of the compulsory license
provision. See note 20 and accompanying text supra. By the time the Jondora suit
was filed, at least one of the named defendants, U.S. Tape, Inc., was clearly making
every effort to operate as a legitimate business organization. See 351 F. Supp. at

573-75.
22. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285
(10th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975). Defendant duplicated on tape the licensed recordings of plaintiffs' musical compositions without any
authorization from the plaintiffs or their licensees. Defendant had filed notices of
intent to use the compositions and had tendered royalty payments to the plaintiffs in
accordance with the compulsory license provision. 497 F.2d at 286, 288. The Tenth
Circuit held that the compulsory license provision did not allow the defendant to
use the copyrighted work by duplicating a licensed recording of that work. Id. at
288. The court stated that the compulsory license provision should be construed
narrowly since it was an exception to a statute which had otherwise granted to the
copyright owner exclusive rights to control the use of his composition. Id.
It is interesting to note that Harry L. Fox Agency, Inc., was the licensing
agent both for the plaintiff in Marks, id. at 286, and the plaintiffs in Jondora. 362
F. Supp. at 500. According to an affidavit submitted to the district court in Jondora,
the Harry Fox Agency is not only
responsible for collecting royalties accruing to its music publisher principals .. .
[but also for] aiding the enforcement throughout the United States of the rights
of mechanical reproduction against unauthorized users thereof ....
Id. at 501 n.2.
23. Fame Pub. Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 73 (1975). Suit was brought by music publishers against what
the Fifth Circuit called "tape parasites." Id. at 668. The defendants' filing of notices
of intent to use and their tendering of royalties were to no avail because the court held
that their duplicating activities did not fit within the compulsory license provision.
Id. at 667.
24. 506 F.2d at 394.
25. Id. at 395.
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used. . . [T]he statute only authorize[d] the use of the . . .written
26
score."
Observing that the compulsory license provision was part of an amendment enacted "to protect the creative efforts of the composer," 27 the court
argued that an interpretation contrary to its own would not offer adequate
protection. Since record piracy reduces the profits of the original manufacturer and lessens his incentive to produce other recordings,28 a composer
could expect his future works to "be performed in a less costly production
and possibly receive less public attention. '2 9 The Third Circuit concluded,
therefore, that the defendants' duplicating activities, sanctioned by neither
the language nor the policy of the compulsory license provision, infringed
80
the plaintiffs' rights under the Copyright Act.
Although the Third Circuit aligned itself with other circuits that have
interpreted the meaning of "similar use,"' 1 the Jondora decision can be
criticized as an incorrect statutory construction in conflict with both
Supreme Court dicta and legislative history. The Third Circuit interpreted
"similar use" to mean that the manufacturer of a subsequent recording
must use the copyrighted composition in a fashion similar to the original
26. Id. In construing "similar use" to exclude record duplication, the court noted
that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had recently reached the same conclusion. Id. at
399-400; see notes 21 & 22 supra.
27. 506 F.2d at 395. The court stated:
The amendment of 1909 was intended to protect the creative efforts of the composer, and the compulsory license provision was inserted, not in an effort to
penalize him, but to prevent monopolization by manufacturers. The statute should
be interpreted in that spirit.
Id. at 395-96.
28. Id. at 396. Since a record manufacturer can now copyright any new recording,
the Third Circuit could have made an additional and arguably stronger argument that
the composer could also be injured by the record manufacturers' reluctance to rerelease old recordings for fear that record piracy would make the release unprofitable.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 397. Although the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately
denied certiorari in Marks, it did invite the Solicitor General to submit an amicus
curiae brief. Colorado Magnetics, Inc. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 419 U.S.
819 (1974). The Solicitor General's brief in Marks, which supported the position
that was later taken by the Third Circuit in Jondora, noted that "on a fair reading
of the compulsory license provision only the original composition is available for
'use'." Brief for Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae, Colorado Magnetics, Inc.
v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp, 419 U.S. 819 (1974). quoted in Derenberg,
Judicial Developments in Literary and Artistic Property, 22 BULL. CR. Soc. 286, 287
(1975). The Solicitor General thought a contrary interpretation would injure the
composer not only because record companies would be less willing to record new
songs but also because the recording of new musical arrangements would be deterred.
Derenberg, supra at 287.
Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Jondora, opposed the majority decision upon
two grounds. First, he asserted that Congress had envisioned more limited control
by composers over the recording of their works by third parties. 506 F.2d at 399
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). Second, because of the preemption doctrine, he argued that
the Supreme Court could not have upheld a state statute which prohibited record piracy,
as it did in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), had a federal remedy against
record duplicators existed. 506 F.2d at 400-01; see text accompanying notes 38-43
infra.
31. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
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licensee - that is, he must hire arrangers, performers, and technicians to
create a recording from the written score. 2 But the phrase "similar use"
is ambiguous. It is equally plausible that those words refer solely to any
subsequent recording of a work, however created. Under this alternative
construction, the composer loses the power to prohibit any recording of
his work once he licenses the first recording. Having made the composition
available and having no rights in the performing or technical elements
which combine with his score to produce a recording, his rights become
solely economic. 33 He cannot enjoin any subsequent recording so long as
the notice and royalty requirements of the compulsory license provision are
4
3

satisfied.

There seems little reason to prefer either the Jondora construction or
its alternative solely upon the basis of the statutory language. Subsequent
to Jondora, however, the United States Supreme Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken35 enunciated a standard which lends support to
the Jondoraposition:
[T]he ultimate aim [of the copyright law] is . . .to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good .... When technological change

has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be
construed in light of this basic purpose.3 6
Record duplicators, by perpetuating existing performances and lowering the
profitability of the recording industry,37 lessen the chance that new and
more artistic versions of a work will become available. The Third Circuit's
decision could have the opposite effect by allowing a composer to enjoin
such record duplication. .
But the support found for Jondora in Twentieth Century Music must
38
be balanced against dicta found in Goldstein v. California.
In Goldstein,
the Supreme Court stated that under the compulsory license provision
"composers were to have no control over the recordings themselves."' 9
Jondora gives the composer control over a recording which duplicates a
prior, licensed recording, a result not reconcilable with Goldstein's dicta.
32. 506 F.2d at 395.
33. M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 108.4621 (1975). For opinions supporting this
interpretation, see Fame Pub. Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667, 672
(5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 73 (1975) ; Jondora
Music Pub. Co. v. Melody Rec., Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) ; Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458
F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir.) (Bryne, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
This interpretation was labelled the "prevailing view" in Schrader, Sound Recordings:
Protection Under State Law and Under the Recent Amendment to the Copyright Code,
14 ARIZ. L. REV. 689, 691 n.10 (1972). It should be noted, however, that the Schrader
article was published in 1972 before the Marks, Jondora, and Fame Publishing decisions.
34. M. NIMMER, supra note 33, § 108.4621.
35. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
36. Id. at 156 (citations and footnote omitted).
37. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
38. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
39. Id. at 566.
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Neither is the Goldstein holding reconcilable with fondora unless one takes
a very narrow view of what constitutes federal preemption. Goldstein involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a California criminal statute
prohibiting record piracy. 40 The Supreme Court upheld the challenged
statute on the ground that Congress had neither given nor precluded copyright protection for recordings prior to February 15, 1972.41 To reconcile
this with Jondora,one must assume the Goldstein Court was referring only
to express congressional protection for the owner of the master record or
tape. 42 In form, Jondora involved only the protection of the composer's
copyrighted work, but the clear practical effect of the Jondora decision is
to protect the composer's licensee against duplication of his recording.
Unless one reads Goldstein in a most limited fashion, both Jondora and
43
Goldstein cannot be valid.
Jondora can also be criticized as judicial legislation. Congressional
committee reports preceding enactment of the Sound Recording Amendment of 197144 repeatedly stated that no federal remedy existed against
unauthorized record duplicators. 45 Despite the view, which prevailed at
that time, that record duplicators were not infringers under the Copyright
Act so long as they made the required royalty payments, 46 Congress refused
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §

653h (West 1970).

41. 412 U.S. at 571. The Court stated:
[Tihe Constitution neither explicitly precludes the States from granting copyrights nor grants such authority exclusively to the Federal Government. The
subject matter to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may at times be of
purely local concern. No conflict will necessarily arise from a lack of uniform
state regulation, nor will the interest of one State be significantly prejudiced
by the actions of another. No reason exists why Congress must take affirmative
action either to authorize protection of all categories of writings or to free them
from all restraint. We therefore conclude that, under the Constitution, the States
have not relinquished all power to grant to authors "the exclusive Rights to their
respective Writings."
Id. at 560.
42. The statute upheld in Goldstein was designed to protect the owner of a
master record or tape. Id. at 548 n.1.
43. A record pirate in a state with a California-type statute could be liable on two
fronts: federally to the composer for using his composition without complying with
the compulsory license provisions and locally to the owner of the master record for
duplicating his product. Similarly, for records first recorded after February 15, 1972,
a record pirate could be liable federally both to the owner of the composition copyright
and to the owner of the copyright in the sound recording. See note 18 supra.
44. 17 U.S.C. §§ l(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 24, 26, 101 (e) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending
17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970); see note 18 supra.
45. See S. REP. No. 72, supra note 11, H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). For example, it was stated:
If the unauthorized producers pay the statutory mechanical royalty required
by the Copyright Act for the use of copyrighted music, there is no Federal remedy
currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction of the recording.
S. REP. No. 72, supra note 11, at 4.
46. See note 33 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit suggested that
cases have only recently arisen because increased remedies in the form of criminal
sanctions were made available with the passage of the Sound Recording Amendment
in 1971. 506 F.2d at 395 n.8. Previously, plaintiffs were limited to injunctive relief
and damages not exceeding three times the statutory royalty. Id.
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to extend copyright coverage to pre-1972 recordings. The Jondora court,
however, stating that it was "not bound by a congressional interpretation
of a statute passed in a preceding session,' 47 construed the compulsory
license provision to provide a pre-1972 federal remedy against record
duplicators, effectively giving the composer, and by extension his licensee,
a copyright in the recording of the composer's work. Thus, the result of
Jondora is to expand by judicial decision the limited copyright protection
granted to recordings in the Sound Recording Amendment.
In conclusion, the language of the compulsory license provision can
reasonably be read either to prohibit record duplication or to permit it as
"similar use of the copyrighted work." 48 Allowing the copyright holder to
enjoin duplicating activities may further the basic copyright purpose of
stimulating artistic creativity, 49 but it places the court in the position of
judicially expanding the protection Congress has granted to recordings.5 0
Further, both dicta and, arguably, the Supreme Court's holding in Goldstein
can be read to conflict with Jondora.5 1 Yet the Fifth,5 2 Ninth, 5 and
Tenth5 4 Circuits have supported the position taken by the Third Circuit
that record duplication may be enjoined by the holder of the composition
copyright.5 5 As the opposite decision would encourage record piracy,56
a dubious judicial goal, it is difficult to find these decisions wholly unreasonable despite their questionable legal foundation. Since many records
that were first recorded prior to 1972, and hence unprotected by the Sound
Recording Amendment, are still in demand, record manufacturers may
pressure copyright holders to initiate other Jondora-type suits. If the
Third Circuit's interpretation of the compulsory license provision does
prevail in such cases, it may well be that neither the composer nor his
licensee is defenseless "but, using the guns of the Copyright Act, can force
'57
the pirate to heave to in response to an injunctive shot across the bow."
MargaretS. Woodruff

47. 506 F.2d at 396. In support of its holding, the court noted that the Senate
Judiciary Committee, in rejecting a proposal to provide a compulsory license for sound
recordings, had found that
"the existing compulsory license merely provides access to the copyrighted
musical composition, which is the 'raw material' of a recording, and the performers,
arrangers, and recording experts are needed to produce the finished creative work
in the form of a distinctive sound recording."
Id. at 397, quoting 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 1569.
48. See text accompanying notes 32 & 33 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
52. See note 23 supra.
53. See note 21 supra.
54. See note 22 supra.

55. To date no court of appeals has held to the contrary.
56. 'The Fifth Circuit was perhaps indicating the underlying motivation in these
decisions when it labeled record duplicators "tape parasites." See note 23 supra.
57. 506 F.2d at 393.
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LANHAM ACT DOES NOT

PREEMPT NEW JERSEY RULE PROHIBITING

TERMINATION

OR NON-

RENEWAL OF FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT CAUSE.

Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co. (1975)
William Mariniello, a New Jersey gas station operator-franchisee,
brought suit against Shell Oil Company (Shell), his franchisor, in New
Jersey state court following Shell's 1972 refusal to renew his franchise,'
seeking continuation of his dealership and damages for Shell's allegedly
discriminatory practices. 2 Shell removed the case to the United States
3
District Court of New Jersey on the basis of diversity of citizenship,
and counterclaimed for possession of the gas station.4 The district court
considered the possession claim upon a motion for summary judgment,
and, under its interpretation of applicable New Jersey law, 5 awarded Shell
possession." In 1973, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Shell Oil
Co. v. Marinello,7 a case involving Mariniello's brother, and held that as
1. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.) 1 74,320,
at 93,478 (D.N.J. 1972). Although the agreement between the Shell Oil Company
(Shell) and Mariniello was embodied by a lease and a dealer-agreement, both the
district court, see id., and the court of appeals treated the arrangement as a franchise.
See Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 855 (3d Cir. 1975). In a related case
involving Frank Marinello, who is Mariniello's brother (but spells his surname
differently), the trial court disposed of Shell's contention that as a commercial landlord, not a franchisor, it had the right to terminate the lease. The court noted:
It is now recognized that a lease is simply a species of contract which happens
to concern real estate, and we must determine under principles of contract law
the construction of the document in question in a manner consistent with the
true intent and purpose and the reasonable expectations of the parties as suggested not only by the contents of the instrument but the whole of the relationship that existed between them.
Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 371-72, 294 A.2d 253, 261 (1972).
But see Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191
(Sup. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 34 App. Div. 2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970).
2. Mariniello alleged that Shell violated provisions of the New Jersey Motor
Fuels Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-20 et seq. (1964), by discriminating
against him in the fixing of motor fuel tankwagon prices. Mariniello v. Shell Oil
Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.) 1 74,547, at 94,405 (D.N.J. 1973). For
District Judge Coleman's summary of the complex procedural history of this litigation,
see id. at 94,406.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
4. TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.) fr 74,320, at 93,478.
5. Id. at 93,481. The court summarily disregarded the holding of the New
Jersey Superior Court in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d
253 (1972), upon the ground that the lower court decision was contrary to New
Jersey law as decided by the state supreme court. TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade
Cas.)
74,320, at 93,481. The district court, however, did not indicate the state
decisions upon which it relied. For a discussion of the superior court's holding, see
note 7 infra.
6. TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.) 1 74,320, at 93,481.
7. 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). Shell
sought to terminate Frank Marinello's gas station franchise at the expiration of a
3-year dealer agreement. Marinello immediately sued in the Chancery Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey seeking to enjoin Shell from terminating, and praying
for reformation of the dealer-agreement to constitute a joint venture. Shell Oil

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

51

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 9

1975-1976]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

a matter of public policy a franchisor could neither terminate nor fail to
renew a franchise without "good cause" to do so (New Jersey rule). 9
In light of this decision, William Mariniello returned to federal court 0
and moved to vacate the earlier summary judgment upon the theory that
the district court had misinterpreted the state law applicable to Shell's
possession claim." The district court refused to apply the New Jersey
12
rule, reasoning that it was repugnant to the Lanham Trademark Act
(Lanham Act, Act) and thus void under the supremacy clause' 8 of the
United States Constitution. 14 Upon appeal, the United States Court of
Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (1972). The trial court held that
there was an implied covenant in the lease and dealer-agreement upon the part of
Shell not to terminate the relationship absent good cause, and ordered the agreement reformed to express this covenant. Id. at 377, 294 A.2d at 264. The court
further found that Marinello had substantially complied with the provisions of the
dealer-agreement, and hence had not furnished Shell with the requisite good cause.
Id. at 385, 294 A.2d at 268.
8. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted:
We hold . . . that said public policy requires that there be read into the
existing lease and dealer agreement, and all future lease and dealer agreements
which may be negotiated in good faith between the parties, the restriction that
Shell not have the unilateral right to terminate, cancel, or fail to renew the
franchise, including the lease, in the absence of a showing that Marinello has
failed to substantially perform his obligations under the lease and dealer-agreement, i.e., for good cause ...
63 N.J. at 410-11, 307 A.2d at 603.
9. Id. While the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, reformation of the dealer-agreement was deemed to be unnecessary since the good cause
covenant was implied by public policy. Id. at 406, 307 A.2d at 600.
The supreme court's holding closely tracked the language of the recently
enacted New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (FPA), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1
et seq. (Supp. 1975). Although the FPA was enacted in 1971, it expressly stated
that it would not apply to agreements already in existence upon the date of its enactment. Id. § 56:10-8. The supreme court, while recognizing that the statute was not
applicable to the contract at issue, nevertheless found the FPA to be a codification
of the existing public policy of the state of New Jersey which forbade termination
of a franchise by a franchisor except upon good cause. 63 N.J. at 409, 307 A.2d
at 602. For similar statutes and their fates, see note 71 infra.
10. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 368 F. Supp. 1401 (D.N.J. 1974).
11. Id. at 1403.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970).
13. The supremacy clause provides in relevant part:
[Tihe Laws of the United States .. . shall be the supreme Law of the land . . .
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
14. 368 F. Supp. at 1407. Shell also advanced two other constitutional challenges to the Nrew Jersey rule, one via the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl.1, and the other under the due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 511 F.2d at 859-60.
Shell argued that the New Jersey rule was in fact a retroactive application
of the FPA in violation of the contracts clause. Id. While recognizing the general
rule that the clause applies only to legislative enactments and not to judicial decisions, the Third Circuit also recognized an exception to the rule - an unconstitutional impairment may be worked by a judicial decision, where the decision has no
grounds other than a statute, even though the statute is not expressly implicated.
Id. at 859, citing Columbia Ry. Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236
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Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded, 15 holding that the New Jersey common law rule prohibiting termination or non-renewal of franchise agreements without good cause, is
not in conflict with the Lanham Trademark Act, and is not, therefore,
invalidated by the supremacy clause. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d
853 (3d Cir. 1975).
The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946 following more than 8 years of
congressional consideration,' 6 was a significant advance over earlier federal
trademark legislation 17 because it gave the owner of a federally registered
mark greater substantive rights than had existed at common law.' 8 While
the prime motivation for its enactment was a desire to simplify, modernize,
and impose uniformity upon trademark practice, 19 the ultimate goals of
(1923), and Terre Haute & I.R.R. v. Indiana, 194 U.S. 579 (1904). The court's
refusal to fit the New Jersey rule within this exception was implicitly based upon
a finding that the New Jersey rule had an independent common law leg to stand upon;
a finding clearly correct in light of decisions from other jurisdictions which have
been able to reach similar conclusions - no termination except on good cause without the benefit of a local franchise practices statute. See Philadelphia Storage
Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 161 S.C. 487, 159 S.E. 825 (1931) (established
South Carolina rule that a franchisor may exercise the power to terminate only in
good faith) ; accord, Gaines W. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp.
243 (E.D.S.C. 1960). See also deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099
(4th Cir. 1971); J.R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 845 (1931);

Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability - Franchisee Remedies for Termination.
29 Bus. LAW. 227 (1973).
The court summarily disposed of the due process challenge, remarking that
it should not be decided upon a record as slim as that before the court, and noting
that if it were to be established at the trial upon the merits that Shell had good
cause to terminate, there would be no need to resolve the due process question. 511
F.2d at 860; see text accompanying notes 75-82 infra.
15. Judge Kalodner and Judge Aldisert heard the case with Judge Adams, who
wrote the opinion.
16. The history of proposed trademark legislation from the first bill on January
19, 1938 through the final version of May 14, 1946 is summarized in S. REP. No. 1333,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1946).
17. Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 164, §§ 1-9, 41 Stat. 533-55; Act of Feb. 20,
1905, ch. 592, §§ 1-30, 33 Stat. 724-31; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 38, §§ 77-84, 16
Stat. 210-12.
18. When the Lanham Trademark Act (Lanham Act, Act) was passed it marked
the first time that:
Congress had passed a law creating substantive, as well as procedural, rights in
trademarks . . . . As Judge Learned Hand concluded, the Lanham Act "did

indeed put federal trademark law on a new footing."
J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 5.4, at 120 (1973), quoting

S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949). Under theAct, substantive rights were given to the federal registrants by the combination of
section 1072, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970), which provides nationwide constructive notice
of adoption of the mark upon registration, and sections 1065 and 1115, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1065, 1115 (1970), which create an incontestable right of use after a certain period
of time. See Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.
1951). See also John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 115 (5th Cir. 1966).
19. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946). The Lanham Act also.
sought to provide protection for foreign marks, securing reciprocal protection of
American marks in international use. Id.
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the Lanham Act were to protect the public from deception, and the trade20
mark owner from piracy of the mark.
When substantive rights are created by federal law, the supremacy
clause often raises a question about the validity of a state statute which
affects the same rights. Although the cases decided under the clause
typically have been treated in an ad hoc fashion 2 ' with special emphasis
upon the individual facts of each case and the particular statutory scheme
in question, 22 the Supreme Court has stated the essential inquiry to be
whether the state law at issue "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' ' 2 3
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that analysis under the supremacy
clause involves a two-step process, 24 requiring a determination, first,
whether the state law stands within a field that Congress has exclusively
occupied, 25 and, second, whether the state law is in actual conflict with
federal legislation.2 6 In the absence of one of these two conditions, there
can be no supremacy clause violation. If it is determined that Congress
intended to exercise exclusive federal legislative power, all state legislation
29
in the same field 27 is barred, whether conflicting,28 or supplementary.
30
Preemptive intent may be expressly stated or may appear by implica20. Id. at 3.

21. See, e.g., Hines v.Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), wherein itwas stated:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or
federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these
expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly

marked formula.

Id. at 67. See also Hirsh, Towards a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 515, 520-21.
22. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973),
citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
23. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
24. For discussion of recent judicial approaches to supremacy clause analysis, see
Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 COLO. L. REv. 51 (1973);
Hirsch, supra note 21; Comment, Supremacy Clause Analysis: Conflict Between

Financial Responsibility Laws and the Bankruptcy Act, 52 B.U.L. Rxv. 168 (1972).
25. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973) ; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) ; Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
26. See, e.g., Perez v.Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); UAW, Local 232 v.Wisconsin Employ. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
27. For a development of the argument that once preemptive intent has been
ascertained, the proper inquiry is the size of the field that Congress intended to
occupy, see note 55 infra.
28. E.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
29. E.g., Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942). See also
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
30. For an example of statutory use of express language of preemption, see 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970) which provides in relevant part: "This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ....
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tion,31 but, where there is strong local interest in the state legislation,
preemptive intent will be implied only where there is clear and unambiguous
evidence3 2- of a congressional design to exclude the states from the particular
legislative field.

3

Shell's contention that the New Jersey rule conflicted with provisions
of the Lanham Act, 34 presented the Third Circuit with a supremacy clause
question. 35 The court indicated that in order to prove its supremacy
claim, Shell had the burden of showing either Congress' express preemption
of the trademarks field, or actual conflict between the New Jersey rule
and the federal law.38

The court first rejected the argument that the

Lanham Act expressly preempted state trademark legislation. Although
one of the Lanham Act's stated purposes is "to protect registered marks
used in [interstate] commerce from interference by state or territorial
legislation,"3 the court was not persuaded that Congress intended to
occupy the field of trademark regulation to the complete exclusion of state
legislation.38 The court supported its conclusion by noting that despite the
uniform, nationwide system of regulation instituted by the Lanham Act,
local marks may still be enforced under applicable state or common law.3 9
Having rejected Shell's allegation of express preemption, the court
then considered its contention that the state regulation and the federal
law were in actual conflict. 40

Noting that conflict must be measured by

determining whether the state law's effect is to frustrate the Act's purposes,41 the court concluded that since there was no allegation that the
31. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624

(1973). See also Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912), wherein the Court noted:
[W]hen the question is whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entirescheme of the statute must of course be considered and that which needs must be
implied is of no less force than that which is expressed.
Id. at 533.
32. Evidence of preemptive intent may be culled from an examination of thelegislative history, the nature of the field, and the particular provisions and purposes.
of the statute. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.

624 (1973) ; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) ; Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).

33. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); California v.

Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) ; Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)_
34. 511 F.2d at 856.
35. For the text of the supremacy clause, see note 13 supra.
36. 511 F.2d at 857.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).

38. 511 F.2d at 857.
39. Id. at 857-58. It should be noted that the existence of state and local mark
protection is not necessarily fatal to the theory that the Lanham Act preempted thefield, it merely goes to the size of the field preempted. For development of this point,
see note 55 infra.

The court also noted that the Act itself created a defense to an infringement
action brought by a federal registrant. 511 F.2d at 858 n.22. The defense is based.
upon prior good faith use under state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1970). For a discussion of how the presence of this defense in the Act tends to negate any congressional preemptive intent, see note 54 infra.
40. 511 F.2d at 858.
41. Id.
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42
New Jersey rule fostered either the evils of piracy or deception, there
43
Neither
was no actual conflict between the Lanham Act and the rule.
express preemption nor actual conflict having appeared, the court con44
cluded that the Lanham Act did not preempt the New Jersey rule.
Although the Lanham Act does not expressly prohibit states from
45
the Third
legislating in the field of federally registered trademarks,
The
implied.
be
to
was
intent
an
such
whether
Circuit failed to consider
47
46
Corp.,
Bicron
v.
Co.
Oil
Kewanee
California,
v.
Goldstein
cited
court
4
and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 8 for the proposition that states may
legislate in places left open within a federal regulatory scheme unless
4 9
there is express language of preemption. Although the cases may foreshadow a trend in the direction noted, it is possible that the court overstated
the development of that trend. In Rice, for example, the Supreme Court of
the United States indicated that even though there is a presumption against
preemption when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by
the states, preemptive intent might still be evidenced in a variety of ways
0
other than by express declaration." Furthermore, while Goldstein and
Kewanee, taken together, are strong support for the proposition that the
mere existence of a nationwide registration system does not preclude states
51
from legislating in the interstices of the national scheme, the cases do
not establish a rule that congressional intent to occupy a field need be

express.

52

42. Id.; see text accompanying note 20 supra.
43. 511 F.2d at 858-59. The court reinforced its conclusion that the supremacy
clause did not bar application of the New Jersey rule by reasoning that if a court were
unable to enforce the implied renewal provision merely because the contract involved
the licensing of federally registered marks, the court would be equally unable to
strike express contractual terms which were unenforceable under state law. Thus,
an exploitive franchisor might include unconscionable terms, or a disclaimer of negligence, in the franchise contract and rely upon the supremacy clause and the Lanham
Act to insulate those provisions from state law. Id. at 858.
44. Id. at 858-59.
45. Id. at 858.
46. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
47. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
48. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
49. 511 F.2d at 857.
50. 331 U.S. at 230. The Court gave examples of several ways that preemptive
intent might appear:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the

inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of the obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.
Id. (citations omitted).
51. In Goldstein the Court decided that the nationwide copyright registration
scheme did not preclude a state from providing musicians protection against piracy of
their music. 412 U.S. at 571. In Kewanee the Court concluded that state protection
of trade secrets would be allowed despite the existence of uniform federal patent laws.
416 U.S. at 493.
52. To imply such a limitation would confiscate the elbow room needed by courts
in their decision-making role. Cf. W. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW - CASES
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The court's error was more analytical than substantive, however, for
despite statements both in the Act and its legislative history suggesting a
congressional intent to insulate federal marks from diverse state regulation, 8
examination of the provisions of the Act strongly suggests that preemptive
intent should not be implied. Two internal inconsistencies 54 within the
19-60 (1975). In Goldstein, in fact, extensive consideration was
given to the question of whether the framers of the Constitution intended exclusive
federal regulation of copyrights by the copyright clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 8, despite the absence of an express reservation of power. 412 U.S. at 553-59.
53. Section 1127 states the purpose of the Lanham Act:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference
by State, or territoriallegislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce ....
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970) (emphasis added). In addition, the Senate report on the
Lanham Act stated:
A man's rights in his trade-mark in one State may differ widely from the rights
which he enjoys in another.
However, trade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in interstate
commerce are properly the subject of Federal regulation. It would seem as if
national legislation along national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in
interstate commerce definite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now.
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946). The report concluded that "[t]rademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given them." Id.
at 6. See also Diggens, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 200 (1949).
54. The first inconsistency in the drawing of the federal-state boundary within
the Lanham Act appears in the following situation. A begins to use trademark X in
one part of the country. B later begins to use trademark X in another part of the
country. A registers his mark under the provisions of the Federal Lanham Act. Five
years pass and A's right to use the mark becomes incontestable. 15 U.S.C. § 1065
(1970). The question is, in what area is A's incontestable right to use exclusive?
Two sections of the Act are of relevance in determining the rights of A and B after
A's right to use the mark has become incontestable. Section 1065 allows a federal
mark owner's right to use the mark to become incontestable only to the extent that
it would not infringe upon rights granted a junior user under state law prior to the
senior user's federal registration. Id. § 1065. Thus, in the hypothetical situation
above, A's right to exclusive use of the mark would only become incontestable in that
geographic area outside the zone in which B had gained a right to use the mark
under state law at the time that A first obtained federal registration. So if the
common law of B's state allowed him to use the mark throughout the state at the
time A registered, then A's right to exclusive use after registration would only be
incontestable in the area outside B's state.
Section 1115(b), on the other hand, establishes a "prior good faith-actual
use" defense in favor of the junior user who is being sued for infringement by the
senior federal user. Id. § 1115(b). If the junior user shows that the mark was
adopted in good faith and has been in use continually from a date prior to the senior
user federal registration, then the senior user has no right to enjoin the junior user's
use. Id. However, the section specifically provides that this defense shall only apply
AND MATERIALS

for the area in which such continuous prior use is proved. Id. So in the above

hypothetical, if B could show good faith and continuous use throughout his home
state, then A's right to exclusive use would be limited to the area outside B's home state.
It is clear that the two sections establish different tests to determine B's
rights. Section 1065 creates a "prior state right" test, while section 1115(b) establishes a "prior good faith-actual use" test. Thus, it appears that to the extent that
state law grants B a right to use the mark in an area larger or smaller than the area
of his good faith-actual use, there is a conflict between the two sections. Since the
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Act, concerning the relationship between federal and state law, indicate
that its authors did not mark the boundaries of federal and state trademark
protection as clearly as they would have done had they actually intended
the federal law to occupy the field.
Having failed to find express preemptive intent,5 5 the Mariniello court
was forced to question whether the state rule actually conflicted with the
common law, still vital in many states with respect to trademarks, gives a markowner the right to use the mark in the area of actual use plus the "zone of natural
expansion," United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918) ; Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), it would seem that potential conflict could be substantial.
Two federal courts have been confronted with this conflict between sections
1065 and 1115(b), and both have ruled that the "prior good faith-actual use" test
should be followed, rather than the "prior state right" test of section 1065. Burger
King v. Hoots, Inc., 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (defendant could acquire no right
to use "Burger King" mark in Illinois in area greater than area of prior actual use,
regardless of applicable state law) ; TraveLodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238
(N.D. Ala. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 352 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1965) ("prior state right"
rule must fall in favor of "prior good faith-actual use" defense of section 1115(b)
so as to deny junior user state rights arguably acquired without good faith). See also
J. McCARTHY, supra note 18, at 238.
A second place in the Lanham Act where the federal-state boundary is inconsistently drawn, is pointed out by the following hypothetical. A uses his mark
in commerce, registers it under the Lanham Act, and after 5 years his right to exclusive use becomes incontestable. Then B, in good faith, begins to use the same
trademark. A's actual use is confined to the Northeast of the United States. B's use
is limited to the Southwest. As has been seen, the Act purports to give a federal
mark owner an exclusive right to interstate use of the mark, subject to a few
limited defenses. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1970). However, section 1114
gives the mark owner the right to enjoin concurrent use of the same mark by another
only when the junior use produces a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
Id. § 1114. Until confusion between the uses arises, the senior user's "exclusive right
to use [the mark] in commerce" must abide in peaceful coexistence with the junior
user's right to concurrent nonconfusing use as regulated by state law. Id. Thus, in
the hypothetical situation set forth above, if B's use does not conflict with A's use,
and if there is no likelihood of deception or confusion between the uses, A cannot
enjoin B from continued use of the mark in the Southwest, despite the fact that as
a federal mark owner, A is given a right of exclusive use in interstate commerce.
Id. § 1115(b). See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d
Cir. 1959) (senior user has a future right to enjoin the junior use should it expand
and cause confusion). Accord, John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108
(5th Cir. 1966) ; American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1963); TraveLodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ala. 1964), aff'd per
curiann, 352 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1965).
'The two internal inconsistencies indicate more than mere bad drafting; in
both cases the confusion is caused by the fact that the weight to be given to state
trademark protection was never decided. As has been seen, section 1052 would make
the scope of the federal right turn upon the extent of the prior right created by state
law. Section 1115(b), on the other hand, creates a federal statutory defense that has
no reference to state mark protection. It is suggested that the conclusion to be drawn
from this is that there was no agreement among the authors regarding preemption;
in such a situation, no preemptive intent can properly be implied. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
55. The most interesting preemption analysis is suggested in Developments in
the Law - Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L. REV. 814 (1955);
and in Note, Franchise Terminations and Refusals to Renew: The Lanham Act and
Preemption of State Regulation, 60 IOWA L. REV, 122 (1974). Given evidence of
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federal scheme.5 6 Although the court concluded that the ultimate effect
of the New Jersey rule would not frustrate the Act's purposes,5 7 in fact,
the rule's future effect upon the twin scourges of piracy and deception is
difficult to ascertain at the present time. But despite this difficulty, there
clearly exists a potential conflict between the New Jersey rule and the
Lanham Act insofar as the Act provides that if a franchisor fails to control
the use of its mark by a related company 5 8 the use will not be deemed to

some preemptive intent, the argument runs, the question is the size of the field that
Congress intended to occupy.
Given this premise, the following analysis of the Lanham Act's preemptive
force would seem to apply. At its broadest, Congress could exclusively occupy only
the field of marks used in interstate commerce. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879). However, had they so intended, no state could legislate with respect to any
mark, registered or not, that affected interstate commerce. Clearly, no such sweeping
occupation was intended. Choosing a slightly narrower field, Congress might have intended to preempt the field of federally registerable trademarks. If this were the case,
no state could regulate use of a mark that was federally registered or was capable of
being federally registered. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974),
where a similar question arose in the field of federal patent law. Further, federal intent
might have been to preempt an even narrower area - the field of federally registered
marks. Under this analysis, a state would not be able to legislate with respect to any
mark once it had been registered under the Lanham Act. An unfortunate side effect of
this reading of congressional intent is that a mark owner would be forced to choose
between state and federal registration, because upon federal registration he or she
would no longer be able to take advantage of the state remedies. However, it may
well be that the advantages of federal registration so far outweigh any state law
benefits that the likelihood of a meaningful choice is remote. A yet narrower expression of preemptive intent would confine exclusive federal legislation to the field of
federal trademark owners' rights. Thus, states would be precluded from enacting
legislation that conflicted with, or suppelmented, the rights of federal mark owners,
but they could legislate in other areas of the trademark field, so long as no conflict
developed. Under this limited view of federal preemption, the New Jersey rule which
essentially regulates the licensing of federal marks, might well be sustained. Of
course, if no preemptive intent were found, a trademark owner could choose between
applicable state and federal law and select the more favorable, so long as there was
no actual conflict.
56. 511 F.2d at 858. Confusion is particularly rife in this area because of the
various uses of the term "conflict."
[T]he fundamental inquiry, broadly stated, is the same: does the state action
conflict with national policy? The Cooley rule . . . , the question of congressional "occupation of the field," and the search for conflict in the very terms of
state and federal statutes are but three separate particularizations of this
initial principle.
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949), citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (in the absence of federal legislation a state may not
regulate those aspects of commerce which are national in nature).
57. 511 F.2d at 858; see text accompanying note 20 supra.
58. Section 1127 provides in relevant part:
The term "related company" means any person who legitimately controls or
is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the
nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark
is used.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
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inure to its benefit. 59 In addition, if the mark loses its significance as an
indication of the product's origin, the franchisor will be found to have
abandoned the mark. 60 Thus, to the extent that the rule's anti-termination
and renewal provisions interfere with a franchisor's ability to control the
quality of the trademarked product or service, and thereby to protect its
rights in the mark, there is conflict with the Act.61
A second potential conflict caused by the New Jersey rule appears in
the area of franchise uniformity. The one virtue of uniformity in franchise
operation is that the consumer can be certain that the quality of a trademarked product or service will be the same in one part of the country as
in another. 62 Since the rule deprives New Jersey franchisors of a method
of controlling the uniformity of franchise operation termination for
those who deviate - and since New Jersey franchisees will gain a corresponding measure of security in their franchises, it is foreseeable that
there will be greater diversity of individual franchise operation throughout
the state. To the extent that franchise diversity would deceive the public,

59. Id. § 1055. With respect to use by related companies which may affect the
validity of the mark, the Act provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may be
used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the
registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the validity
of such mark or of its registration, provided such mark is not used in such
manner as to deceive the public.
Id.; see Taggart, Trade-Marks and Related Companies: A New Concept In Statutory
Trade-Mark Law, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234 (1949), wherein it is explained

that a common law, trademarks could be assigned along with the goodwill of the
business which was using the mark, but they could not be licensed. Id. at 235-36.
If a mark owner permitted outside use of the mark he or she risked losing the mark
to the other user. Id. Section 1055 of the Lanham Act was a new development in
statutory trademark law, allowing licensing of trademarks when certain control
requirements were met. Id. If the related-company provisions of the statute are not
satisfied, the licensor is placed in the same position as at common law, and by
licensing the mark, may be found to have abandoned the mark. Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Superior Bedding Co. v.
Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See also Alligator Co. v.
Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
60. With regard to abandonment, the Act provides:
A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" (b) When any course of conduct of the registrant, including acts of omission
as well as commission, causes the mark to lose its significance as an indication
of origin.
15 U.S.C. § 1127(b) (1970).
61. See Shniderman, Trade-Mark Licensing - A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14
; Taggart, supra note 59.

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 248 (1949)
62. J. MCCARTHY, supra note

18, §§ 2.12-.14. It is important that a distinction be drawn between uniformity of franchise operation, and the quality of the
goods supplied by the various franchisees. The Lanham Act was not concerned with
effectuating consumer protection by setting minimum standards of quality for licensees.
For the purposes of the Act, see text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra. The
idea was to insure that whatever the standard of quality chosen by the licensor, all the
licensees would substantially comply. The goal, therefore, was uniformity of products
distributed and produced under a given trademark. Id.
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there would be a second conflict between the New Jersey rule and the
Lanham Act.
Although these potential conflicts exist, the Third Circuit was justified
in holding that the New Jersey rule does not frustrate the Lanham Act's
purposes for several reasons. While the Act requires that a licensor provide
for and actually exercise affirmative control over its licensees in order to
protect the mark,63 the Act expressly limits the licensor to the exercise of
legitimate control.6 4 In fact, the Act expressly warns against overzealous
control of a licensee's use of the mark, and specifically provides for forfeiture of the right to exclusive use of the mark if "overcontrol" causes
a violation of the antitrust laws.65 While it appears that an inability to
control the mark may constitute abandonment, and "overcontrol" may result
in forfeiture, there is, of course, a reasonable range of legitimate control
between the two extremes, within which the franchisor can adequately
insure the uniformity and quality of goods or services produced by its
franchisees. Thus, the loss of one method of control does not necessarily
mean that the franchisor will be unable to protect the mark.
Secondly, the New Jersey rule does not deprive a franchisor of all
avenues of control over the uniformity of the product merely by removing
the threat of termination without cause. 66 Clearly, substantial deviation
from the norm of franchise operation would constitute good cause to terminate.6 7 Furthermore, it has been established that a franchisor can state
63. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1970). See note 59 supra. "Legitimate" control is not
defined in the Act and must take its meaning from state and federal law surrounding
the Lanham Act. It has been suggested that the FPA and the New Jersey rule
represent nothing more than statutory and common law definitions of "legitimate"
control. See Note, supra note 55, at 138-42.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (7) (1970); see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Hearings on H.R. 82
Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. 58-71 (1941), where Department of Justice representatives testified that
if joint use and control of a mark were permitted upon the strength of contractual
arrangement alone, trademark licensing "would be used as a colorable legal sanction
for contracts directed towards price control, for allocation of markets, divisions of
uses, and fixing channels of distribution." Id. at 58. The Justice Department's fear
that the limited monopoly necessarily conferred by the Lanham Act would be
abused, led it to advocate an express prohibition of the use of trademarks as a means
of violating the antitrust laws. Id. Thus, section 1115(b) (7) was enacted. See
Taggart, Trade-Marks: Monopoly or Competition, 43 MicH. L. REV. 659 (1945).
66. In addition to the examples stated, a franchisor may, of course, recover
against the franchisee for breach of contract, where the franchisee fails to perform
his or her obligations under the franchise contract.
67. See New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (Supp.
1975), which provides:
For purposes of this act, good cause for terminating, cancelling, or failing to
renew shall be limited to failure by the franchisee to substantially comply with
those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise.
Id. Substantial deviation would also be "good cause" for purposes of the New Jersey
rule. See note 8 supra.
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a cause of action against a franchisee who sells nonconforming goods under
the licensed trademark.', But perhaps the strongest response to the argument that the franchisor needs to control its licensees in order to protect
the mark, is simply that a franchisor does not need the excessive control
that it has in practice.69 Thus, even though the full effect of the rule cannot
68. Franchised Stores v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1968). The court noted:

It would be anomolous on the one hand to burden the trademark owner with
this 'affirmative' duty [to control the licensee from acting in a fashion that
would cause the mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin] and
then on the other hand deny him a federal forum in which to control his licensees.
Id. at 669 (emphasis added); see Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting
Mills, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (franchisee selling sweaters below
level of quality established in license agreement found liable to franchisor upon unfair
competition theory).
69. In Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D. Mass. 1953), a
licensor sued a licensee to terminate their license agreement and to enjoin the
licensee's use of plaintiff's trademark, upon the theory that the license agreement
failed to provide for adequate control over the licensee's use of the mark, because by
its terms the plaintiff-licensor was prohibited from interfering "directly or indirectly
with the internal management of the [1licensee's business." Id. at 679. The court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the internal management provision did not interfere with plaintiff's ability to supervise the method of dance
instruction and the other subjects of the license. Id. at 680. The court gave the
following advice:
After all the licensee should have a right to manage his own affairs provided he
observes the terms of his contract without the licensor taking over. A licensee

acts wisely in not submitting to observation and management by the licensor of
the many details outside the concern of the licensor.
Id. at 680. For the realities of the extent of modern franchisor control, see generally
H. BROWN, FRANCHISING - REALITIES AND REMEDIES (1973) [hereinafter cited as
H. BROWN, REMEDIES]; H. BROWN, FRANCHISING - TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969)
[hereinafter cited as H. BROWN, TRAP].
By virtue of the often tremendous disparity in size and bargaining power
between the franchisor and the franchisee, the latter is often unable to protect himself
or herself against arbitrary termination or failure to renew. Inequality of bargaining
power is especially apparent in the gasoline industry. See Comment, Dealer Franchising in the Gasoline Industry, 4 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 65 (1969). In Shell Oil Co. v.
FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), it was noted that "a man operating a gas station
is bound to be overawed by the great corporation that is his supplier, his banker, and
his landlord." Id. at 487. The court concluded that a major oil company is in a posi-

tion of inherent leverage with respect to its dealers. Id.
The principle problem of the franchise relationship lies in the area of goodwill. While a local franchisee may build up considerable goodwill during his or her
operation of the franchise, the goodwill necessarily attaches to the franchisor's trademark. Thus, upon dissolution of the franchise relationship, the goodwill inures to
the exclusive benefit of the franchisor. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1970). When it is realized
that franchise agreements often combine provisions for termination without cause
with covenants not to compete in the same geographic area after termination, H.
BROWN, REMEDIES, supra at 129-34, it becomes apparent that dissolution of the relationship can mean economic tragedy for the franchisee. One commenator has suggested that the situation may be further exacerbated, for once the franchisor's
primary purpose - rapid corporate expansion without enormous capital investment is accomplished, the franchisor may find it to be to its benefit to acquire the franchise
units and to vertically integrate them into the corporate operation. Id. at 40-41.
Thus the franchisee's position is maintained at the peril of the franchisor's decision
to exercise its power to terminate. As Brown states:
[T]he franchisee who signed visualizing himself as his own boss finds, after he
has purchased the franchise, that nothing could be farther from the truth - he
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yet be precisely determined, the minimal conflict with federal purposes,
and the alternative methods of control available to the franchisor, justify the
70
Third Circuit's holding.
State franchise legislation has faced constitutional attack before, 71 but
Mariniello presented the first supremacy clause challenge to state franchise
regulation.7 2 The decision impacts upon a greater area than that which is
at first apparent, for although the court vindicated only the state rule from
preemption under the supremacy clause, the decision will extend protection
to the newly enacted New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (FPA), 73 the
74
substance of which parallels the New Jersey rule.

Yet while the New Jersey rule prevailed in Mariniello, it must face a
further constitutional challenge. Since the rule applies to franchise contracts

must submit to complete domination for fear of losing his life savings if the
contract is terminated.
Id.
70. The proposition that preemption is not warranted in cases of partial conflict
derives support from Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), wherein
the Supreme Court held that federal patent laws did not preempt state trade secret protection. An analysis of Chief Justice Burger's opinion indicates that even though in
certain situations state protection of trade secrets would discourage inventors from entering the patent system, and thus conflict with the federal purpose of disclosure, preemption would not necessarily be warranted. Id. at 491. Although the Court did not
expressly adopt a balancing test in cases of partial conflict, Chief Justice Burger asserted that state-federal relations were best served by allowing the state and federal
protection to coexist. Id. See also Comment, A Balancing Approach: State Franchise
Law and Federal Trademark Law, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 463 (1975).
71. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 423 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (Puerto Rican statute requiring "just cause" to terminate a dealer's contract held to violate due process insofar as retrospectively applied) ;
Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1973)
(South Carolina statute requiring good cause to terminate franchise agreement held
to work an unconstitutional impairment of contract when given retrospective effect) ;
Globe Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers -Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 873 (1971) (Delaware Franchise Security Law struck down as unconstitutional
impairment of contracts within the meaning of the contracts clause).
72. Unlike the impairment of contracts and due process problems which essentially menace only retrospective regulation, the supremacy clause threatens any franchise regulation, retroactive or prospective, insofar as it interferes with the federal
regulation of trademarks.
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
74. As has been indicated (see note 9 supra), the Shell court decided that the
FPA merely codified the existing public policy of the State of New Jersey. 63 N.J.
402, 409, 307 A.2d 598, 602. Thus, while the New Jersey rule is of judicial origin
and capable of standing independently of the statute, it should be realized that, fictions
aside, the New Jersey rule makes the anti-termination provision of the FPA retroactive. The ambiguity caused by the posture of Mariniello is evident; although ostensibly it was the New Jersey rule being evaluated under the supremacy clause in
Mariniello, the role so closely tracks portions of the FPA that the latter would have
been stricken as well by an adverse decision. See note 9 supra. The irony of this
situation is pointed out in Comment, Federal District Court Declares New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act to Be An Unconstitutional Regulation of Trademarks in
Conflict With the Lanham Act, 6 RUTGERS-CAM EN L.J. 155 (1974), where the
author notes that although the rule, and not the statute, was considered by the district
court in Mariniello, that court essentially struck down the FPA without giving a state
court a chance to render a saving construction. Id. at 163.
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which were negotiated and executed prior to the rule's formulation, a
substantial question arises under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 75 which, by way of the fourteenth amendment,76 prohibits a state
from taking private property without compensation. It can be argued that
a franchisor's contractual right to terminate is a property right and thus
cannot be taken by the state without compensation. 77 So while Mariniello
removes any doubts about prospective application of the New Jersey rule,
a question remains about the constitutionality of its retroactive applicability.
That question gains importance when it is realized that a significant portion
of the franchise industry operates under contracts of indefinite duration
and would, thus, escape regulation which is wholly prospective, 78 as is
the FPA.79 For this reason, the impact of Mariniello could be dampened
when the problem posed by the due process clause is finally faced. Although proponents of the New Jersey rule have suggested that it places
only a reasonable restriction upon the franchisor's enjoyment of private
property,80 it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion reached by the court in
Fornarisv. Ridge Tool Co.,81 after it considered the change worked upon
existing contract rights by similar retroactive franchise regulation in Puerto
Rico:
If we may be forgiven a rude analogy, the change seems comparable
to a legislative retrospective conversion, in the asserted interest of
liaisons into marriage, with the necessity
public morals, of all temporary
82
of divorce and alimony.
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the due process question, it is
believed that the Mariniello court properly found the supremacy clause to
present no bar to application of the New Jersey rule. Although there is
some potential conflict between the rule and the Lanham Act, it appears
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. Chicago, B.&Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
77. One commenator has suggested that analysis under the contracts clause has
coalesced with that typically applied in due process situations. In this approach, the
Supreme Court considers the nature of the right, the policy furthered by the enactment or rule, and the extent and duration of the deprivation, then decides whether
the impairment worked, or the burden created, is reasonable in the circumstances. If
so, the statute or rule stands. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960).
78. See generally SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, IMPACT OF FRANCHISING ON SMALL BUSINESS, S. REP. No. 1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-28 (1970);
H. BROWN, REMEDIES, supra note 69; H. BROWN, TRAP, supra note 69; C. ROSENFIELD,
THE LAW OF FRANCHISING (1970); Student Symposium, The FranchiseRelationship Abuses and Remedies, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 641 (1972); Comment, supra note 69.
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-8 (Supp. 1975).

80. Comment, Constitutional Obstacles to State "Good Cause" Restrictions on
Franchise Terminations, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1487 (1974); Note, supra note 56, at

126 n.27.
81. 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir.), revd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
82. 423 F.2d at 568 n.9.
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that actual conflict will be slight, and outweighed by the great state interest
in regulating the abuse-ridden franchise industry. 83
Joseph A. Dworetzky

LABOR LAW -

ARBITRATION

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
STOPPAGE BY LOCAL MAY

UNQUALIFIED LANGUAGE IN
AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING No WORK
BIND

OTHER UNITS REPRESENTED

BY

SAME LOCAL.

Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Brothers Meat Packers, Inc. (1975)
The slaughtering and boning employees of Cross Brothers Meat
Packers, Inc. (Packers), who each comprised separate collective bargaining units, were represented by Local 195 of the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO (Local
195). 1 Local 195 was also the bargaining representative of a third unit,
consisting of the employees of Cross Brothers Hotel Supply, Inc. (Supply),
a separate but related corporation, 2 which was located across the street
from Packers. 3 The day after the Supply unit's collective bargaining agreement expired, the Supply employees went on strike 4 and later extended
their picketing to the area in front of the Packers' plant.5

At the request

of Local 195, Packers' employees, who were members of Local 195 as well
83. The need for regulation of the franchise relationship has increasingly been
recognized by the commentators and the courts. See e.g., Triple T. Serv. Inc. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 204 (Sup. Ct. 1969), aff'd,
34 App. Div. 2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1971); H. BROWN, REMEDIES, supra note 69,
at 129-34; H. BROWN, TRAP, supra note 69, at 87-94; Comment, FranchisingRegulation: An Appraisal of Recent State Legislation, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 529,
530-33 (1972). See also SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, IMPACT OF FRANCHISING ON SMALL BUSINESS, S. REP. No. 1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). In
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City
1972), the court made the following statement:
This court has done extensive research in the field of franchising and its
abuses and finds that while franchising accounts for approximately 90 billion
dollars in annual sales, 10% of the gross national product, and 25% of all retail
sales, the franchise industry is practically unregulated by statutory or common law.
Id. at 397, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 630; see note 69 supra.
1. Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113,
1115 (3d Cir. 1975).
2. Id. at 1115. The issues of whether Cross Brothers Hotel Supply, Inc.
(Supply) and Cross Brothers Meat Packers, Inc. (Packers) were in reality a single
employer and the resulting applicability of the "ally doctrine," were argued before
both the arbitrator and the district court, but were not at issue upon appeal. Id.; see
Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1274, 1277
(E.D. Pa. 1974). See generally NLRB v. Local 810, Steel Fabricators, 460 F.2d 1
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
3. 518 F.2d at 1115.
4. The Supply workers' collective bargaining agreement expired on June 30,
1971. The strike began on July 1, 1971. Id.
5. Id.
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as of other unions, refused to cross this Supply employees' picket line,6
causing a work stoppage at Packers. 7 Packers' separate agreements with
the slaughtering and the boning employees each contained grievance procedures which included compulsory arbitration clauses and no-strike provisions.8 After the work stoppage, Packers sought damages for breach
of the no-strike provisions. 9 When voluntary adjustment of the claim
failed, the claim was submitted to a single arbitrator. 10 The arbitrator
determined that Local 195 was liable to Packers for all damages caused
by the breach of the no-strike agreements, including those damages resulting from the refusal of employees who belonged to unions other than
Local 195 to cross the picket line." Local 195 then filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
requesting the court to vacate the arbitrator's award.' 2 Packers filed a
counterclaim seeking enforcement of the award.' 3 Upon reviewing the
arbitrator's decision, the district court granted Packers' motion for sum6. Id. None of Packers' union employees reported for work. This included the
slaughtering and boning employees, who were represented by Local 195, office and
clerical employees, who were represented by Teamsters' Local 161, and delivery employees, who were represented by Teamsters' Local 500. In addition, employees of an
independent contractor and of a garbage removal contractor refused to cross the
picket line. Id.
7. Id. The work stoppage lasted 1 day, at which time Packers obtained an ex
parte "preliminary restraining order," Cross Bros. Meat Packers v. Meat Cutters
Local 195, Civil No. 4535 (C.P. Phila. County, Pa., July 1, 1971), the validity of
which was not challenged on this appeal. 518 F.2d at 1115.
Since an injunction can issue only when arbitration is available, Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the issuance of the
restraining order by the common pleas court raises the implication that the dispute
had already been deemed arbitrable, making the present appeal unnecessary. The Third
Circuit reasoned, however, that because Packers had discontinued its suit in the
common pleas court before a preliminary injunction was actually issued, no final
disposition upon the merits had been made. 518 F.2d at 1118 n.10. Supply, therefore,
was not collaterally estopped from denying arbitrability. Id.
8. 518 F.2d 1115 n.2. The agreement for the slaughtering unit read in pertinent part:
The Union, for itself and for its individual members, agrees and guarantees
that there shall be no strike, stoppage of work, slow-down or other interference
with production. ...
Should any difference arise between the parties hereto or between the
Employer and the employees as to the interpretation or application of this agreement, an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences . ...
Id. The agreement for the boning unit was substantially identical to the agreement
above. Id.
9. Id. at 1116. The damages sought were for attorney's fees, condemnation of
meat, shrinkage caused by the delay, and for feed and transportation of cattle which
were denied ingress to the plant. Id. at 1116 n.4.
10. Id. at 1116. There was a minor issue in this case concerning whether the
dispute's submission to a single arbitrator was in compliance with the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 1120-21. The court concluded that the arbitrator and
not the court must decide whether the procedural aspects of the arbitration clauses
had been followed. Id., citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,

557 (1964).
11. 518 F.2d 1116.
12. Id. The district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
13. 518 F.2d at 1116-17.
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mary judgment. 1 4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed, 15 holding: 1) that when Local 195 negotiated the
collective bargaining agreements, which contained arbitration and nostrike provisions, on behalf of the slaughtering and boning units of Packers,
it had thereby agreed to arbitrate the Supply unit's right to picket at
Packers' plant even though that unit's collective bargaining agreement
should thereafter expire, and 2) that the arbitrator, therefore, had jurisdiction to hold Local 195 liable for all damages caused by the work stoppage at Packers' plant, including damages caused by members of unions
other than Local 195.16 Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Brothers Meat
Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1975).
In the context of collective bargaining agreements, any discussion of
the scope of arbitration clauses must commence with the Steelworkers
Trilogy.1 7 In that set of cases, the United States Supreme Court held
that, in order to effectuate the congressional policy encouraging arbitration,
the courts must resolve doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute in
favor of arbitration."' The Court announced, however, that "arbitration
is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."' 19 Therefore, the
threshold question that courts must determine in reviewing an arbitration
award is whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction. 20 If the dispute is deemed
to be arbitrable, the scope of judicial review of an arbitrator's award is
limited, and the award must be affirmed if it "can in any rational way be
'21
derived from the agreement."
The instant case involved not only the policy in favor of arbitration
but also a determination of which units Local 195 had bound to submit to
arbitration by its collective bargaining agreements on behalf of the slaughtering and boning employees. 22 Therefore, reference must also be made
to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which governs the estab14. 372 F. Supp. at 1274.
15. Judge Van Dusen wrote the opinion for the court, Judge Gibbons concurred,
and Judge Hunter dissented.
16. The court also held that the award was not "arbitrary, capricious, [nor] in
manifest disregard of the law," because it could rationally be derived from the agreements. 518 F.2d at 1121-22.
17. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.

564 (1960).

18. E.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Corp.,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). The Court stated:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may
be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage.
Id. at 582-83 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 582.
20. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964).
21. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).
22. 518 F.2d at 1118.
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lishment and operation of bargaining units.23 Sections 301 (b), 24 and
9(a)-(b) 25 of the NLRA are pertinent to this determination. Section
301 (b) enables a union to sue and be sued as an entity ;20 sections 9(a)-(b)
deal, respectively, with selection of representatives for all the employees in
a collective bargaining unit, and certification of appropriate representatives
27
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
In the instant case, the Third Circuit faced a question of first impression ;28 namely,
whether the Supply employees' right to picket was an arbitrable issue
where the collective bargaining agreement covering those employees
had expired, but where the local which represented them had agreements which related to different bargaining units, and which contained
29
no-strike and arbitration clauses.
The opinion of the court, written by Judge Van Dusen, divided the
Cross Brothers dispute into two parts for the purposes of analysis.30 First,
Judge Van Dusen dealt with those damages caused by the slaughtering
and the boning employees' refusal to cross the Supply picket line. 31 The
court applied two generally accepted principles of law. The first is that
a union may bargain away the rights of its members to honor a lawful
picket line ;32 the second, that the question of whether this right has been
bargained away may be an arbitrable issue.3 3 The court then examined
the slaughtering and the boning agreements, both of which had grievancearbitration clauses which were, respectively, called into play "[s]hould
any difference arise between the parties hereto . . . as to the interpretation or
application of [the] agreement" 3 4 or "[ijf a grievance arises."3 5 The court
acknowledged that neither of these clauses specifically referred to disputes
over the employees ability to honor lawful picket lines ;36 however, by reason of their inclusion within the same article that contained the broadly
worded no-strike clause, the court found it "natural to infer" that the scope
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 etseq. (1970).
24. Id. § 185(b).
25. Id. §§ 159(a)-(b).
26. Id. § 185(b).
27. Id. §§ 159(a)-(b).
28. 518 F.2d at 1118.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1117. This division, however, was not regarded by the court as a basis
upon which to divide the award, because of the well-settled principle against splitting
unitary arbitration awards. Id. at 1119, citing Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher,
405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
31. 518 F.2d at 1117.
32. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79-81 (1953).
33. Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975). In that case,
the Third Circuit held that the question of whether a union has relinquished its right
to cross picket lines is an arbitrable issue even in the absence of a no-strike provision.
Id. at 653.
34. See note 8 supra.
35. 518 F.2d at 1115 n.2.
36. Id.at 1117.
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of the no-strike clauses was arbitrable, particularly in light of the7 strong
policy favoring settlement of labor disputes through arbitrationY
The second area of damages was that caused by persons who were
not represented by Local 195.38 In Judge Van Dusen's opinion, the arbitrator included those damages in the award because he had found that the
Supply unit's picketing of Packers was proscribed by the slaughtering and
the boning units' agreements.3 9 Realizing that such a conclusion had
serious implications, the court examined the arguments presented on each
side. 40 The union had asserted that since an arbitrator's power is derived
solely from an existing collective bargaining agreement, 41 the arbitrator
had no contractual jurisdiction upon which to base this portion of his decision - the picketing involved a dispute between Local 195 and Supply
42
whose collective bargaining agreement had expired prior to the picketing.
Consequently, Local 195 argued that because it could not force Supply
to arbitrate a new collective bargaining agreement, there was "no quid
pro quo for the no-strike 'agreement' which the arbitrator enforced
'43
against the union."
44
Packers' argument, which was ultimately accepted by the court,
was that Local 195 had guaranteed not only for its individual members in
the slaughtering and boning agreements, but also "for itself," that there
would be no work stoppages. 45 Packers' argument turned upon the fact
that Local 195 had not limited the phrase "itself" to the role it played
as representative of the slaughtering and boning units. 40 Packers contended that Local 195 could not circumvent its agreement by "changing
hats" - that is, Local 195 could not agree to a no-strike clause in its
agreements with Packers, and then direct picketing against Packers as
47
bargaining representative for the Supply unit.

The court enumerated several factors which persuaded it to accept
Packers' argument. First, in the past, picketing at Supply had not disrupted business at Packers or vice versa, and this, Judge Van Dusen
concluded, in combination with Local 195's unqualified guarantee not to
strike, 48 left Packers without reason to anticipate work stoppages at its
plant so long as its agreement with the slaughtering and boning units
37. Id. There seems to be little question that all three judges agreed that Local
195 was liable for at least this portion of the damages. See note 62 and accompanying
text infra.
38. 518 F.2d at 1117; see note 6 supra.
39. 518 F.2d at 1117-18.
40. Id. at 1118.
41. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
42. 518 F.2d at 1118.
43. Id. at 1118-19 (citations & footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 1119.
45. See note 9 supra.
46. 518 F.2d at 1119. 'the court analogized the restrictions on Supply to those
that arise from a local's membership in an international. Id. at 1119 n.11.
47. Id. at 1119. It was at Local 195's request that the Packer employees refused
to cross the Supply picket line. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
48. For the text of the bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of the slaughtering unit employees by Local 195, see note 8 supra.
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remained in effect. 49 Second, the court stated that the union could have
altered Packers' expectations, which were based upon such past experience, by drafting an exception to the general language used in the slaughtering and boning agreements. 50 Third, the court emphasized that a
decision for the company would not entirely deprive the Supply employees of their right to engage in protected, concerted activity, for they
were still free to picket Supply.5 ' Finally, an overriding consideration for
the decision was the strong judicial policy encouraging arbitration, a
52
factor that was in Packers' favor.
Judge Van Dusen carefully noted that the court considered the reasons for its decision to be "peculiar to the unique facts of this case."153 Thus,
he concluded that the court might well have reached a different conclusion
if Packers' expectations had been based solely on ambiguous language in the
collective bargaining agreement, or if, by enforcing the collective bargaining
agreements, the employees in the unit not covered by an agreement would
have been totally deprived of their right to engage in concerted activity. 4
Judge Gibbons, in a concurring opinion, rejected Local 195's claim
that there was no contract arbitration provision from which the arbitrator
could obtain jurisdiction since the Supply employees' agreement had expired.5 5 Judge Gibbons concluded that Packers' claim that a work stoppage
had occurred in violation of its agreements with Local 195 was clearly an
arbitrable dispute within the meaning of those agreements. 56 Conceding
that the dispute might fall outside either contract, he still considered the
matter properly before the arbitrator since it was a "difference aris[ing]
between the parties hereto . . . as to the interpretation or application of

this agreement. '57 He also found it to be relevant that in neither the district court nor in the briefs filed with the court of appeals had Local 195
argued that any specific item of damage were improper, rather they had
based their argument on the impropriety of any award.5 8 Finally, the
reason for Judge Gibbons' separate concurrence was his belief that the
majority's treatment of the local as one entity for the purpose of interpreting its contracts despite its representation of varying units, was unnecessary to resolve the specific problem before the court.5 9
49. 518 F.2d at 1120.
50. Id.; see note 86 infra.
51. 518 F.2d at 1120.
52. Id.; see text accompanying note 18 supra.
53. 518 F.2d at 1120.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1123 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons focused his attention
on the slaughtering and boning units' agreements, both of which provided for arbitration and which were still in force, rather than upon the expired agreement between
Supply and its employees. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see note 8 supra.
58. 518 F.2d at 1124-25. The court's opinion also cited this as a factor in its
decision. Id. at 1119.
59. Id. at 1125. Judge Gibbons reasoned that the court's approach suggested a
major enlargement of the remedy under section 301 of the National Labor Relations
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Judge Hunter's dissent was based on his conclusion that the arbitrator
lacked jurisdiction.6" Insofar as the arbitrator's award granted damages
for the refusal of the slaughtering and boning employees to cross the picket
line, Judge Hunter found it correct ;61 but he could not subscribe to that
portion of the award which granted damages for the illegal Supply picket
line. 62 The dissent reasoned that it was impossible for the arbitrator to
obtain jurisdiction over the Supply workers when their collective bargaining agreement had expired. 63 While he recognized that section 301 of the
NLRA allowed a union to sue and be sued in its own capacity, Judge
Hunter did not find it inconsistent with the union's status as an entity to
hold that Local 195 could, as the representative for the Supply worker,
also be entrusted with different responsibilities in representing the slaughtering and boning employees.6 4 The dissent found no support for the
court's opinion in either the guarantee language of the collective bargaining agreements 65 or the past picketing history of the two companies.86
Finally, Judge Hunter believed that the court's opinion blurred the boundaries between collective bargaining units, thereby calling into question
the NLRB process for certification of bargaining units under section 9(b)
67
of the NLRA, a result which he considered wholly unjustifiable.
Since the arbitrator had granted damages which were caused by the
refusal of employees who were represented by unions other than Local 195
to cross the Supply picket line, 68 the court believed it necessary to determine whether the Supply unit's right to picket at Packers' plant was an
arbitrable issue. 69 The key question in evaluating the instant decision,
therefore, is whether this issue in fact had to be resolved, and if so, whether
it was correctly decided.
Act (NLRA) and that no such enlargement was necessary. See notes 73-75 and
accompanying text infra.
60. 518 F.2d at 1125 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
61. Id. The dissent recognized the validity of the arbitration and no-strike clauses
in the slaughtering and boning agreements. Judge Hunter agreed that these two
units had bound themselves by the agreements, and that, therefore, the arbitrator had
jurisdiction to award this portion of the damages. Id.
62. Id. In the dissent's view, because the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to order
part of the award, the whole award had to be reversed. See note 30 supra.
63. 518 F.2d at 1125.
64. Id. at 1126.
65. Id. at 1127. That Local 195 had bound "itself" did not, in the dissent's
opinion, bind the Supply employees who played no role in the formation of the contract. Id.
66. Id. The dissent found the past picketing history of the Supply employees to
be totally irrelevant in determining whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction over
them. Id.
67. Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted). The dissent disputed Judge Van Dusen's
analogy to the international's power to bind the local union. See note 46 supra. In
Judge Hunter's opinion, basic contract analysis revealed that privity of contract
between the international and the local justified binding the local. In contrast, there
was no privity between Supply and the slaughtering and boning units. 518 F.2d at
1126 n.4.
68. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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In holding that the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the Supply employees, the court elected to treat Local 195 as an entity rather than as a
separate agent for each bargaining unit it represented. 70 Under this reasoning, the union's guarantee for "itself" bound all unions represented by
it. 7 1 The court, however, gave no justification for its conclusion other
than stating that when an interpretation is not patently frivolous the arbitrator's interpretation should be accepted.72 It is submitted that while the
arbirator may have had jurisdiction over the dispute between Packers and
Local 195, both his and the court's decision - binding the Supply workers
to the slaughtering and boning agreements, thereby obtaining jurisdiction
over Supply - are unsupportable in light of the relevant sections of the
NLRA. While section 301 of the NLRA allows a union to sue or be
sued as an entity, 73 it does not provide that a union bargains as an entity.

The legislative history of section 301 shows that its purpose was to allow
the union as a single entity, rather than its individual members, to be sued
for breach of labor contracts. 74 To interpret this section as the instant
court did, as saying that a union binds all the units it represents when it
enters an agreement pursuant to its representation of one particular unit,
goes far beyond the congressional purpose in enacting section 301.75
Besides expanding the purpose of section 301, the court's decision
appears to conflict with section 9(a) of the NLRA which provides in part:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining . . .shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees its

such unit."76 While the legislative history is not determinative of the pre7
cise issue in Cross Brothers,"
section 9(a)'s wording is clear - the union
represents only those employees in a unit which it is certified to represent. 78
Supportive of the conclusion that the union is not an entity for bargaining
purposes is the following statement from the Supreme Court's opinion in
UMW v. Pennington:79
[T]here is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the union and
the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bargain about the
wages, hours and working conditions of other bargaining units ....
On the contrary, the duty to bargain unit by unit leads to a quite
different conclusion. The union's obligation to its members would
70. 518 F.2d at 1125 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
71. While the court apparently relied to some extent upon a contract analysis in
binding the Supply employees to the Packers' agreement, it is submitted that the court
should have first determined whether under the applicable labor statutes, Local 195's
use of the phrase "itself" in the agreements for the slaughtering and boning employees
could possibly be interpreted as binding anyone but those two units.
72. 518 F.2d at 1119.
73. 29 U.S.C.185(b) (1970).
74. H.R. REP.No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947)
75. Id.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
77. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1935) ; H.R. REP. No. 972,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20 (1935).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
79. 381 U.S.657 (1970).
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seem best served if the union retained the ability to respond to each
bargaining situation as the individual circumstances might warrant,
without being strait-jacketed by some prior agreement ....80
Finally, as the dissent pointed out, section 9(b) of the NLRA specifically gave to the NLRB the power to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit "in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this subchapter." 8' In the instant case, the NLRB
had certified three separate bargaining units with Local 195 as the representative of each. The NLRB's certification of separate bargaining units
would seem to have little significance if all the units subsequently can be
lumped together for purposes of interpreting their individual collective
bargaining agreements, the negotiation of individual agreements would
82
become a meaningless exercise.
The court also suggested that the past picketing practices of the Supply
and Packers employees supported the arbitrator's jurisdiction over the
Supply employees.83 Past picketing practices in and of themselves cannot
be determinative of arbitrability since that is solely a contractual determination. 4 The court nevertheless contended that Packers could have viewed
the slaughtering and boning units' agreements with Local 195 as codifications of their past picketing history, and that it was up to Local 195 to
dispel Packers' expectations by drafting an exception to the agreement.8 6
This interpretation again requires the union local to be treated as an entity,
for otherwise an agreement upon behalf of the slaughtering and boning
employees of Packers could not be considered to be a codification of the
picketing practices of another company.8 6
Even if this interpretation were legally tenable, there are several practical problems which remain. A union may represent units from variety
of occupations whose needs may vary accordingly. As the number of bargaining units which a union represents grows, it may become increasingly
difficult for the union to juggle the terms of each contract to complement
or mirror the terms of other agreements which it has already negotiated.
A union may eventually find itself in a position where a conflict of interest arises simply because one bargaining unit may not want a contract
80. Id. at 666.

81. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).

82. For all practical purposes, the court's decision means that whenever a local
represents bargaining units from different companies, unless the contracts expressly
stipulate otherwise, a multi-employer bargaining unit, whose contracts with each
employer binds all the local's members, is established.
83. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
84. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) ; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
85. 518 F.2d at 1120.
86. The court's opinion is puzzling, for it seems to contravene the normal rule
of contract interpretation which states that "[t]he court will not interpret the words
of an agreement so as to hold one party bound in accordance with the wholly unexpressed intentions and meanings and understandings of the other." 3 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 538, at 67 (1960).
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term, the inclusion of which is essential to the resolution of another unit's
87

collective bargaining negotiations.
Agreement with the proposition that a union should not be treated
as an entity for bargaining purposes does not, however, necessarily render
the result of the court's opinion incorrect. It is essential to keep in mind
the fact that the dispute before the arbitrator was between Packers and
Local 195 who were bound by a valid arbitration agreement, and not between the Supply employees and Packers or, as Local 195 had argued,88
between the Supply employees and Supply. Thus, as the concurring
opinion concluded, it may have been unnecessary in resolving the instant
dispute as to arbitrability to decide whether the Supply employees were
89
bound by the slaughtering and boning agreements.
The court's result is additionally strengthened by the fact that Local
195's arguments suffer from a number of flaws. First, the slaughtering
and boning employees did stop work in contravention of their collective
bargaining agreements. 0 The fact that they were honoring a lawful
picket line did not in the instant case affect whether they were ultimately
liable because this right may be bargained away 9 ' and the question of
whether it has been bargained away is arbitrable. 92 Second, as both the
majority and the concurring opinion pointed out, neither in the district
court nor in its briefs filed with the court of appeals, had Local 195 argued
that any specific item of damage was incorrect. Their argument solely was
that any award of damages was improper. 93 Thus, the issue of whether
specific items of damage were incorrect was raised for the first time on
appeal where the court could not consider it.9 4 Third, it was at Local 195's
request that Packers' employees, including the slaughtering and boning
employees, decided to honor the Supply employees' picket line. 95 This
request was a violation of its contract with Packers. 96 Finally, if, as the
concurring opinion states, the real issue submitted to the arbitrator was not
the legality of the Supply picket line but rather the legality of the resultant
87. The court stated that while the issue has never been determined, an action
for unfair representation may lie against a local for favoring one unit over another.
518 F.2d at 1119 n.13. The dissent rejected this because Judge Hunter did not agree
with the court's premise that a local could not act independently for two separate
units. Id. at 1126 n.3 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1118.
89. Id. at 1125; see note 60 and accompanying text supra.
90. 518 F.2d at 1115.
91. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
92. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Although it is not clear from the
opinion, it would appear that Local 195 had failed to argue that any specific items of
damage were improper because they had based their defense on the fact that they were
honoring a lawful picket line and were, therefore, not in breach of their contract.
See note 2 supra.
94. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 208 (3d Cir.), vacated,
44 U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S. March 23, 1976).
95. 518 F.2d at 1115.
96. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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work stoppage, 97 the broad policy favoring arbitration, plus the agreement
in this case which provided for arbitration "[s]hould any difference arise
between the parties hereto,"98 leaves little question that this was a proper
matter for arbitration.
Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses in Local 195's position, the
scope of the court's analysis in Cross Brothers appears to have exceeded
that necessary for a proper resolution of the case. Since the dispute was
exclusively between Packers and Local 195 as representative for the
slaughtering and boning employees, there seemed to be no reason to bar
the Supply workers from picketing the Packers' plant, as long as the
slaughtering and boning employees did not honor the picket line. There
does not appear to be any logic in changing this result, insofar as Supply
employees were concerned, simply because the slaughtering and boning
employees breached their agreements with Packers.
If, in the future, the court's opinion is not limited to the particular
facts of Cross Brothers, it will greatly impinge upon the NLRB's power
to certify bargaining units. The possibility that a local's promises in a
contract on behalf of one of its bargaining units may bind all other units
represented by the local will, for all practical purposes, render the separate unit certification meaningless. For the same reason, the ability of
one local to represent different bargaining units in the same or in different
companies will be adversely affected. Unions will face practical problems,
such as determining whether restrictions must be placed on a unit's picketing
activities, even when that unit's collective bargaining agreement has expired.
There are legal implications as well. As the dissent pointed out, by
abrogating the distinctions between bargaining units, the court's opinion
takes a significant step toward eliminating the principle that arbitration
cannot be required as a matter of law. 99 Moreover, in the past, the ability
to enjoin a work stoppage depended upon a finding of arbitration jurisdiction. 100 By greatly expanding the reach of collective bargaining arbitration
clauses, the court's opinion has seemingly expanded the power of federal
courts to enjoin work stoppages.
However, many of these problems may be avoided by courts who
must construe Cross Brothers in the future. These courts should take
heed of the court's caveat that this decision was based upon the "unique
facts of this case,"' 0 ' and should look for guidance to the concurring
opinion's disapproval of the court's rationale.
Robert B. Gigl, Jr.
97. 518 F.2d at 1124.
98. See note 8 supra.
99. 518 F.2d at 1128 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
100. The dissent argued that the court's opinion would extend the injunction
remedy, so that arbitration jurisdiction would no longer be a prerequisite for injunctive
relief. Id. at 1128 n.5 (Hunter, J., dissenting). This does not necessarily follow, however, because the Cross Brothers court had found arbitration jurisdiction. Id. at 1120.
101. Id.
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE -

SECURED TRANSACTIONS SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT'S DESCRIPTION OF AFTERINCLUSION OF AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
ACQUIRED PROPERTY MUST BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXPRESSED.

In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co. (1974)

Debtor executed a promissory note, two security agreements, and a
financing statement in favor of its creditor, True-Fit Screw Products
Corporation (True-Fit).1 The security agreement in issue granted to TrueFit an interest in "all of [the] Debtor's Accounts Receivable" to secure
"any and all indebtedness of Debtor to [the] Secured Party of every kind
and description, now existing or hereafter arising."'2 In a proceeding for
an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 3 the creditor
argued that section 9-110 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) only
requires that the description "reasonably identif [y]" the collateral,4 and
that the description in its security agreement was therefore adequate.,
The bankruptcy referee and the district court6 found that the agreement
was intended to cover accounts receivable which were acquired after the
date of the agreement, but held that the description of after-acquired
property was insufficient to comply with section 9-110 of the Code and
that, therefore, the creditor's interest in the after-acquired property authorized under section 9-204(1) 7 did not attach.8 On appeal, the Court
1. In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d 1133, 1134 (3d Cir. 1974).
2. Id. The language of the financing statement mirrored that of the security
agreement.
3. 11 U.S.C. 731 (1970). Many commentators have discussed the interaction of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) and the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g.,
Hogan, Games Lawyers Play With the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts
and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 553 (1968) ; Henson, The Interpreta•tion of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 9 in the Bankruptcy Courts, 22 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 101 (1967) ; Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 232 (1965); Riemer, The After-Acquired Property Clause
Revisited, 70 CoM. L. REV. 334 (1965) ; Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1962); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUT. L. REv.
518 (1960); Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired
Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194 (1959).
4. Section 9-110 of the Code states:
For the purposes of this Article any description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what
is described.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110 [hereinafter cited as UCCI (emphasis added).
5. 503 F.2d at 1135.
6. In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., Civil No. 124 (D. Del., May 16,
1973).
7. Section 9-204(1) states that "a security
agreement may provide that any or
all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral." Id. § 9-204(1).
8. 503 F.2d at 1135.
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a security interest
attaches to property acquired after the date of the agreement only if the
security agreement clearly and unambiguously states that after-acquired
property is included. In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d
1133 (3d Cir. 1974).
Since in the normal commercial setting accounts receivable are in a
constant state of flux, it is arguable that the phrase "all accounts receivable"
"reasonably identifies" after-acquired accounts.9 Despite this commercial
reality, insofar as the Third Circuit is concerned, the description "all
accounts receivable" is now insufficient to secure after-acquired accounts.
Similarly, the term "inventory" will no longer sufficiently describe a
floating lien 10 upon a debtor's future inventory." While the very nature
of after-acquired property makes it impossible to describe specifically, this
decision holds that no interest will attach to any after-acquired collateral
unless the security agreement explicitly indicates that the "class" of afteracquired property is to be included therein. 12 In the instant case, the
addition of the statement, "this agreement includes but is not limited to
security interests in all after-acquired property," would have been sufficient
to comply with the court's requirement. Because the Third Circuit's interpretation of the description requirement concerning after-acquired
property is stricter than that of other circuits,' 3 the practitioner in the
Third Circuit should clearly express in the security agreement the existence
of any interest in after-acquired collateral.
The court noted that the Code's official comment to section 1-102
makes the policy underlying a particular section the determinative factor
9. Accounts receivable, by their nature, are constantly changing since old
accounts are extinguished by receipt of full payment, while new accounts are acquired
by sales of inventory. Thus, it is common for a creditor, who wishes to secure a loan
or series of loans, to demand an interest in the borrower's future, as well as present,
accounts receivable. See Coogan and Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial
Code Upon Receivables Financing - Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1529, 1547 (1963); cf. In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 93 (D. Neb.), aff'd per curiam, 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971) ; In re Fibre Glass
Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1971). See also Henson, Proceeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLuM.
L. REV. 232, 232-39 (1965).
10. Although the Code does not contain the terminology "floating lien," the
phrase is commonly used to describe a security interest which attaches automatically
to after-acquired assets, usually inventory and accounts receivable, as the debtor
obtains them. See Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17
STAN. L. REv. 822 n.1 (1965).
11. 503 F.2d at 1136. The Court cited decisions from two other circuits, In re
Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ; In re Fibre
Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 781 (5th
Cir. 1971), in which it was held that the word "inventory" sufficiently described future
inventory. The Court did not attempt to distinguish these two analogous cases from
the instant case, rather it simply noted their similarity and then proceeded to discuss
why they could not concur with the results of these other circuits. 503 F.2d at 1136.
12. 503 F.2d at 1136.
13. See, e.g., cases cited in note 12 supra. See also National Cash Reg. Co. v.
Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
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in the resolution of whether that section should be narrowly or broadly
construed.' 4 An important policy consideration behind the Middle Atlantic
decision was the protection of subsequent creditors 5 and, thus, while the
court's holding was limited to the description requirement of a security
agreement, the financing statement 16 will in all probability also be made
subject to this strict interpretation. 17 The official comment to section 9-402
states that the Code adopts the system of notice filing, which requires
only that notice that the secured party may have an interest in the collateral
described be sent to subsequent creditors, delegating the burden of any
further inquiry to those creditors. 18 The Court's emphasis upon the policy
of protecting subsequent creditors makes it unlikely that this comment will
deter the Third Circuit from also interpreting the Code's description requirement of reasonable identification' 9 narrowly when dealing with afteracquired property in the financing statement context.20 Thus, the Third

14. 503 F.2d at 1136. Comment 1 to Section 1-102 states:
The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy
of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be,
in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
UCC § 102, Comment 1.
15. 503 F.2d at 1136.
16. Section 9-402(1) provides that a financing statement is not sufficiently specific
unless it "contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral." UCC § 9-402(1).
17. Courts and commentators have not agreed upon whether the description
requirements should be stricter for financing statements or security agreements.
Compare In re Thibodeau, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 873, 875 (D. Me. 1969), with N.Y.
U.C.C. § 9-203 (McKinney 1964) (Practice Commentary No. 1).
18. Comment 2 to section 9-402 advises:
Notice filing has proved to be of great use in financing transactions involving
inventory, accounts and chattel paper, since it obviates the necessity of refiling on
each of a series of transactions in a continuing arrangement where the collateral
changes from day to day .... [T]he financing statement is valid to cover afteracquired property and future advances under security agreements whether or not
mentioned in the financing statement.
UCC § 9-402, Comment 2. See generally Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform
Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing",
47 IOWA L. REv. 289, 314-22 (1962).
19. To determine whether a description "reasonably identifies" the collateral, the
possibility that a subsequent creditor will be misled must be analyzed in light of the
ease with which the prior creditor could have clarified the description. 503 F.2d at 1136.
When clarification can be achieved by the simple addition of the word "future," the
Third Circuit will demand it. Id. See generally Still Assoc., Inc. v. Murphy, 44 Mass.
App.' (Dec. 9, 1970). But see In re Varney Wood Prod., Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th
Cir. 1972).
Judge Seitz, in a dissenting opinion to Middle Atlantic, argued that the above
rationale misconceives the court's role in interpreting the Code, stating that "[t]he
Code enjoins courts to interpret its provisions in a commercially reasonable manner
rather than to require businessmen to follow judicial decisions and comply with them
so long as they are not onerous." 503 F.2d at 1137 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
20. Cf. In re Bristol Assoc., Inc., 505 F.2d 1057, 1063 (3d Cir. 1974). But see
In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Platt, the district court determined
that the description "Inventory and Accounts Receivable" in a financing statement was
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Circuit practitioners should also specifically state whether there is any
interest in after-acquired collateral in the financing statement.
It is submitted that the Third Circuit appropriately demanded a
particular degree of specificity be included in security agreements since the
interest in protecting subsequent creditors far outweighs the slight inconvenience which will result from the drafting of security agreements which
will comply with the standard of reasonableness adopted by the court.
Robert L. Genuario

LABOR LAW

-

INJUNCTIONS -

EMPLOYER

Is

ENTITLED TO A

Boys

Markets INJUNCTION

TO END A WORK STOPPAGE EVEN WHERE THE

ARBITRABLE DISPUTE

Is

NOT THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF THE WORK

STOPPAGE.

NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs
Local 926 (1974)
Plaintiff, NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. (NAPA) and defendant, Automotive Chauffeurs, Parts and Garage Employees, Local 926 (Local 926) were
parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing a compulsory arbitration clause,' a no-strike clause, 2 and a clause permitting employees to
refuse to cross any "primary" picket lines.8 A second union, Teamsters
Local 110 (Local 110) established picket lines at the facilities of NAPA
Altoona, Inc., in Altoona, Pennsylvania, as well as at NAPA's Pittsburgh
place of business. 4 Relying upon the picket-line clause in their own bargaining agreement, the members of local 926 honored the Local 110 picket
line.5 NAPA filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin the
sufficient to perfect an interest in after-acquired inventory and accounts receivable. If
the present analysis of the impact of Middle Atlantic is correct, the holding in Platt
has necessarily been overruled.
1. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
322 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). The arbitration clause encompassed
"[a]ny and all grievances, complaints or disputes arising between the Employer and
the Union or any employee represented by the Union and covered by this Agreement .

. . ."

502 F.2d at 328-29 n.1l.

2. Id. at 329 n.11. This clause stipulated that "[t]here shall be no cessation of
work during the pendency of the grievance proceedings." Id.
3. Id. at 322. This clause provided:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement ...in the event an employee refuses
to enter upon any property involved in a primary labor dispute or refuses to go
through or work behind any primary picket lines ... at the Employer's place or
places of business.
Id.
4. Id. The exact control relationship between NAPA Pittsburgh and NAPA
Altoona was not determined by the district court or the court of appeals, although
such a finding would bear on whether the Local 110 activity was primary or
secondary. Id. at 322 n.2.
5. Id. at 322.
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Local 926 work stoppage and to compel arbitration to determine whether
the Local 110 picket line was "primary" within the meaning of the picketline clause." The district court found the dispute between NAPA and
Local 926 to be arbitrable, 7 ordered the parties to arbitrate,8 and preliminarly enjoined Local 926 from honoring the Local 110 picket line. 9
On appeal, the Third Circuit, applying Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union Local 770,10 affirmed the district court order, holding that
the dispute as to the nature of Local 110's picketing was arbitrable and
that therefore Local 926 was properly enjoined from causing a work
stoppage. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926,
502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
The power of the federal courts to grant injunctive relief in labor
disputes was severely limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,11
which enumerated certain union activities that could not be enjoined. 12 The
growth of organized labor and a shift in national labor policy to favor
the settlement of labor disputes through arbitration, '3 caused an increase
of labor litigation in the federal courts, 14 where it quickly became apparent
that the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction provisions did not bar a federal
court from specifically compelling employers to arbitrate in accordance
with collectively bargained-for arbitration clauses,' 5 nor from compelling
6. Id. See note 3 supra for the language of the picket-line clause.
7. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 363 F. Supp.
54, 57 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
8. Id. at 58.
9. Id.

10. 398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 176 (1970).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
12. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization . . .
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute ....

Id. § 104.
13. The policy favoring arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes was
reflected in section 203(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. See id.
§ 173(d). See generally AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, THE DEVELOPING LABoR LAw 35-47
(C. Morris ed. 1971) ; Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1960).
14. Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act permits employers
and unions to bring suits in federal court for breach of contract without fulfilling
the traditional diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970). See generally Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike
Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to AVCO and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REV. 32 (1969).
15. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the
Supreme Court reviewed a district court order in a section 301(a) suit requiring an
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compliance with the awards of such arbitration. 16 However, in spite of
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, 17 in 1962 the United States
Supreme Court, in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,'8 reaffirmed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's limitations upon the power of federal courts to
enjoin striking and picketing. Thus, after Norris-LaGuardia and Sinclair,
the federal forum was preferred by union litigants, and section 301(a)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act 19 coupled with the Supreme
Court's decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 73520 gave unions free
access to the federal courts and deprived employers of injunctive relief.
It was in this context 2' that the Supreme Court, 8 years later in Boys
Markets, overruled Sinclair and held that under certain conditions 22 the
employer to arbitrate in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The court approved the order stating that the "failure to arbitrate was not a
part and parcel of the abuses against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed."
Id. at 458.
16. See Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. Longshoremen Local 1291, 365
F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967). See generally
M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DisPuTE SETTLEMENT 601-40 (1968).
17. In 1960 the Supreme Court dealt with three cases, popularly known as the
Steelworkers Trilogy, interpreting the scope of arbitration clauses. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The
Court stated that "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., supra at 582-83.
18. 370 U.S. 195 (1962), overruled, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Sinclair an employer sued under section 301 (a)
to enjoin a union strike and picketing which were allegedly in violation of the
arbitration and no-strike provisions of their collective bargaining agreement. 370
U.S. at 197. The Supreme Court held that the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act barred the federal court from issuing the injunction. Id. at
203. See note 22 and accompanying text in!ra.
19. See note 14 supra.
20. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). In Avco the Supreme Court held that suits brought
in state court under section 301(a) could be removed to federal court under federal
question jurisdiction. Id. Labor litigation during the period following Sinclair had
been marked by considerable forum shopping due to the existence of "little NorrisLaGuardia Acts" in a number of states, which provided benefits similar to the federal
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398
U.S. at 247, 248 n.15. The Avco decision allowed unions routinely to remove section
301 (a) suits to federal court in order to avail themselves of the injunction proscriptions
of Norris-LaGuardia.
21. For extensive discussions of the background which prompted Boys Markets,
see Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia
Marine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 980 (1969)

Keene, supra note 14.
22. Boys Markets involved a suit brought by an employer in state court and
removed to federal court by the union. 398 U.S. at 238-40; see note 20 supra. The
litigants were parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing no-strike and
arbitration clauses, and the employer sought to enjoin a strike prompted by certain
work assignments. Id. at 238-39. In affirming the district court's grant of injunctive
relief, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Sinclair and held that injunctive relief
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Norris-LaGuardia Act did not preclude the use of injunctive relief to
terminate a work stoppage which violated no-strike and compulsory arbi23
tration clauses of a collective bargaining agreement.
In the instant case, the Third Circuit was confronted with the question
of whether a Boys Markets injunction should issue to end the Local 926
work stoppage. After noting the established federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, 24 the court interpreted Boys Markets as sanctioning injunctive relief whenever the subject of the labor dispute is encompassed within no-strike and arbitration clauses. 25 Pointing out that all
doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration,26 the court then found
that the dispute between NAPA and Local 926 over the nature of the
27
Local 110 picket line was clearly within the scope of the arbitration clause.
The court distinguished a trio of cases, 28 wherein injunctive relief had
may be granted to an employer in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, provided that
the following conditions are met:
1) the collective bargaining agreement must provide for binding arbitration of
the issue in dispute;

2) the employer must be prepared to arbitrate, or the court must order the
employer to arbitrate as a condition to the grant of injunctive relief;
3) traditional equitable standards must warrant the issuance of an injunction.
Id. at 254.
23. Id. at 253.
24. 502 F.2d at 323. The court cited the recent decision of Gateway Coal Co. v.
Local 6330, UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), noted in 19 VILL. L. REv. 655 (1974), as a
reaffirmation of the federal policy, recognized in the Steelworkers Trilogy, favoring
arbitration. See note 17 supra. In Gateway the employer sought a Boys Markets
injunction in a federal court to end a strike over a safety dispute. The district court
issued a preliminary injunction, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that section
502 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), which excluded
from the definition of "strike" any work stoppage due to abnormally hazardous work
conditions, indicated a congressional policy disfavoring compulsory arbitration of
safety disputes. Gateway Coal Co. v. Local 6330, UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d
Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that safety disputes were not sui
generis and that the presumption of arbitrability established by the Steelworkers
Trilogy would apply to cases involving such disputes. 414 U.S. at 376, 379. For
an argument contending that the presumption of arbitrability should not be applied
in suits seeking Boys Markets injunctions, see Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets
and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 636 (1972). See also Comment, The New FederalLaw of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALv L.J. 1593, 1601-02 (1970).
25. 502 F.2d at 323. The Third Circuit stated:
Boys Markets holds in essence that where a matter has been made arbitrable
by the terms of a contract between the union and company, an injunction may be
issued to enforce this method of settling controversies between the parties.
Id. (citation omitted).
This interpretation of Boys Markets assumed the presence of both of the other
two conditions set forth in Boys Markets as necessary for a grant of injunctive relief.
See note 22 supra.
26. 502 F.2d at 323.
27. Id. See note 1 supra for the relevant text of the arbitration clause.
28. The cases distinguished were Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972) ; General Cable Corp. v. Local 1644, IBEW, 331 F.
Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971) ; Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314 F.
Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970). In each case the work stoppage sought to be enjoined was
precipitated by another union's picket line. See 468 F.2d at 1373; 331 F. Supp. at
480-81; 314 F. Supp. at 885.
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been denied to employers in similar factual situations, by noting the
absence in each case of a picket-line clause restricting the union's right to
honor other picket lines. 29 Additionally, the court mustered decisional
80
support for its position by citing two recent Fourth Circuit decisions
in which unions were enjoined from honoring another union's picket line.
Judge Hunter, in his dissenting opinion in NAPA 3 disputed the
majority's conclusion that Boys Markets was authority for the district
court's issuance of an injunction,3 2 reasoning that the majority's interpretation ignored both the policy behind the Boys Markets decision and the
factual situation giving rise to that case. Boys Markets, the dissent asserted,
was an attempt by the Supreme Court to remove the injunction limitations
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in those cases where the union attempted to
avoid its obligation to arbitrate by an economic strike, forcing employer
capitulation upon an arbitrable issue. 33 In such circumstances, the narrow
Boys Markets exception, while relaxing slightly the strictures of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 34 furthered the equally important policy of promoting
resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. 35 The dissent pointed out
that in the instant case the Local 926 work stoppage was not an attempt
by the union to avoid arbitration and force employer capitulation, because
no concession by NAPA on the "primary-secondary" dispute would have
helped to end the Local 926 work stoppage. 36 Thus, the dissent reasoned
that while the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia is frustrated in
NAPA just as it was in Boys Markets, the countervailing policy of furthering arbitration is not advanced by the issuance of the injunction in the
37
instant case.
29. 502 F.2d at 324. See note 3 supra, for the language of the picket line clause.
The dissent disputed the characterization of the picket line clause as a
"restriction" upon the union's right to strike, reasoning instead that the clause
"enlarged" the appellant's right to strike to include a work stoppage occasioned by the
honoring of another union's picket line. 502 F.2d at 331 n.14 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that under the majority's interpretation, the denial of injunctive
relief in those three cases added more force to the argument in favor of denying relief
in the instant case, because the argument for granting injunctive relief in each of the
three cases was stronger than in the instant case, Id.
30. Id. at 324, citing Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamster Local 391, 497 F.2d
311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (collective bargaining agreement
contained arbitration, no-strike, and picket-line clauses similar to those in NAPA),
and Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973)
(collective bargaining agreement did not contain a picket-line clause) ; see note 43

infra.

31. Judge Hunter was joined in his dissent by Chief Judge Seitz, 502 F.2d at
324 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Adams issued a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
at 333 (Adams, J., dissenting) ; see note 68 infra. Unless indicated otherwise, all
future references to "the dissent" refers to Judge Hunter's dissenting opinion.
32. Id. at 325.
33. Id. at 326. See note 22 supra.
34. See note 12 supra.
35. See note 17 supra.
36. 502 F.2d at 326.
37. Id.
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Far from comporting with the policy behind Boys Markets, the dissent
continued, the result in the instant case actually frustrates the arbitrationfavoring policy of Boys Markets, because a grant of an injunction will
deter employers from submitting disputes to arbitration.8 Knowing that
it can readily obtain an injunction without the court ever reaching the
merits of the dispute, an employer will invariably choose the courts over
arbitration where it runs the risk of losing on the merits and facing an
arbitration-sanctioned work stoppage.39 For the same reason, once the
employer has obtained an injunction it has every incentive to delay arbitration, whereas a striking union delays at the cost of increasing damages
40
recoverable against it should it ultimately lose in arbitration.
Having explored the policy considerations which militated against the
majority opinion, the dissent next argued that the factual situation presented by the instant case also placed it beyond the holding of Boys
Markets. 41 The dissent extracted an additional requirement from the
Boys Markets holding, i.e., that there be a definite chronological and causal
relationship between the arbitrable dispute and the strike. 42 Since in Boys
Markets the arbitrable dispute was the underlying cause of the strike,4 3
the dissent reasoned that in order for a Boys Markets injunction to issue,
the arbitrable dispute must necessarily precede and precipitate the strike;
the validity of the strike itself cannot be the arbitrable dispute.44 In the
dissent's view, this underlying cause requirement was supported by a
45
caveat in Boys Markets which indicated the narrowness of its holding.
The dissent applied this requirement 46 to the facts of NAPA, where the
underlying cause of the Local 926 work stoppage was the NAPA-Local 110
38. Id. at 327.
39. Id.

40. Id. at 328.
41. Id. at 329.
42. Id. at 330. For the three preconditions for the issuance of a Boys Markets
injunction, see note 22 supra.
43. With respect to the federal courts' interpretation of Boys Markets as applied
to picket-line honoring cases, two divergent views have developed. The broader interpretation, represented by Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d
1209 (4th Cir. 1973), does not recognize this "underlying cause" requirement, even
though such a requirement is arguably implicit in the Boys Markets facts and holding.
See 484 F.2d 1209, 1213 (4th Cir. 1973) ; note 22 and text accompanying note 30
supra. The narrower interpretation, represented by Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972), applies the "underlying cause" requirement in addition to the three explicit conditions of Boys Markets. See 468 F.2d 1372,
1373 (5th Cir. 1972) ; note 28 and accompanying text supra.
44. 502 F.2d at 330.
45. Id. Justice Brennan wrote: "Our holding in the present case is a narrow one.
We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 398 U.S. at 253.
46. 'The dissent noted that the Third Circuit had previously intimated its approval
of the "underlying cause" approach to suits seeking Boys Markets injunctions. 502
F.2d at 330 n.13 (Hunter, J., dissenting). This approval was expressed by the court
in dicta in Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 459 F.2d 369, 374 (3d Cir.
1972). However, Parade did not present a picket-line honoring issue, and the suit
was remanded for a determination of arbitrability without a finding by the Third
Circuit on the question of underlying cause. Id. at 373-74.
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dispute,4 7 a dispute clearly not arbitrable as between NAPA and Local
926.48 The dissent thus concluded that the arbitrability precondition of the
49
Boys Markets injunction had not been satisfied.
The basic issue dividing the NAPA majority and the dissent was the
proper interpretation to be given to the Boys Markets decision. Although
Boys Markets was responsive to a number of jurisdictional and substantive
labor law problems, 0 the overriding goal of the Supreme Court was to
"accommodate""' both the pervasive federal policy favoring arbitration
and the injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by permitting a federal court to enjoin strikes in those instances where such an
injunction would neutralize union pressure and encourage a resolution of
52
the dispute through contractually agreed upon arbitration procedures.
To the extent that any injunction which terminates a strike and
orders arbitration immediately serves a policy favoring arbitration, the
NAPA decision is in accord with the philosophy of Boys Markets. However, while NAPA furthers this one facet of the policy underlying Boys
Markets, it takes little or no cognizance of the critical element of "accommodation," nor does it consider the element of union pressure present in
53
Boys Markets which so concerned the NAPA dissenters.
The dissent's contention that the availability of injunctive relief would
encourage employer avoidance and delay of arbitration 54 in cases where
the underlying cause factor is absent is convincing primarily because it
recognizes the practical advantages that would prompt such employer
reaction - the possibility of obtaining an injunction without becoming
embroiled in the merits of the dispute.5 This analysis is problematical
47. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
48. 502 F.2d at 331.
49. Id.
50. For enlightening discussions of these problems, see Gould, Labor Injunction,
Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 S. CT. REV. 217-25; Keene,
supra note 14; Vladeck, Boys Markets and National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REV.
93 (1970).
51. 398 U.S. at 250. Justice Brennan wrote: "The literal terms of § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of
§ 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration." Id.
52. See note 23 and text accompanying notes 22 & 33 supra.
53. The dissent differed with the majority as to which question should be addressed
first. The majority proceeded immediately to the question of arbitrability, whereas
the dissent considered the threshold question to be whether the dispute, be it arbitrable
or not, was the underlying cause of the work stoppage. See text accompanying notes
42-44 supra. With respect to this divergence of opinion the dissent noted that neither
party contested the district court's finding that the "primary-secondary" dispute was
arbitrable. 502 F.2d at 324 n.1. (Hunter, J., dissenting).
54. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
55. The availability of equitable relief in the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements is of the utmost importance to an employer. In this regard, one commentator has written: "Equitable relief is not only the most appropriate remedy, but
also the only effective one." Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59
MICH. L. REV. 673, 675 (1961). See also Cox, Current Problems in the Law of
Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 247, 255 (1958) ; Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 1949 WASH. U.L.Q. 3, 12 (1949) ;
Comment, Injunctive Relief Against a Union's Violation of a No-Strike Clause, 5Z
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in that the dissent implies that a subsequent action for damages against a
striking union is both an adequate legal remedy for the employer and
a deterrent to union delay of arbitration.5" It is questionable whether this
implication comports with Justice Brennan's statement in Boys Markets
that "an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute
for an immediate end to an illegal strike. '57 Furthermore, as a practical
matter the desire to maintain harmonious industrial relations militates
against post-strike damage suits by employers.58 These objections aside,
it would seem that the dissent's position is more in line with the "accommodation" policy of Boys Markets than is the majority's.
The question remains as to whether Boys Markets should be limited
to its facts, as the NAPA dissent urged, 9 or whether it supports the
broader reading chosen by the NAPA majority. 60 The "accommodation"
approach of Boys Markets resulted in a court-created exception to a clear
statutory prohibition.' Before such an exception is applied in a factual
context different from that in which it arose, it would seem desirable that
the court engage in closer scrutiny of the facts in issue than was shown
by the majority's somewhat mechanical and literal application of Boys
Markets to NAPA. 62 Although the majority's interpretation neither lacks
decisional support, 3 nor offends the plain language of Boys Markets,0 '
the more restrictive "underlying cause" interpretation given to Boys
Markets by the dissent martials the support not only of several recent

L.Q. 132 (1966). An injunction which terminates a work stoppage often
precludes the possibility of the union ever prevailing upon the merits. In this respect,
one commentator has stated: "In a great many, if not the majority, of cases . ..
the restraining order or preliminary injunction spells defeat for the defendant's cause."
Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts - Part II: A Critique, 50 VA. L. REV.
1147, 1157-58 (1964). See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCCORNELL

TION 200-01 (1930).

56. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
57. 398 U.S. at 248.
58. See id. It is conceivable that a pending post-strike damage suit can become a
bargaining issue between the employer and union when they negotiate for a new
collective bargaining agreement; such pending litigation could even become an issue
in the settlement of the arbitrable dispute. See Gould, supra note 50 at 230-31. These
considerations render a damage suit less attractive to employers. Id.
59. 502 F.2d at 329-30.
60. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
61. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
62. The majority opinion did not contain even a cursory discussion of the Boys
Markets factual situation. 502 F.2d at 322-23.
63. In addition to the two Fourth Circuit cases relied upon by the majority
(see note 30 and accompanying text supra) at least two other courts have reached
similar results. See Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir.
1974) (Boys Markets injunction granted where contract contained arbitration clause
but not a picket-line or no-strike clause) ; Barnard College v. Local 560, TWU, 372
F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Boys Markets injunction granted where contract
contained both arbitration and no-strike clauses but no picket-line clause).
64. Justice Brennan asserted: "We deal only with the situation in which a
collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure." 398 U.S. at 253.
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decisions, 65 but also the support of the narrowness caveat of Justice
Brennan in Boys Markets0 6 and his statement in Sinclair that there is
"no general federal anti-strike policy."'67 Given this tentative balance
between the majority's and the dissent's view of the Boys Markets holding,
it would seem that both the fundamental policy against judicial incursion
into the legislative domain 68 and the Supreme Court's express desire to
retain the vitality of Norris-LaGuardia 9 tip the scale in favor of recognizing the narrow underlying cause requirement distilled from Boys Markets
by the NAPA dissent.
Despite dicta in Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia,70 which
expressed the Third Circuit's intention to adopt the underlying cause
requirement for Boys Markets injunctions, the NAPA decision implicitly
dispenses with this requirement, thereby indicating a broad reading of
Boys Markets by the Third Circuit. 71 Since the underlying cause requirement may be determinative in any case where the work stoppage is a
reaction to something other than a direct dispute between the union and
the employer, the court's implicit rejection of this requirement expands
the availability of the Boys Markets injunction to employers, 72 and to
the degree that this extension of equitable relief mitigates the threat of
65. See cases cited in note 28 supra. For other cases adopting the restrictive
interpretation, see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 517 F.2d
1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 911 (1975) (Boys Markets injunction
denied where contract contained arbitration and no-strike provisions, but no picketline clause) ; Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 560, 373 F. Supp. 19
(D.N.J. 1974) (Boys Markets injunction denied where contract contained arbitration,
no-strike, and picket-line clauses). The Buffalo Forge case offers questionable support, since the majority opinion, while relying primarily upon the Amstar decision,
characterized the picket-line clause as a "restriction" upon the right to strike as did
NAPA's majority. Id. at 410; see text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
66. See note 45 supra for Justice Brennan's statement.
67. 370 U.S. at 225.
68. This concern formed the basis for Judge Adams' separate dissenting opinion.
502 F.2d at 333 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams tentatively characterized
Boys Markets as possibly being "the judiciary's most ambitious foray into an area
seemingly pre-empted by statute." Id. at 334. He went on to say that without "a clear
signal from the Supreme Court, doubts should be resolved in favor of the applicability
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. This statement suggests that Judge Adams might
favor a reversal of the presumption of arbitrability in suits seeking Boys Markets
injunctions. See Note, supra note 24 at 639.
69. See note 45 supra.
70. 459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1972) ; see note 46 supra.
71. See notes 43 & 63 supra.
72. The NAPA dissent characterized the majority's holding as sanctioning the
issuance of a Boys Markets injunction whenever arbitration might end a work stoppage. 502 F.2d at 330. In recognizing and applying the underlying cause requirement,
the Fifth Circuit in Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th
Cir. 1972), commented upon the effect that the rejection of this requirement would
have on the availability of the Boys Markets injunction:
Were we to hold that the legality of the very strike sought to be enjoined in
the present situation constituted a sufficiently arbitrable underlying dispute for a
Boys Markets injunction to issue, it is difficult to conceive of any strike which could
not be so enjoined.
Id. at 1373.
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union strikes, union bargaining power is correspondingly diminished. Such
free access to injunctive relief may ultimately force unions to restrict
contractually the scope of their arbitration and no-strike clauses in order
to limit the availability of the Boys Markets remedy to employers. 73 This
result would clearly impinge upon the federal policy favoring the arbitration
of labor disputes. 74 For those reasons, and considering the well-developed
cleavage of federal judicial thought as to the narrowness of Boys Markets,
perhaps the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to clarify the boundaries of
Boys Markets.
When the Supreme Court considers the question, the NAPA decision,
aside from announcing the Third Circuit's adoption of the broader view
of Boys Markets, will add little persuasive power to management's arsenal
of decisional law on the issue. This is due not only to the brevity with
which the majority treats policy and precedent, but also due to the dissenting opinion of Judge Hunter, which is to date the most exhaustive and
cogent analysis of Boys Markets as it applies to cases involving the honoring of picket lines.
Philip I. Katauskas

CIVIL RIGHTS -

SEX DISCRIMINATION - EMPLOYER WHO EXCLUDED
PREGNANCY FROM THE LIST OF COMPENSABLE DISABILITIES IN AN

EMPLOYEE DISABILITY PLAN AND WHO TREATED MATERNITY LEAVE
DIFFERENTLY FROM ORDINARY SICK LEAVE, ENGAGED IN SEX DISCRIMINATION, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

OF 1964.

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1975), vacated,
44 U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976)
Plaintiffs, female claims representatives formerly employed by the
defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), charged
that the company discriminated against them and all female technical employees in the company's claims department on the basis of sex, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Specifically, the plaintiffs
charged sex discrimination in four categories: hiring, job classification,
pay differential, and employment benefit policies. 2 The United States Dis-

73. See Gould, supra note 50 at 262 n.164. On this point Professor Gould commented: "I am advised of one situation where the union relinquished wage increase
demands in order to obtain removal of the no-strike clause and the Boys Markets
remedy." Id.
74. See notes 13 & 17 and accompanying text supra. Such a result becomes even
more significant when it is noted that more than 90% of union-employer contracts
contain arbitration clauses. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR
BULL. No. 1425-1, GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 1 (1964). See also Gould, supra note 50,
at 230 n.63.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
2. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, concluding that the company's income
protection plan and maternity leave policy discriminated against female
employees. 3 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed, 4 holding that the income protection plan, in excluding
pregnancy from the list of insured temporary disabilities, discriminated
against women; and that the maternity leave policy, because it treated
pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities and was based
upon class generalizations of the female sex, discriminated as well against
women, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 44
U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
administers Title VII, 5 and whose interpretations of Title VII are entitled
to "great deference," 6 has on several occasions addressed itself to the
issue presented in Wetzel; that is, whether an employer discriminates
against female employees on the basis of sex by treating pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities, for purposes of disability payments and leave of absence. Initially, the EEOC took the position that
pregnancy was sui generis, and that an employer might properly maintain
a separate policy for pregnant women concerning disability payments and
3. Id. at 1163.
4. The case was heard before Circuit Judges Staley, Hastie and Aldisert.
On May 27, 1975, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 421
U.S. 987 (1975), and the Court heard arguments on the merits on January 19, 1976.
In an unexpected decision, the Court vacated the judgment of the Third Circuit. 44
U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976). Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
observed that while neither party had questioned the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals to entertain the appeal, the Court was obligated to do so on its own motion.
Id. at 4351, citing Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379
(1884). The Court held that the district court's order, as a grant of partial summary
judgment (see text accompanying notes 2 & 3 supra), was interlocutory and not
appealable, because assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remained to be
resolved. Id. at 4352, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (c), and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
Hence, the Court never reached the merits.
Whether the Third Circuit's analysis on the merits was nonetheless sound
should be determined when the Supreme Court decides the companion case of Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975).
The Court heard arguments on the merits in Gilbert on January 19-20, 1976.
5. The EEOC was created by Congress to administer Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4(a) (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974).
6. In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court
observed:
The EEOC Guidelines are not administrative "regulations" promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the Congress. But, as this Court has
heretofore noted, they do constitute "[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act
by the enforcing agency," and consequently they are "entitled to great deference."
Id. at 431, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). But see
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (courts need not defer to EEOC
guidelines when their application would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional
intent not to reach the questioned employment practice); text accompanying notes
93-105 infra.
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leaves of absence.7 The EEOC still maintained this position in a decision
rendered in 1969.8 However, the EEOC reversed itself in a 1971 decision
in which it held that a denial of disability benefits for pregnancy was
discriminatoryY In 1972, the Commission issued comprehensive guidelines
on maternity leave and pregnancy benefits which stated that pregnancy
was henceforth to be treated no differently from other temporary disabilities for purposes of fringe benefits such as leave and insurance.' 0
The EEOC guidelines relating to maternity leave and pregnancy disability benefits were for the most part accepted by the courts. In Newmon
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.," the plaintiff-employee charged that the company's
policy, which required her to go on unpaid maternity leave at the end
of the fifth month of pregnancy without accrued sick pay, discriminated
on the basis of sex.' 2 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia agreed that the mandatory leave policy violated Title
VII;13 however, the court held that the denial of disability pay, sick leave
pay, and other attendant employment benefits to pregnant employees did
not violate Title VII's ban on sex discrimination.' 4 While the court
7. See Comment, Current Trends in Pregnancy Benefits: 1972 EEOC Guidelines
DEPAUL L. REV. 127, 129 n.15 (1974).
8. EEOC Dec. No. 70-360, 1973 CCH EEOC DEC.
6084 (Dec. 16, 1969).
9. EEOC Dec. No. 71-1474, 1973 CCH EEOC DEC. ff 6221 (Mar. 19, 1971).
10. The EEOC guidelines provide in pertinent part:
§ 1604.9 Fringe benefits.
(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life

Interpreted, 24

ir

insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.

(e) It shall not be a defense under Title VIII [sic] to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to
one sex than the other.
§ 1604.10 Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes
from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie
violation of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written
and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the
commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual
of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal,
shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and
conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available,
such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees
of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.9(a), (b), (e), 1604.10(a)-(c) (1975).
11. 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
12. Id. at 239-40.
13. Id. at 244-45.
14. Id. at 245-46.
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acknowledged that the EEOC guidelines 15 determined that such pregnancy
disability policies did violate Title VII, the court dismissed the guidelines
as "not legally binding upon the court,"'1 and EEOC reports and decisions
as "not adequate legal authority"'17 for plaintiff's position. The court
rejected as well plaintiff's contention that the guidelines equated pregnancy
with disability or sickness,' 8 reasoning that pregnancy was neither a sickness nor a disability "in the usual sense of the word."' 9 As a result, the
court concluded that plaintiff was not discriminated against on the basis of
sex in being denied disability benefits for a nondisability.
Within two weeks of the Newmon decision, the United States District
Court for the Western- District of Pennsylvania decided Wetzel. The
district court emphasized that pregnancy is a "natural," "expectable,"
"statistically foreseeable," and ultimately a "necessary" condition, 20 which
is "limited to women by biological law." 21 Giving "great deference" to the
EEOC guidelines, 22 and relying on sex discrimination cases decided under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 23 the court held
that Liberty Mutual's maternity leave policy, 24 and income protection plan,
which excluded pregnancy from the list of compensable disabilities, discriminated upon the basis of sex. 25 On rehearing, the district court specifically rejected Newmon's determination that pregnancy is not a disability.2 6 Shortly after the district court's decision in Wetzel, the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, in Singer v.
Mahoning County Board of Mental Retardation,27 citing Newmon and
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). For the text of this section, see note 10 supra.
16. 374 F. Supp. at 245.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 246.
20. Id. at 1158.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1159, quoting Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94-95
(3d Cir. 1973).
23. 372 F. Supp. at 1160. The district court emphasized that Title VII standards
of discriminatory conduct were "more compelling" for private employers than equal
protection standards for state and local government employers; the latter employers
need only have a "rational basis" for the discrimination. Id. at 1159, citing Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Nevertheless, the district
court relied heavily on equal protection clause cases dealing with pregnancy-related
conditions of employment, especially maternity leave. 372 F. Supp. at 1160, citing
Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973) ; Green v. Waterford
Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
24. Under the companys' plan, a female employee could work' for as long as her
physician certified her able to work prior to commencing a maternity leave of absence.
However, unlike employees on ordinary sick leave, employees on maternity leave had
to return to work within a prescribed time period - within either 6 months of the
commencement of leave or 3 months from the date of delivery, whichever came first.
372 F. Supp. at 1155.
25. Id. at 1161-63.
26. Id. at 1164; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
27. 379 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Wetzel, reached the conclusion that a mandatory leave policy similar to
that in Newmon, discriminated upon the basis of sex.2 8
Subsequently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, in Gilbert v. General Electric Co.,29 held that the company's
policy of excluding pregnancy from sickness and accident benefits violated
both the EEOC guidelines and Title VII.3 0 The court, while citing neither
Newmon nor Wetzel, determined that although pregnancy is not a disease,
it is, at times, physically disabling. 31 The Gilbert court afforded "great
deference" 32 to the EEOC guidelines,3 3 and relied in part on a sex discrimination case decided under an equal protection analysis 34 and on Judge
Wisdom's dissent in a sex discrimination case under Title VII,85 thus
placing the opinion on a somewhat questionable legal footing. The court
held that
women are required to undergo the economic hardship of the disability
which arises from their participation in the procreative experience.
The disability is undisputed and inextricably sex-linked. To isolate
such a disability for less favorable treatment in a scheme purportedly
designed to relieve 36
the economic burden of physical incapacity is
discrimination by sex.
In June 1974, however, the United States Supreme Court decided
Geduldig v. Aiello,37 which appeared to cast doubt on the viability of the
EEOC guidelines and, hence, the rationale of decisions such as Wetzel
and Gilbert. In Geduldig, female employees asserted that California's disability insurance system violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.38 The system, as interpreted by California's intermediate
28. 379 F. Supp. at 989.
29. 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975).
30. 375 F. Supp. at 381.
31. Id. at 376.
32. Id. at 381.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975). For text of this section, see note 10 supra.
34. 375 F. Supp. at 382, citing Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92
(10th Cir. 1973). In Buckley, the Tenth Circuit did not test the validity of the school
system's mandatory maternity leave policy against the "rational basis" standard
enunciated in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ; rather, the court determined that pregnancy - the interest of a woman in having a child - is a fundamental
right. 476 F.2d at 96. The court reasoned that the school's policy impinged upon that
fundamental right in requiring the teacher to choose between employment and pregnancy. The policy was, therefore, unconstitutional since the school demonstrated no
compelling state interest. Id., citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
35. 375 F. Supp. at 386, citing Schattman v. Texas Employ. Comm., 459 F.2d 32,
41 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
36. 375 F. Supp. at 381. The Gilbert court rejected the company's contention
that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage was justified because pregnancy was a voluntary condition and because of the prohibitive costs of including
pregnancy in the disability coverage. Id. at 382. See also Farkas v. South W. City
School Dist., 8 F.E.P. Cas. 288 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd inem., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974).
37. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
38. Id. at 487.
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appellate court, 9 excluded from coverage any disability accompanying
normal pregnancy. 40 Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion, ruled
that the state had legitimate interests in providing an insurance plan that
excluded pregnancy from its coverage. 41 The equal protection clause, the
Court noted, did not require, in the case of social welfare programs, including insurance, "that a State ... choose between attacking every aspect
of a problem or not attacking the problem at all."' 42 Thus, according to the
Geduldig Court, the Constitution did not require that the state subordinate
its legitimate interests solely to create a more comprehensive insurance
program. 43 Further, Justice Stewart reasoned that the California program
44
did not discriminate on the basis of sex in the first instance.
Since Geduldig, at least seven courts, in addition to the Third Circuit,
have had an opportunity to decide whether that decision, in holding that
the California program did not constitute sex discrimination under the
equal protection clause, precluded relief when similar pregnancy disability
39. Rentzer v. California Unemploy. Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108
Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973).
40. Id. at 607, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
41. 417 U.S. at 496. The state had legitimate interests in maintaining the selfsupporting nature of its insurance program; in distributing the available resources in
such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities that were
covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately; and in maintaining the contribution rate at a level that would not unduly burden participating employees. Id.
42. Id. at 495, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
43. 417 U.S. at 496.
44. Id. at 496-97. Justice Stewart explained the nondiscriminatory basis of the
state's insurance plan:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by the
program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of
the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program.
There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In footnote 20 of the Geduldig opinion, Justice Stewart explained further the notion that the state's program involved no sex-based discrimination:
The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry from cases
like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender
but merely removes one physical condition - pregnancy - from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sexbased classification like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra.
Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis,
just as with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program
thus accrue to members of both sexes.
417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

93

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 9

1975-1976]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

623

policies were challenged under Title VII.45 Of these courts, only one has
held that Geduldig precluded such a challenge under Title VII. 40
45. The decisions include: Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist No. 7, 519
F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Oct. 10,
1975) (No. 75-568); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975) ; Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp.
784 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580
(N.D. Cal. 1974) ; Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) ;
Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp. 679,
rev'd, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S.
June 19, 1975) (No. 74-1601).
In Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Paar, 227 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa
1975), the Iowa Supreme Court, in a sex discrimination case, construed that state's
fair employment practices act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6 (1975), which is similar to
Title VII. The Paar court relied upon the district court opinions in Wetzel and
Gilbert, and rejected the argument that, in light of Geduldig, employers did not commit
sex discriminatioin in denying pregnancy disability benefits or maintaining maternity
leave policies different from ordinary sick leave. 227 N.W.2d at 492-94.
46. Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No. 74-1601). The district court
reasoned that footnote 20 of the Geduldig opinion (see note 44 supra) was the key to
the Supreme Court's holding in that case. 379 F. Supp. at 681. While the plaintiffs,
and the EEOC as amicus curiae, argued that Geduldig was inapplicable to a case
brought under Title VII, the district court concluded:
The flaw in this argument is that it begs the question. The threshold question is whether disparity of treatment between pregnancy related disabilities and
other disabilities can be classified as discrimination because of sex (or gender).
If, as footnote 20 seems to suggest, it cannot be so classified, then the further
question of whether such disparity is justified - or less justifiable in the employment context than in some other context - can never be reached.
Id. at 682; see Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 968
(9th Cir. 1975) (Schnack, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3285
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1975) (No. 75-568) ; Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 668
(4th Cir.) (Widener, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975); Richards v.
Omaha Public Schools, ___ Neb .....

232 N.W.2d 29 (1975).

In Richards, a female

teacher charged that sex discrimination was being practiced against her in violation of
Nebraska's fair employment act. Nu. REv. STAT. § 48-1104 (1968). The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that a sick leave policy which provided no benefits for disability
occurring while the employee was on leave of absence for any purpose, including
maternity, was not an unlawful practice, and that a maternity leave policy which
required that leave for teachers begin at the start of a semester was not unlawful. _
Neb. at _, 232 N.W.2d at 33. The Richards court discussed Wetzel, but declined to
follow the Third Circuit's reasoning, observing that certiorari had been granted in
that case. Id. at ___ 232 N.W.2d at 32. Finally, the Richards court relied upon the
analysis in Geduldig, especially footnote 20 of that opinion, and concluded that "a
classification based on pregnancy is not a classification based on sex. Such a classification distinguishes between pregnant women and all other men and women." Id.
at _, 232 N.W.2d at 32, citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Notwithstanding the reasoning of the district court and Richards, the Second
Circuit in Communications Workers reversed, cautioning that "general expressions"
in Supreme Court opinions, especially those found in footnotes or other "marginalia,"
transposed to other facts, were often misleading. 513 F.2d at 1028. Moreover, the
issue in Communications Workers, as framed by the court, was one, not of constitutional analysis, as in Geduldig, but of statutory interpretation of an act of Congress
promulgated under the commerce clause. Id. at 1031. Thus, the court declined to
recognize a requirement that discriminatory practices forbidden by Title VII should
be limited to practices violative of the equal protection clause. Id., citing Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 44 U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S.
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It was within this historical context that the Third Circuit decided
Wetzel. Having concluded that the district court properly had jurisdiction
over the claim, 47 the Third Circuit addressed itself to the question posed
after Geduldig :48 namely, whether the Supreme Court's holding that California's program, which denied disability payments to pregnant women,
was not sex-based discrimination under the equal protection clause, a fortiori disposed of plaintiff's claim under Title VII. Judge Staley, writing
for the court, distinguished Geduldig on a number of bases. First, Geduldig
was a case decided under the equal protection clause, whereas the case at
bar was one of statutory interpretation. 49 Thus, the Wetzel court decided
that it "need not attempt to balance public social welfare interests with the
Mar. 23, 1976) ; Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa
1975) ; and Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
47. Initially, a matter of jurisdiction and procedure under Title VII detained
the court. 511 F.2d at 202-03. Under Title VII, one who charges discrimination in
terms or conditions of employment may not sue until he or she has exhausted all
administrative remedies; hence, filing a complaint with the EEOC is a prerequisite
to suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974). In characterizing her claim on the charge form filed with the EEOC, plaintiff had erroneously
checked the box marked "terms and conditions," instead of the box marked
"benefits." The company urged that, as a result, the plaintiff's claim relating to
pregnancy benefits had not been presented to the EEOC, thus precluding suit on that
issue in federal court. 511 F.2d at 202. The court rejected the company's argument,
reasoning that the private litigant played an important role in the enforcement of
Title VII because the EEOC did not have wide powers of enforcement. The court

concluded that because enforcement of Title VII was vested exclusively in the federal
courts, the rights of a private party must not be barred by procedural technicalities.
Id. at 202. Thus, plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisite when she timely
filed a charge with the EEOC and received and acted on the EEOC notice of the right
to sue. Id. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement that court actions
under Title VII are de novo; hence, a complainant is not restricted to "those charges
as to which the Commission has made a finding of reasonable cause." Id. at 203,
quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
It has been said that the purposes of section 2000e-5(e) of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended (Supp. IV, 1974), regarding the filing of
charges with the EEOC, are: 1) to provide notice to the charged party; 2) to bring
to bear the voluntary compliance and conciliation functions of the EEOC; and 3) to
permit the EEOC to determine the adequacy of the charge. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969). The Bowe court further explained, in
seeming contradiction to the liberal position of the Wetzel court, that "the charge
determines the scope of the alleged violation and thereby serves to narrow the issues
for prompt adjudication and decision." Id. at 720 (footnote omitted). The Fifth
Circuit, however, anticipated the Wetzel court's reasoning in regard to jurisdiction
and procedure under Title VII:
"For a lay-initiated proceeding it would be out of keeping with the Act to import
common law pleading niceties to this 'charge,' or in turn to hog-tie the subsequent
lawsuit to any such concepts. All that is required is that it give sufficient information to enable EEOC to see what the grievance is all about."
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1969), quoting
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 30 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968). See also King v.
Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 679-82.
48. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text supra.
49. 511 F.2d at 203.
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Constitution."5 Second, the insurance program upheld in Geduldig differed from Liberty Mutual's, in that California's program covered certain
pregnancy-related disabilities, excluding only normal pregnancy disability
from benefits, while Liberty Mutual's income protection plan excluded all
pregnancy-related disabilities. 51 Consequently, Judge Staley concluded that
52
Geduldig was not dispositive of the issues raised before the Wetzel court.
The court next engaged in an analysis of the legislative history of Title
VII and discerned a congressional intent to eliminate any artificial or
arbitrary impediment to employment.5 3 The court acknowledged the peculiar background of the sex provisions in Title VII, 5 4 but observed that,
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 203-04.
53. Id. at 204, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); and H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963).
54. 511 F.2d at 204. Originally, the Civil Rights bill reported by the House
Judiciary Committee contained four bases of proscribed discrimination in employment
practices: race, color, religion, and national origin. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963). Representative Howard Smith of Virginia made an unsuccessful
attempt to include "sex" as one of the proscribed bases of discrimination while the
bill was before the House Rules Committee. 20 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 344 (1964).
Thereafter, Representative Smith offered an amendment on the House floor to include
"sex" as a proscribed basis. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). Because he was a leading
opponent of the Civil Rights bill, Representative Smith's action in proposing to ban
discrimination in employment practices on the basis of sex was widely viewed as an
attempt to enlist additional opposition to the bill, or to "clutter up" the bill. Id. at
2581 (remarks of Representative Green) ; see Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in
American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968) ; Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 880-84 (1967); Comment,
supra note 47, at 676-77. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 431 (1966). Floor debate on the Smith amendment further
indicated the insincerity of the southern Congressmen who supported the amendment.
110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964) (introductory remarks of Representative Smith); id. at
2583 (remarks of Representatives Tuten and Rivers); also id. at 2577 (humoring
remarks of Representative Celler of New York). Moreover, the Smith amendment
was opposed by certain Congresswomen who had been vigorous supporters of other
legislation designed to eliminate sex discrimination in employment. Congresswoman
Green argued that the main purpose of the Civil Rights bill was to end race discrimination, and that the Smith amendment would probably be used by opponents of
the bill who supported the Smith amendment to destroy Title VII. 110 CONG. Irc.
2581 (1964). Because there had been "not one word of testimony" before the House
Judiciary Committee or the House Committee on Education and Labor concerning
the bill, id. at 2582, the Congresswoman argued that "[its] full implications could
not have been understood." Id. at 2720. See also id. at 2584. She concluded:
[I]f this amendment . . . were being considered by itself, and it were brought
to the floor with no hearings and no testimony, such a piece of legislation would
not receive 100 votes. In fact, it probably would be laughed off the floor by
some of the gentlemen who this week are seemingly giving it its strongest support,
some of whom are openly and honestly seeking to kill the entire bill.
In making jokes and introducing some very irrelevant amendments, have we
so soon forgotten the James Meredith's, the Medgar Evers - yes, and Prince

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/9

96

Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21

since Congress had had an opportunity in 197255 to make changes in Title
VII, and had made no substantive changes regarding sex discrimination,
Congress was satisfied with the operation and administration of the Act. 56
Moreover, the Wetzel court adopted a broad reading of the statute, noting
Edward County where for 5 long years there was no public school door open to
any child who happened to be born a Negro?
Id. at 2720-21. For subsequent reflections by Representatives Green and Smith on
the sex amendment, see Miller, supra at 883 n.34.
Nevertheless, the amendment was adopted. 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964). The
bill, as passed by the House, did not go through normal committee procedure in the
Senate. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3001

[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Hence, there were no Senate committee
reports on the bill. While it appears that Senator Dirksen, a leading proponent of
the Civil Rights legislation, intended to remove the sex provision when the bill reached
the Senate, he was dissuaded as a result of intervention by Mrs. Lyndon Johnson.
Comment, supra note 47, at 678 n.44. None of the changes made by the Senate on
the House bill dealt with the sex provisions, and the House subsequently voted to
accept the Senate amendments without change. 110 CONG. Rc. 15896-97 (1964).
See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 11.
Thus, it is difficult to discern any legislative intent with respect to the ban on sex

discrimination in employment. Indeed, it has been asserted that "the sex provisions
of Title VII can be viewed more as an accidental result of political maneuvering than
as a clear expression of congressional intent to bring equal job opportunities to women."
Miller, supra at 883-84. But see Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity
and Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. L. REV. 326, 337 (1971)

(it is untrue that the sex discrimination provision in Title VII was Representative
Smith's joke contrived to hurt racial minorities). Miller qualified his statement,
however, by observing that successful passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1970) during the previous congressional session demonstrated that Congress
was willing "to respond to the demand for fairer treatment of women. Accordingly,
it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on the particular circumstances in
which the ban on sex discrimination was passed." Miller, supra at 884-85. Another
writer urged that the sex discrimination provisions "were the product of serious legislative purpose." Comment, supra note 47, at 677. Indeed, it has been asserted that
"it would be a most serious error to attribute to Congress as a corporate unit the
apparently cynical motives of the [Smith] amendment's sponsor." Kanowitz, supra
at 312.
The federal courts of appeals have variously read congressional intent in banning
sex discrimination in employment. Compare Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) ("Congress intended to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes"), with Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publish. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th
Cir. 1975) ("Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription of sexual
discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications"). See also 110 CONG.
REc. 7213 (1964), wherein Senator Clark, one of the floor managers of the Civil Rights
bill in the Senate, stated that "discrimination" had no hidden meanings, but simply
meant "to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor." Id.
55. In 1972, Congress enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq. (1970). Among other things, the 1972 Act extended Title VII's coverage to nonreligious educational institutions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. IV, 1974),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970) ; and broadened the powers of the EEOC and
the Attorney General, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to (f) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) to (e) (1970). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
824 (1972).
56. 511 F.2d at 204. But see note 105 infra.
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that Congress, in passing Title VII, "intended to strike at all discriminatory
57
treatment of men and women."
Addressing itself to the EEOC guidelines, 58 the Wetzel court said
that the guidelines were entitled to great deference, 9 unless they ran contrary to an obvious congressional intent or unless there were compelling
indications that the guidelines were wrong. 60 Unable to identify any indication of congressional conflict with the EEOC guidelines under scrutiny,
the court deferred to them, holding that it was discriminatory to treat
pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities. 61 Judge Staley
rejected Liberty Mutual's argument that it could lawfully treat pregnancy
differently from other disabilities because pregnancy was a voluntary condition. 62 Indeed, the court stated that Liberty Mutual's income protection
plan covered many voluntarily incurred disabilities, 6 3 excluding only a "voluntary"0 4 condition peculiar to one sex. Nor was the court persuaded by
Liberty Mutual's argument that, because its plan covered only disabilities
arising from sickness, the company might exclude pregnancy from coverage
because pregnancy was not a sickness. 65 Pregnancy, the court noted, should
be treated as any other temporary disability: "A woman, disabled by pregnancy, has much in common with a person disabled by a temporary illness." 60 Finally, the court was not convinced that Liberty Mutual's policy
was justified in light of the company's asserted interest in maintaining the
7
financial integrity of the plan.
The court then examined the company's maternity leave policy, which
required a woman on pregnancy leave to return to work within 6 months
57. 511 F.2d at 204, citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
58. For pertinent text of these provisions, see note 10 supra.
59. 511 F.2d at 204, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. 511 F.2d at 205. Indeed, the court remarked:
We feel that the legislative purpose of the Act is furthered by the EEOC
guidelines and that the guidelines are consistent with the plain meaning of the
statute. Mindful that the guidelines are interpretive rules, we will give them
our deference ....
Id., citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61. 511 F.2d at 205-06, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
62. 511 F.2d at 206.
63. Id. The court remarked that disabilities which might result from such voluntary activities as skiing, tennis and handball were covered by the company's income
protection plan, while pregnancy was not covered. Id. Apparently, the court viewed
pregnancy as a hazard of engaging in sexual intercourse, much as a sprained ankle or
back are hazards of engaging in other sports.
64. Id. However, the court noted in passing that pregnancy might not in every
instance be deemed a voluntary condition, given a person's religious convictions or the
methods of contraception used. It commented, "There is no 100% sure method of
contraception." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court observed that the company had offered no statistical information from which the court could conclude "that the increased costs for pregnancy
benefits would be 'devastating.'" Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/9

98

Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21

of termination of employment or 3 months of delivery, whichever came
first.6 8 Again, Judge Staley accorded great deference to the EEOC guidelines,60 and concluded that, under the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII,
the company's policy of distinguishing between employees on sick leave
and those on maternity leave violated Title VII70 "Since appellant provides
leaves for all temporary disabilities, it must also provide leaves for pregnancy on the same basis."'" The court found the leave policy to be grounded
in impermissible generalizations about women employees, i.e., that most
women recovered from childbirth within 6 weeks and that most women did
not return to work after childbirth. 72 The court stated that "[d] iscrimination based on stereotypes or overly categorized distinctions between men
and women are forbidden by Title VII.

'7

3

The court would not consider,

at this stage of the proceeding, the company's proffered defense of "business
necessity," 74 because the defense was not raised at trial.75 Further, the
court observed that the district court had dismissed Liberty Mutual's de68. Id. at 207.
69. Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b), (c)(1975).
70. 511 F.2d at 207.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 207-08.
73. Id. at 208, citing Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969), and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. 511 F.2d at 208. The "business necessity" defense to a charge of discrimination under Title VJI is not specifically set out in Title VII, but is a judicially developed exception'l Title VII. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
the plaintiff-employee contended that an employer had discriminated against him on
the basis of race, in requiring, as a condition of employment, that he pass a standardized
general intelligence test and possess a high school diploma. Chief Justice Burger
explained:
The Act [Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
Id. at 431. The Fourth Circuit subsequently elaborated on the "business necessity"
doctrine in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). In Robinson,
the plaintiffs charged that the employer's seniority system perpetuated a policy of
race discrimination in hiring. The Robinson court reasoned that
the applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for
adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently
compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available
no acceptable alternative policies, or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
racial impact.
Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted). In Robinson, the court rejected as a business necessity
defense the employer's desire to avoid the increased cost of changing the employment
practice. Id. at 800. For a suggestion that an employer, whose disability payments plan
does not cover pregnancy, might urge cost as an overriding business necessity defense
to a charge of sex discrimination, sec Comment, supra note 7, at 138-41.
75. 511 F.2d at 208.
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fense of bona fide occupational qualification, 76 because no evidence had been
7
presented in support of that defense. "
The Wetzel court thus presented an engagingly simple formula for
resolving a question of sex discrimination in employment practices under
Title VII; that is, given that the EEOC guidelines address the employment
practice in issue, unless there is an obvious congressional intent to the
contrary, the court will defer to the guidelines. It is unlikely, however, that
any obvious congressional intent to the contrary or otherwise can ever be
78
shown, regarding the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII.

Hence,

under the Wetael court's formula, the EEOC guidelines are given the status
of law, and consequently, are dignified beyond their original intendment.
76. Unlike the business necessity defense (see note 74 supra), the defense of
"bona fide occupational qualification" is statutorily created. The relevant provision
states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees
...on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1970).
The EEOC guidelines provide:
§ 1604.2 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels - "Men's jobs" and
"Women's jobs" - tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one
sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant
the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions
of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example,
the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable
of assembling intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive
salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be
considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1) (i) - (ii) (1975).
A seminal case construing the defense of bona fide occupational qualification is
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). In Weeks,
the employer declined to hire plaintiff, a woman, for the position of switchman, a
job entailing lifting of weights in excess of 30 pounds, and other strenuous activity;
a switchman was also on call 24 hours a day and was required to work alone during
late night hours. In this context, the court held that the employer had not made out
a satisfactory defense. Id. at 236. The Fifth Circuit relied upon the EEOC guidelines and concluded that if an employer wanted to rely on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense, it would have to prove that it had reasonable cause to believe
"that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved." Id. at 235; see Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Developments in the Law - Employment
Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109,
1176-86 (1971) ; Comment, supra note 47, at 695-705.
77. 511 F.2d at 208.
78. See note 54 supra.
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It is submitted that such a formula is unsatisfactory and should not be
applied.
That the EEOC guidelines should not be so readily embraced by the
court is clear upon several considerations. First, the factual basis of the
1972 guidelines is questionable. Indeed, in declining to follow the EEOC's
guidelines on employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth, 79
the district court in Newmon 80 observed that "there appears to be no factual
basis upon which these regulations were drawn." 8' The insubstantial background of the guidelines was revealed by the Chief of the Legislative Counsel Division of the EEOC,8 2 Ms. Sonia P. Fuentes, in a deposition for the
Newrnon case. She stated that
the EEOC had conducted no medical studies concerning pregnancy
prior to issuing the guidelines, and that she was not aware of any
financial studies conducted concerning the monetary impact of the
guidelines on industry. She testified that she had no expertise in medicine, economics, or labor relations and that she was assisted in drafting
the guidelines by four other people, including two law students. She
also stated that no 83public hearings were held in connection with the
proposed guidelines.
The fact that the proposed guidelines were prepared with neither
published notice nor opportunity for public participation, suggests that the
guidelines were not a product of considered judgment upon substantial
input from those who would be affected by the guidelines.
Secondly, the Wetzel court should have discussed the questionable legal
basis of the guidelines. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act 8
provides that the agency must, inter alia, give general notice of the proposed rulemaking in the FederalRegister before an administrative agency's
regulations become effective. 85 The agency must then give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking86 and to petition for
the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.87 However, the procedural
requirements of section 4 do not apply to "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 88
79. 29 C.F.R. §1604.10 (1975).
80. See text accompanying notes 11-19 supra.
81. 374 F. Supp. at 245.
82. The Office of Legislative Counsel drafted the guidelines in question. Comment,
supra note 7, at 130.

83. Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
85. Id. "Rule making" is 'defined as "agency process for formulating, amending, or
repealing a rule." Id. § 551(.5). "Rule" is defined in part as
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organizati6n,; procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
Id. § 551(4).
86. Id. § 553(c).
87. Id. § 553(e).
88. Id. § 553(b) (3) (A).
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While the EEOC announced that its guidelines were interpretative in
nature,8 9 it appears that the guidelines, which represented a drastic change
from the agency's earlier position,9" may not fit within the interpretative
rule exception. 91 One commentator has even suggested that the EEOC
abused its administrative powers in promulgating the 1972 guidelines. 92
In addition, EEOC guidelines have been the subject of recent judicial
comment. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part
in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 93 criticized the majority's analysis of
a race discrimination case under Title VII, as "based upon a wooden application of EEOC Guidelines. '94 The Chief Justice, who had given "great
deference" to the guidelines in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,95 distinguished
Griggs upon two bases. First, in Griggs, the guidelines interpreted specific
statutory language; and secondly, the interpretation was supported by both
the statute and its legislative history. 96 Hence, in Griggs "there was 'good
reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.' 97 In
Albermarle, however, Chief Justice Burger argued, the guidelines in issue
interpreted no section of Title VII, the EEOC interpretation had no support in legislative history, and the guidelines had not been submitted to
public comment and scrutiny, 98 as provided for in the Administrative Procedure Act. 99 Therefore, the Chief Justice urged that "slavish adherence"
to the guidelines was not required in Albermarle ;100 rather, the guidelines
89. 37 Fed. Reg. 6836 (1972). The Supreme Court recognized that the EEOC
regarded its guidelines as interpretative, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 431 (1975). See note 6 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
91. One court has stated:
An administrative interpretation or interpretative rule is a classification or explanation of existing laws or regulations rather than a substantive modification in or
adoption of new regulations. Substantive legislative rules and regulations "create
law . . . whereas interpretative rules are statements as to what the administrative
officer thinks the statute or regulation means."
Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Del. 1970), quoting Gibson
Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The Continental Oil court
listed four factors to be considered in determining whether a rule is interpretative
and, thus, exempt from the requirements of section 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act: 1) the complexity and pervasiveness of the rules; 2) the drastic changes effected
in existing law; 3) the degree of retroactivity; and 4) the confusion and controversy
created in an attempt to comply with the rule. 317 F. Supp. at 197. Under this
analysis, the 1972 EEOC guidelines relating to pregnancy and employment practices
manifestly appear to be substantive rules creating law, and not mere clarification of
existing law or regulations.
92. Comment, supra note 7, at 131. The Fourth Circuit dismissed this suggestion
in Gilbert, 519 F.2d at 664-65 n.12.
93. 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
94. Id. at 451.
95. 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
96. 422 U.S. at 452.
97. Id., quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
98. 422 U.S. at 452.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
100. 422 U.S. at 452.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/9

102

Editors: Federal Statues and Government Regulation

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21

were "entitled to the same weight as other well-founded testimony by
experts."' 101
10 2
It is submitted that the EEOC guidelines relating to fringe benefits
and employment policies regarding pregnancy and childbirth' 0 3 interpret
no specific statutory language in Title VII other than the general ban on
sex discrimination in terms and conditions of employment, and are not
supported by legislative history; that these guidelines were never submitted
to public comment or scrutiny; and that the theory on which these guidelines apparently were based 10 4 is not beyond dispute. Yet the Wetzel
opinion is a model of "slavish adherence" to the guidelines. It is further
submitted that there was no reason in Wetzel to treat the guidelines as
expressing the will of Congress, and the court can take little comfort in
the fact that Congress made no changes in Title VII in 1972, in connection
with sex discrimination)°5
Moreover, the Wetzel court's analysis of Geduldig v. Aiello, 0 0 while

reaching an apparently sound result, 107 is unsatisfactory. While it is true
that the insurance program in Geduldig can be factually distinguished from
the income protection plan in Wetzel, x0 8 both programs were similar in
one important respect: they denied payments to women disabled by normal
pregnancy. To dismiss Geduldig as inapposite because the Wetzel court
101. Id. Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring in Albermarle, also questioned the
EEOC guidelines. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring). While he acknowledged that
deference is normally due agency statements which are based on its experience and expertise, nevertheless the guidelines in question had "never been subjected to the test
of adversary comment. Nor are the theories on which the guidelines are based beyond
dispute." Id.; cf. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publish. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1975). In Willingham, the Fifth Circuit declined to adhere to the EEOC's position on
dress and grooming codes which was set forth in administrative decisions and regulations. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress' intent in proscribing sex-based
discrimination in employment practices was inconclusive. Therefore, without a stronger
congressional mandate, the court refused to extend Title VII's coverage to situations
of questionable application, regardless of the position adopted in EEOC guidelines.
Id. at 1090.
102. 29 C.F.R. § 1609(a), (b), (e) (1975).
103. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975).
104. The guidelines apparently proceed from the notions that: 1) qualitatively,
pregnancy isno different from a common cold or virus, in its effects on employment
disruption and employee return following recovery; and 2) including pregnancy as a
compensable disability in employee income protection plans will not destroy the plans'
financial integrity.
105. As the Fifth Circuit has explained:
[W]hile it is argued that a lack of change in this section in the 1972 amendments
to the Act evidences Congressional agreement with the position of the E.E.O.C.,
it may be argued with equal force that the law was insufficiently developed at the
time the amendments were considered to support any change.
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975). Congress
enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, amending Title VII, on March 24,
1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972),
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970). The 1972 EEOC guidelines were promulgated on April 5, 1972. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1 et seq. (1975).
106. See notes 37-44 and accompanying test supra.
107. See notes 120 & 121 infra, for cases reaching the same result as Wetiel.
108. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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was "not faced with an insurance program similar to Aiello's"'109 is unconvincing at best.
The Third Circuit distinguished Geduldig on an additional basis. In
Geduldig, the insurance program was tested against the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, while the program in Wetzel was
measured against Title VII's proscription of sex discrimination. 110 However, the court's dismissal of Geduldig suggested a casual approach to the
implications of that decision, and an insensitivity to the larger problem
of whether the equal protection clause and Title VII embody fungible
standards. Indeed, it is submitted that, while the insurance program was
discussed in the context of an equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court
did not sustain sex discrimination in Geduldig as rationally related to
legitimate state interests. Rather, the Court said there was no sex discrimination in the first instance."' Had the Court determined that the
pregnancy classification constituted sex discrimination, but was permissible
because rationally related to legitimate state interests, the insurance program would clearly have been tested against equal protection standards.
Because there was no sex discrimination, it is not entirely certain that the
Court in Geduldig ever tested the insurance program against the fourteenth
amendment.
The Wetzel court ignored as well the well-reasoned opinions of four
district courts which had previously considered the impact of Geduldig
on cases in which employees attacked pregnancy disability plans under Title
VII. 1 2 Nor did the Wetzel court discuss the possibility that, under the
109. 511 F.2d at 203.
110. The Wetzel court remarked: "In this posture our case is one of statutory
interpretation rather than one of constitutional analysis." Id.
111. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
112. In Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379
F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 513 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No. 74-1601), the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York placed great emphasis upon Mr.
Justice Stewart's discussion in footnote 20 of Geduldig (see note 44 supra), and
concluded that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance simply was not
discrimination on the basis of sex. 379 F. Supp. at 682. On the other hand, in
Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974), the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California read Geduldig narrowly.
The Vineyard court viewed Title VII as a congressional enactment to implement the
dictates of the equal protection clause. As implementing legislation, the court reasoned
that Title VII reached more broadly than the equal protection clause itself. Additionally, under Title VII, the court was not required to go through the balancing process
required in Geduldig. Id. at 584-85. In Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765
(M.D. Tenn. 1974), a different approach was taken by the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee. The Satty court viewed Title VII as an enactment by Congress under the commerce clause to establish standards for conduct
affecting interstate commerce. Since Title VII standards went beyond the standard
of "reasonableness" traditionally applied to the states under the equal protection
clause, Geduldig was held to be inapplicable to a Title VII case. Id. at 768-71.
Finally, in Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa
1975), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa held that
Title VII prohibited a broader range of practices than the equal protection clause.
Id. at 787. The Sale court cited Congress' wide authority under the commerce clause
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commerce clause n" and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,1 1 4 Congress
might proscribe discriminatory conduct by a private employer, while such
conduct, if engaged in by a state, would not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court failed to consider the fact
that, in past cases brought under the equal protection clause, many courts
have incorporated Title VII and the EEOC guidelines into the fourteenth
amendment, 115 and, on the other hand, in cases brought under Title VII,
courts have incorporated fourteenth amendment reasoning into Title VII. 11
Although it has been contended that Congress' intent in proscribing
sex discrimination in Title VII cannot be clearly discerned, the explanation
of Title VII by Senator Clark, floor manager of the 1964 Civil Rights bill
in the Senate, is illuminating:
It [Title VII] would establish a legislative civil right for what has
always been a sacred American constitutional right, the right to equal
protection of the laws. That phrase does not come from the commerce
and its authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation to
proscribe private forms of discrimination. Id.; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Heart of
Atlanta, Mr. Justice Douglas asserted that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, exercised its power under both the commerce clause and section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 286; see id. at 293 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
114. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
115. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Davis v.
Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs in Douglas and Davis claimed
their fifth amendment rights had been violated. Douglas v. Hampton, supra at 979;
Davis v. Washington, supra at 957. The equal protection requirement applies to the
actions of the federal government through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Walston v. County School Bd., 492
F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d
70 (4th Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972). See also Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications
and the Definition of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REv. 441, 464, 467 (1975).
In his dissent in Geduldig, Justice Brennan relied upon the 1972 EEOC guidelines under Title VII to support his view that California's insurance program constituted sex discrimination proscribed by the equal protection clause. 417 U.S. at 502
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. The district court in the instant case, for example, observed that Title VII
standards are "more compelling" on a private employer than equal protection standards
are upon state action, but nevertheless relied upon equal protection clause cases dealing
with pregnancy. 372 F. Supp. at 1159-60, citing, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School
Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973) ; Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629
(2d Cir. 1973). In Gilbert, the district court also cited Buckley in support of its
analysis under Title VII. 375 F. Supp. at 382.
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behind it is the philosophy behind the fair
clause, but the philosophy1 17
employment practicestitle.

Given this explanation, and considering that much of the congressional
debate on Title VII focused on the equal protection clause, 118 it is not unreasonable to suggest that Congress intended only to prohibit practices by
private employers which would be impermissible under the equal protection
clause if pursued by a state.119 This suggestion has been rejected by three
district courts, 2 0 and three circuit courts of appeals in addition to the Third
Circuit.12 ' Thus, the Wetzel court's dismissal of Geduldig is in line with
the weight of authority; nonetheless, in declining to consider in any meaningful way the issue of fungible standards under Title VII and the fourteenth amendment, the court's abbreviated analysis produced an undistinguished precedent.
The Wetzel court was the first circuit court of appeals to limit Geduldig
in the Title VII context, and to accept the 1972 guidelines relating to pregnancy disability policy and maternity leave. The Second, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits have subsequently relied upon Wetzel in factually indistinguishable cases ;122 the Fifth Circuit has cited Wetzel in support of its
117. 110 CONG. REC. 13080 (1964) (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., id. at 12619 (remarks of Senator Muskie); id. at 2580 (remarks of Representative Griffiths).
119. One author has suggested that, in the absence of precise statutory language and legislative history for guidance' in interpretation, the EEOC should
treat discrimination under Title VII so as to conform with national policies
developed in other areas, i.e., the equal protection area. "In this regard, the
considerable tolerance in our Constitution for the numerous state laws classifying
persons on the basis of sex must be considered." Miller, supra note 54, at 897.
120. See Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D.
Iowa 1975); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Vineyard v. Hollister Elem. School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
121. Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1975) (No. 75-568) ;
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36
(1975); Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d
1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975)
(No. 74-1601). In Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff challenged Georgia's bar examination under the equal protection clause, and relied upon
EEOC guidelines and Title VII decisions in support of his charge of race discrimination. The Fifth Circuit rejected the facile equation of Title VII and the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 1098-99, citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.) cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975);
Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No.
74-1601); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated,
44 U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
122. Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1975) (No. 75-568)
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,96 S. Ct. 36 (1975)
Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No.
74-1601).
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holding, in an equal protection context, that the fourteenth amendment and
Title VII do not embody fungible standards. 12 Wetzel's impact has thus
been substantial, but whether that impact be characterized as a squall or a
24
slow and steady rain remains to be forecasted by the Supreme Court.'
Frederick T. Haase, Jr.
123. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1975).
124. See note 4 supra.
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